DUKE 

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THE  RELATION  OF  JOHN  LOCKE 
TO  ENGLISH  DEISM 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 
CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 


THE  BAKER  & TAYLOR  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK 

THE  CAMBRIDGE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON  AND  EDINBURGH 

THE  MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA 

TOKTO,  OSAKA,  KYOTO,  FUKUOKA,  SENDAI 

THE  MISSION  BOOK  COMPANY 


SHANGHAI 


THE 


RELATION  of  JOHN  LOCKE 

. 

TO  ENGLISH  DEISM 

) 


By 

S.  G.  HEFELBOWER 


Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Washburn  College 
Topeka,  Kansas 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 
CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 


Copyright  1918  By 
The  University  of  Chicago 


All  Rights  Reserved 


Published  December  1918 


Composed  and  Printed  By 
The  University  of  Chicago  Press 
Chicago,  Illinois,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 


Ha.3. 

H4(ci"R 


Probably  all  students  of  English  thought  of  the 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  recognize  some  sort 
of  relation  between  John  Locke  and  English  Deism,  but 
they  differ  as  to  how  they  are  related.  Some  writers 
make  him  a part  of  the  movement,  others  consider  him 
its  father,  and  several  of  the  leading  historians  of  philos- 
ophy merely  note  the  fact  that  there  is  some  relation 
without  defining  it. 

This  monograph  undertakes  to  show  that  these 
statements  are  wrong  or  inadequate,  and  that  Locke  and 
English  Deism  are  related  as  co-ordinate  parts  of  the 
larger  progressive  movement  of  the  age . 

When  widely  accepted  historical  opinions  are  chal- 
lenged, proof  of  the  thesis  to  be  established  should  be 
made  accessible  to  the  reader  and  should  be  as  complete 
as  possible.  Accordingly  the  book  is  to  a great  extent 
a tediously  detailed  marshaling  of  evidence. 

The  discussion  of  the  belief  in  Providence  and  the 
statement  of  the  attitude  of  the  progressive  leaders 
toward  toleration  in  the  fifth  chapter  do  not  contribute 
to  the  solution  of  the  problem.  The  former  is  introduced 
here  because  it  is  generally  believed  that  the  “absentee 
God”  was  a characteristic  of  Deism,  which  it  was  not; 
and  the  presentation  of  the  latter  is  necessary  because 
some  writers  use  it  to  prove  that  Locke  was  a Deist, 
which  it  does  not  prove. 

The  quotations  from  Locke  are  from  Fraser’s  edition 
of  the  Essay  and  from  the  tenth  edition  of  his  works. 

S.  G.  H. 


351598 


Topeka,  Kansas 
June,  1918 


v 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/relationofjohnlo01hefe 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  Introduction i 

1.  The  Remote  Historical  Background i 

2.  English  Thought  in  the  Seventeenth  Century  . 6 

3.  The  Problem 11 

4.  Possible  Solutions 12 

II.  Solutions  of  the  Problem  That  Have  Been  Offered  i 7 

1.  In  the  Histories  of  Philosophy  and  Related  Studies  17 

2.  In  the  Special  Study  by  Crous 24 

3.  Resume 27 

III.  The  Method 31 

1.  A Possible  Source  of  Error  in  the  Genetic  Method  . 31 

2.  The  Nature  of  the  Problem  Determines  the  Method  32 

3.  The  Method  Indicated  for  This  Problem  ....  33 

4.  Result  of  This  Study  of  Method 42 

IV.  The  Two  Focal  Concepts 43 

1.  Origin  of  the  Two  Focal  Concepts  of  Rationalistic- 

Critical  Speculation 45 

2.  The  Use  of  the  Concept  of  Nature 50 

A.  The  Rational  Theologians 50 

B.  The  Philosophers 53 

C.  The  Deists 57 

D.  Conclusion 61 

3.  The  Use  of  the  Concept  of  Reason 63 

A.  The  Rational  Theologians 64 

B.  The  Philosophers 67 

C.  The  Deists 74 

D.  Conclusion 78 

vii 

351593 


viii  Contents 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

V.  The  Main  Points  in  the  Religious  Discussions  of 
this  Period 83 

1.  Concerning  God 83 

A.  Proofs  of  the  Existence  of  God 83 

B.  The  Relation  of  God  to  the  World  ....  90 

a)  Providence 90 

b)  Miracles 94 

2.  Revelation  and  Scripture 10 1 

3.  Religion 116 

A.  The  Importance  of  Natural  Religion  . . . .117 

a)  The  Rational  Theologians  118 

b)  The  Philosophers 120 

c)  The  Deists 126 

B.  Religion  Defined  as  Morality 133 

4.  Toleration 141 

VI.  Direct  Evidence  of  the  Relation  of  the  English 
Deists  to  Locke 151 

1.  Locke’s  Influence  in  England  after  1688  ....  151 

2.  The  Temporal  Relation  of  Locke  and  the  Deists  . 153 

3.  Direct  Evidence  of  Locke’s  Influence  on  the  Deists  154 

A.  Toland 156 

B.  Collins 159 

C.  Tindal 160 

D.  Wollaston 165 

E.  Bolingbroke 165 

F.  Morgan 167 

4.  Conclusion 169 

VII.  Conclusion 172 

1.  Resume 172 

2.  Definition  and  Comparison  of  Locke’s  Religious  Opin- 
ions and  Deism 176 

3.  Theories  Tested  by  Facts 178 

Index 187 


CHAPTER  I 


INTRODUCTION 

I.  THE  REMOTE  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND 

The  problem  concerning  the  relation  of  John  Locke 
and  English  Deism  arises  out  of  a situation  that  had  been 
developing  slowly  for  a long  time.  A full  account  of  its 
origin  would  lead  us  back  centuries  to  the  beginnings  of 
the  New  Learning  in  Italy.  The  scene  had  shifted, 
other  interests  had  appeared ; but  the  dominant  motives 
were  essentially  the  same.  In  the  political,  the  social, 
the  religious,  the  philosophical,  and  the  scientific  strife 
and  movements  of  this  time  we  have  the  age-old  struggle 
of  humanity  for  freedom.  Man  is  so  constituted  that 
awareness  of  limitations  is  felt  as  a perpetual  challenge 
to  throw  them  off.  Men  felt  this  in  Italy  in  the  thir- 
teenth century;  they  were  conscious  of  it  in  England  in 
the  seventeenth  century;  the  resulting  movements 
differ  because  conditions  had  changed. 

When  the  Renaissance  dawned  in  Italy,  it  did  not 
find  the  general  confusion  that  we  often  associate  with 
the  Middle  Ages.  On  the  contrary,  the  civilization  at 
that  time  was  strongly  organized.  There  was  one  cen- 
tral authority  that  dominated  everything  everywhere. 
Henry  IV  defied  it,  and  in  order  to  carry  out  his  political 
plans  he  found  it  necessary  to  make  peace  with  Pope 
Hildebrand  at  Canossa.  Abelard  was  condemned  by 
councils,  and  he  was  imprisoned  and  his  books  were 


2 John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

burned  because  his  views  were  not  approved.  In  the 
period  of  the  Renaissance  we  see  the  same  centralized, 
authority  dictating  what  men  should  think.  Pompo- 
nazzi  cEangedTlisAeaching  concerning  immortality,  fear- 
ing the  anathema  of  Leo  X;  Bruno  was  burned;  Galileo 
denied  scientific  conclusions  to  escape  a like  fate. 
Ecclesiastical  authority  approved  and  established  sys- 
tems of  philosophy  and  theories  of  the  universe;  and 
to”  think  differently  was  a sin  against  God,  punishable 
by  his  vicegerent  upon  earth.  Of  course  such  a con- 
dition could  not  last;  it  must  break  down  sooner  or 
later,  for  “the  thrust  and  kick  of  life”  is  felt  also  in  the 
realm  of  man’s  spiritual  interests,  and  whatever  hinders 
here  becomes  intolerable.  But  men  of  the  late  Middle 
Ages  probably  did  not  feel  the  hampering  conditions 
under  which  they  lived  as  keenly  as  we  might  think, 
for  the  horizon  of  life’s  interests  was  narrow,  and 
religion  was  their  chief  concern:  the  value  of  things 
here  was  estimated  largely  in  terms  of  the  life  to 
come. 

But  a new  spirit  was  making  itself  felt;  at  the 
beginning  of  the  fourteenth  century  Dante  drew  mate- 
rials for  his  masterpiece  from  classical  as  well  as  from 
biblical  sources,  and  even  acknowledged  Virgil  to  be  his 
teacher  and  master.  And  a generation  later  Petrarch 
was  largely  instrumental  in  starting  that  contagious 
enthusiasm  for  all  things  of  the  ancient  Roman  and 
Grecian  civilizations  which  resulted  in  raising  up  a body 
of  men  who  loved  learning  for  its  own  sake,  and  in  giving 
European  culture  another  center.  Along  with  this 
growing  interest  in  the  humanities  there  also  developed 
a scientific  impulse.  As  early  as  the  thirteenth  century 


Introduction 


3 


Roger  Bacon  had  a fairly  clear  grasp  of  scientific 
methods,  and  characterized  scholastic  disputes  as  vain 
battles  of  words.  Two  hundred  years  later  the  Aris- 
totelian cosmology  collapsed  before  the  new  science. 
Man’s  horizon  grew;  he  learned  to  know  himself  as  a 
citizen  of  this  world,  and  to  think  of  the  earth  as  a 
little  member  of  the  great  universe.  Conflict  was 
inevitable;  it  was  as  if  he  were  dethroning  God  and 
reverting  to  paganism.  The  wine  of  the  new  learn- 
ing burst  the  old  bottles  of  authoritatively  given 
systems. 

In  the  northern  country  the  Renaissance  was  soon 
accompanied  by  the  Reformation;  or,  if  you  prefer,  it 
soon  became  the  Reformation.  There  were,  of  course, 
many  and  varied  motives  that  helped  to  determine  that 
complex  movement  of  the  sixteenth  century;  but  it 
was  fundamentally  a revolt  against  human  authority 
in  matters  of  religion.  As  Luther  put  it:  If  a man  is 
to  be  persecuted  for  his  religious  opinions,  the  hangman 
is  the  best  theologian.1 

This  was  a logical  deduction  from  the  right  of  private 
judgment,  which  was  a basal  principlFoflTTT^Tdkrma- 
tion.  Unfortunately  this  was  to  remain  but  an  ideal 
for  another  hundred  years;  that  is,  liberty  of  thought 
was  the  privilege  only  of  those  who  had  power  to  assert 
it.  The  new  learning  and  the  new  religious  movement 
were  so  entangled  in  the  seesaw  of  the  fortunes  of 
political  and  personal  interests  on  the  Continent  and  in 
England  that  this  toleration,  which  they  had  promised, 
remained,  in  part  at  least,  unrealized.  The  English 

1 Luther’s  Werke  (Weimar  Ausgabe),  VI,  455. 


4 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


statute  of  1400,  which  decreed  death  at  the  stake  for 
heretics,  yielded  to  the  new  spirit  in  1533;  but  it  was 
re-enacted  under  Mary  and,  nominally  at  least  and 
sometimes  actually,  continued  in  force  until  1676.1 
Even  as  late  as  1648  Puritan  zeal  for  orthodox  belief 
caused  an  ordinance  to  be  passed  which  made  anyone 
liable  to  the  death  penalty  “who  denied  the  Trinity, 
Christ’s  Divinity,  the  inspiration  of  the  scriptures,  or  a 
future  state,”  and  set  prison  penalties  for  other  heresies.2 
Fortunately  this  act  did  not  result  in  persecution  unto 
death.  But  in  those  troubled  times  in  England,  about 
the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  lot  of  the 
confessor  of  a disapproved  dogma  was  very  uncertain; 
thousands  of  clergymen  were  thrown  out  of  their  pulpits 
because  they  did  not  agree  with  the  party  in  power; 
and,  judging  from  the  successive  changes  at  Oxford, 
academic  freedom  was  far  from  realization.3 

However  the  right  to  private  opinion  was  more  and 
more  recognized.  | Protestantism,  in  its  appeal  from 
papal  authority,  recognized  the  right  of  appealy  and  this 
was  resulting  in  greater  freedom  of  thought. I In  .the 
seventeenth  century  Holland  in  particular  was  the  land 
of  liberty,  the  place  where  Arminians  and  Socinians  and 
Racovians  lived  and  taught  with  practically  no  restraints. 
And  in  England  many  leaders  had  appeared  who  forsook 
the  beaten  paths,  and  yet  were  undisturbed.  Important 
independent  religious  movements,  more  or  less  organ- 
ized, were  able  to  grow  up  and  continue.  Compared 
with  almost  all  other  countries,  England  was  a land  of 

1 J.  B.  Bury,  History  of  Freedom  of  Thought  (London,  1913),  p.  59. 

2 Ibid.,  pp.  79-86. 

3 H.  R.  F.  Bourne,  Life  of  John  Locke  (London,  1876),  I,  27  £f. 


Introduction 


5 


liberty.  And  yet  with  that  liberty  often  went  persecu- 
tion. As  Blount,  quoting  another  in  the  dedicatorial 
letter  to  his  Religio  Laid,  very  aptly  expressed  it: 
“Every  opinion  makes  a sect,  every  sect  a faction:  and 
every  faction  (when  it  is  able)  a war:  and  every  such 
war  is  the  cause  of  God : and  the  cause  of  God  can  never 
be  prosecuted  with  too  much  violence.” 

It  seems  almost  impossible  that  Protestantism 
should  have  been  untrue  to  its  fundamental  principle, 
that  liberty  of  thought  should  be  denied  by  the  party 
in  power.  And  yet  it  is  not  so  strange  when  we  consider 
all  the  circumstances.  (Europe  had  long  been  schooled 
in  the  right  of  mighty  jand  it  unlearned  the  lesson  slowly. 
There  was  the  usual  inertia  of  hoary  tradition,  and  the 
necessity  of  self-defense  against  those  who  would  crush 
all  who  differed  from  them  in  religious  matters;  and 
what  more  complete  defense  than  to  overwhelm  any  who 
would  steal  away  their  hard-won  liberties ! F urthermore, 
the  strife  and  stress  of  theological  controversies  mingled 
with  political  conflicts  required  creedal  definitions  and 
the  formation  of  systems  of  divinity.  And  once  these 
were  made  it  was  easy  to  be  intolerantly  loyal  to  one's 
own  religious  beliefs.  Perhaps  it  was  necessary  to 
defend  them;  and,  ere  they  realized  it,  the  anomalous 
condition  of  Protestant  intolerance  was  a fact.  When 
those  confessions  and  systems  became  authoritative 
standards  of  types  of  religious  conviction  and  eccle- 
siastical organization,  we  have  the  age  of  dogmatism, 
when  the  spontaneous,  living,  inquiring  spirit  of  the 
Reformation  is  replaced  by  dead  orthodoxy.  However, 
this  hampered  the  development  of  religious  thought  less 
in  England  than  in  Germany. 


6 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


2.  ENGLISH  THOUGHT  IN  THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY 

The  century  of  the  Stuarts  and  the  Commonwealth 
was  a turbulent  time  of  beginnings.  Much  that  is  best 
in  England  today  can  be  traced  to  this  age.  The  old 
order,  stubbornly  resisting  every  change,  was  slowly 
yielding  to  the  new;  and  the  waning,  outlived  notions  in 
the  various  fields  of  interest  mingled  with  the  ideals  that 
marked  the  opening  of  another  epoch  in  England’s 
history.  TLp  rHylnp  tight  of  Mags  was  crumbling;  the 
Laudian  scheme,  which  “was  to  exterminate  all  individu- 
ality and  freedom  of  conscience”  and  to  enthrone 
“Prelatic  tyranny”  was  becoming  impossible.1  The 
struggle  for  liberty  was  slowly  getting  the  victory.  In 
science  and  philosophy  a new  spirit  was  moving;  men 
were  turning  from  ancient  masters  to  nature  herself  to 
learn  of  nature’s  ways — the  Baconian  method  was 
gaining  followers.  In  the  forties  a group  of  interested 
scholars  met  weekly  in  London  to  foster  experimental 
investigation.  This  is  probably  what  Boyle  called  “the 
invisible  college,”  which  later  became  the  Royal  Society.2 
Sydenham  founded  the  new  study  of  medicine  on  induc- 
tive methods  in  England,  and  Boyle  practically  revolu- 
tionized chemistry  by  championing  “the  empirical 
method  in  chemistry  against  the  Alchemist.  ”3 

But  still  a great  deal  of  serious  thinking  moved  in  the 
old  scholastic  ruts:  When  the  Protestant  theologians 
made  their  confessions  and  theological  systems,  they 

1 John  Tulloch,  English  Puritanism  and  Its  Leaders  (London,  1861), 
p.  179. 

2 C.  R.  Weld,  History  of  the  Royal  Society  (London,  1848),  I,  chap.  ii. 

3 H.  Hoffding,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy  (London,  1900),  I,  378. 


Introduction 


7 


used  the  thought-forms,  that  is  the  philosophy,  of  the 
age;  and  in  doing  this  they  were  conservative,  as  theolo- 
gians generally  were;  they  chose  for  the  most  part  the 
old  and  accepted  formulas  of  the  traditional  systems. 
Thus  the  metaphysical  background  of  most  English 
theology  of  this  period  was  drawn  from  scholasticism. 
Now  “men  had  become  weary  of  Protestant  scholas- 
ticism.”1 Toland’s  calling  it  a “scholastic  jargon”  was 
not  altogether  the  hostile  gibe  of  an  unsympathetic 
critic.2  In  fact  Protestant  theologians  everywhere 
simply  used  the  philosophical  concepts  that  had  been 
handed  down  to  them  from  the  former  period.  “The 
Reformation  produced  no  immediate  change  in 
philosophy.”3 

Descartes  was  taught  scholastic  philosophy  at  La 
Fleche ; but  this  was  to  be  expected  in  a Roman  Catholic 
school.  Bacon  never  wearies  of  exhibiting  scholastic 
systems  and  methods  as  the  great  obstacles  to  progress. 
Philosophy  was  in  ill  repute  because  it  concerned  itself 
“in  a multitude  of  barking  questions,  fruitful  of  con- 
troversy, but  barren  of  effect.”  One  of  the  “distempers 
of  learning”  was  the  “contentious”  learning,  which 
must  be  removed  if  we  are  ever  to  advance.  Even  when 
Locke  studied  at  Oxford  in  the  middle  of  the  century,  it  is 
evident  that  he  received  little  more  than  the  old  scho- 
lasticism, for  he  complained  that  the  time  he  spent  in 
the  study  of  philosophy  was  almost  wasted,  “because 
the  only  philosophy  then  known  at  Oxford  was  the 

1 Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  art.  “Deism.” 

2J.  Toland,  Christianity  Not  Mysterious  (London,  1702),  Preface, 
p.  xi. 

3 A.  Weber,  History  of  Philosophy  (New  York,  1896),  p.  277. 


8 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


peripatetic,  perplexed  with  obscure  terms  and  useless 
questions.”1  The  situation  was  somewhat  different  at 
Cambridge;  there  the  dominance  of  the  old  system  had 
been  broken  before  Locke’s  student  days  at  Oxford.  In 
the  closing  years  of  the  sixteenth  century  the  new  philos- 
ophy was  opposed  by  Digby,  “a  zealous  scholastic  and 
mystic.”  He  was  in  turn  attacked  by  Temple,  who  had 
largely  adopted  the  point  of  view  of  Ramus,  and  thus 
Cambridge  became  the  chief  center  of  Ramism. 
Temple’s  successful  opposition  to  scholasticism  broke 
down  hindering  traditions  and  made  Cambridge  the 
center  of  the  progressive  tendency  in  philosophy,  where 
later  the  school  of  Platonists  flourished.2 

Thus  in  England  of  the  seventeenth  century  the 
general  progress  of  civilization  had  not  fully  achieved 
freedom  of  thought;  there  was  still  such  a thing  as 
persecution  for  opinions’  sake.  Even  Locke’s  Letter  on 
T oleration ; which  was  probably  the  greatest  plea  for  it 
that  had  been  heard  in  England,  expressly  denied  full 
liberty  to  atheists  and  papists.  In~theology  much  of 
the  thinking  looked  backward  rather  than  forward;  it 
was  content  to  appeal  to  symbols  and  authorities;  it 
loved  the  traditional  and  was  prone  to  heap  scolding 
epithets  upon  innovators.  And  in  philosophy  there  was 
still  a vigorous  contest  between  the  outworn  scholasticism 
of  the  Middle  Ages  and  the  new. philosophy.  Even  as 
late  as  the  last  decade  of  the  century  Locke’s  Essay  was 
refused  recognition  at  Oxford.3  Such  in  general  was  the 

1 Bourne,  op.  cit.,  I,  48. 

2 Weber,  op.  cit.,  p.  277;  R.  Falkenberg,  History  of  Modern  Philos- 
ophy (New  York,  1897),  p.  63;  Hofiding,  op.  cit.,  I,  187,  288,  377. 

3 Hofiding,  op.  cit.,  I,  381. 


Introduction 


9 


conservative  tendency  in  English  thought  in  the  seven- 
teenth century. 

But  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Renaissance 
and  the  Reformation  were  progressively  asserting  them- 
selves. The  right  of  private  judgment  and  the  duty  of 
free  inquiry  were  claimed  and  exercised  by  an  ever- 
increasing  circle  of  independent  thinkers.  They  did  not, 
it  is  true,  form  a school  or  have  any  bond  save  this 
common  recognition  of  the  necessity  of  a change;  but 
they  represented  the  progressive  spirit  of  the  age.  They 
saw  that  there  was  much  truth  that  could  not  be  forced 
into  old  forms,  that  the  inherited  systems  were  not 
adequate  to  meet  the  demands  of  new  discoveries. 
Hence  they  undertook  to  adapt,  to  amend,  to  enlarge, 
or  even  to  supplant  the  old.  They  sought  to  serve  their 
age  by  giving  it  a system  fitted  to  meet  the  new  require- 
ments. 

They  represented  practically  all  fields  of  thought — 
theology,  philosophy,  politics,  literature,  and  the 
sciences.  And  they  were  of  practically  every  shade  of 
opinion,  from  the  relatively  conservative  thinker,  who 
with  hesitation  departs  as  little  as  possible  from  tradi- 
tional views,  to  the  revolutionary  innovator,  who  would 
make  all  things  new.  But  whatever  their  field  of 
interest  and  whatever  their  tendency,  they  agreed  in 
this,  that  the  old  systems  and  methods  were  inadequate. 
They  saw  the  need  of  new  adjustments  to  meet  new 
problems,  and  of  freedom  of  thought  in  making  these 
adjustments.  Among  themselves  they  disagreed  in 
many  ways  and  criticized  each  other  freely.  But  as  a 
group  of  thinkers  they  stand  out  in  contrast  with  the 
conservative  tradition-loving  leaders  described  above. 


IO 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


The  line  of  demarcation,  it  is  true,  cannot  be  sharply- 
drawn;  it  is  difficult  to  determine  where  some  men 
properly  belong.  But  this  is  not  necessary.  It  is 
sufficient  to  recognize  the  fact  that  at  this  time  there  was 
a conservative  group  of  leaders  who  tended  to  maintain 
things  as  they  had  been,  and  that  opposed  to  them, 
perhaps  sometimes  unconsciously  opposed  to  them,  there 
was  a group  of  progressive  leaders  who  recognized  the 
need  of  change  and  undertook  to  effect  it. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  call  the  entire  roll  of  honor  of 
England’s  sons  who  rightly  grasped  the  problems  of  their 
age  and  made  their  contributions  toward  their  solution; 
but  it  will  be  worth  while  to  mention  the  leaders.  The 
catalogue  of  the  progressive  thinkers  of  England  in  the 
seventeenth  century  begins  with  Hooker,  although  his 
work  really  lies  in  the  previous  century.  In  his  great 
treatise  on  Ecclesiastical  Law  he  marked  a departure  from 
servile  tradition,  and  did  not  hesitate  to  appeal  to  reason, 
“sound  reason,”  and  “the  higher  reason,”  and  to  nature 
and  to  natural  law.  He  is  frequently  quoted  by  his 
successors;  Locke  refers  to  him  in  the  Essay  as  the 
“learned  Doctor  Hooker.”  Then  there  were  the  philos- 
ophers Bacon,  Hobbes,  the  Cambridge  Platonists,  and 
Locke;  and  such  theologians  as  Hales,  Taylor,  Culver- 
well,  Chillingworth,  Tillotson,  and  others;  and  the 
statesmen  Faulkland  and  Cromwell,  and  the  poet- 
statesman  Milton;  and  the  whole  generation  of  Deists 
beginning  with  Herbert;  and  the  scientists,  among 
whom  Boyle,  Sydenham,  and  Newton  were  the  most 
important.  These  were  the  leaders,  men  who  left  their 
mark  on  their  times.  This  age  had  its  share  of  great 
men;  some  of  them  are  among  the  greatest  the  world 


Introduction 


ii 


has  ever  known.  And  together  they  broke  away 
from  tradition  and  raised  English  thought  to  world- 
leadership  in  their  generation.  We  fail  to  appreci- 
ate the  heritage  that  we  have  received  from  them 
because  we  use  it  daily. 

3.  THE  PROBLEM 

For  the  present  purpose  we  are  concerned  only  with 
the  party  of  progress  in  England  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  The  conservative  element  comes  into  con- 
sideration only  as  the  common  object  of  attack  and 
criticism,  because,  in  greater  or  less  degree,  it  represents 
the  spirit  of  opposition  to  free  inquiry,  which  would 
check  progress  by  clinging  to  systems  and  methods  that 
had  outlived  their  usefulness. 

We  find  that  in  a general  way  Locke  and  the  Deists 
opposed  the  same  tendencies  or  principles.  They  are 
also  associated  closely  in  time.  Locke  entered  upon  his 
Westminster  schooldays  in  the  midst  of  the  struggles  that 
resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the  Commonwealth. 
In  1652  he  became  a student  at  Christ  Church,  Oxford, 
from  which  he  received  his  Bachelor’s  degree  in  1656  and 
his  Master’s  degree  in  1658.  He  continued  as  a member 
of  the  University  in  various  relations  until  1684.  During 
his  maturing  youth  and  manhood  he  witnessed  at  close 
range  two  revolutions  and  the  disorders  that  they 
occasioned  particularly  at  the  University.  He  began 
writing  during  the  early  sixties,  although  he  published 
nothing  until  twenty-five  years  later.  From  this  time 
until  his  death  in  1 704  he  expressed  himself  through  the 
press  on  a number  of  subjects— political,  economic, 
theological,  scientific,  and  philosophical.  The  period  of 


12 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


his  greatest  activities  lies  between  1685  and  the  time 
of  his  death. 

Deism  is  dated  from  the  closing  years  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  to  about  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 
century — at  least  this  is  the  period  when  it  was  at  its 
height.  Its  beginnings  in  England,  however,  reach  back 
more  than  sixty  years,  and  a decade  or  more  before  the 
appearance  of  Toland’s  Christianity  Not  Mysterious  it 
was  so  strong  as  to  call  forth  criticisms.  Locke’s  years 
of  greatest  activity  and  the  period  of  Deism  overlapped, 
though  the  movement  did  not  reach  its  highest  point 
until  after  his  death. 

Furthermore,  as  will  appear  more  fully  later,  they 
have  much  in  common,  they  often  seem  to  speak  the 
same  language;  in  the  midst  of  differences  there  are 
suggestive  likenesses. 

In  a general  way  Locke  and  Deism  face  the  same  foe, 
they  are  associated  in  time,  and  they  show  resemblances 
that  seem  to  indicate  a close  relation  of  some  sort.j  Our 
problem  is  to  determine,  so  far  as  possible,  what  sort  of 
relation  exists  between  them.  Is  it  merely  a tempo- 
ral elation,  and  are  these  resemblances  without  sig- 
nificance ? Or  if  they  have  significance,  what  do  they 
mean,  what  are  we  to  infer  from  them,  how  are  we 
to  link  together  Locke  and  Deism  in  this  period  of 
English  thought?  Such  is  the  task  that  is  before  us 
in  this  investigation. 

4.  POSSIBLE  SOLUTIONS 

It  will  be  well  to  begin  this  study  by  defining  the 
possible  relations  that  may  exist. 


Introduction 


13 


The  solution  of  our  problem  might  lie  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  some  sort  of  a causal  relation  between  them; 
in  the  theory  that  the  one  in  some  way  and  to  some 
extent  accounts  for  the  other.  Temporal  connection 
would  then  have  significance,  and  any  likenesses  that 
might  be  found  could  be  explained  quite  easily — the 
child  would  resemble  the  parent,  and  the  parent  the 
child.  But  then  a further  problem  would  appear:  this 
causal  relation  can  work  in  either  one  of  two  opposite 
ways. 

A.  It  is  possible  that  students  of  this  period  might 
be  led  to  conclude  that  Deism  was  the  source  of  the 
religious  philosophical  views  of  Locke;  that,  when  we 
find  Locke  and  the  Deists  discussing  the  same  problems 
and  setting  forth  similar  views,  Locke  is  dependent  upon 
the  Deists.  But,  as  we  shall  see  later,  this  theory  is 
historically  untenable. 

B.  Or  it  may  be  that  the  causal  linkage  works  in  the 
other  direction,  that  Locke  accounts  for  Deism.  This 
would  be  much  more  in  harmony  with  what  we  know  of 
Locke’s  relation  to  a number  of  other  movements.  He 
was  a leader,  a pioneer  in  thought;  he  dominated  intel- 
lectually his  own  and  the  succeeding  period.  He  has 

'^gone  down  in  history  as  the  father  of  English  Empiricism, 
the  molder  of  the  political  ideas  of  the  revolution  of 
1688;  and  various  other  movements  had  their  origin  in 
him  or  were  deeply  influenced  by  him.  Even  without 
any  historical  data  bearing  immediately  on  the  question, 
one  would  be  tempted  to  conclude  that  Locke  was  in 
some  degree  responsible  for  Deism.  There  might  be 
some  trouble  with  dates,  especially  if  we  should  empha- 
size the  earliest  beginnings  of  Deism;  but  this  theory 


14  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

would  easily  explain  the  resemblances.  We  shall  see 
in  the  next  chapter  that  this  view  has  been  held  by  a 
number  of  historians,  who  cite  facts  that  tend  to  support 
their  position. 

Another  possible  theory  that  might  co-ordinate  the 
facts  and  define  the  relation  between  Locke  and  English 
Deism  is  the  theory  that  they  belong  together,  that  they 
constitute  one  and  the  same  movement,  that,  whatever 
else  he  may  be,  Locke  is  one  of  that  group  of  men 
commonly  known  as  Deists,  who  fostered  free  and 
critical  thinking  on  religious  problems.  This  hypothesis 
would  have  no  chronological  problem  and  would  be 
supported  by  any  resemblances  that  might  be  found. 
It  could  also  account  for  many  of  the  differences  that 
would  certainly  appear;  for  Deism  continued  to  develop 
after  Locke’s  time;  and  it  could  be  urged,  with  great 
plausibility,  that  the  more  extreme  views,  which  did  not 
altogether  agree  with  Locke’s  relatively  conservative 
positions,  represented  a further  stage  in  the  development 
of  the  same  principles.  The  Deism  of  Tindal  and 
Morgan  is  but  the  Deism  of  Locke  grown  up.  Such  a 
theory  would  have  the  advantage  of  simplicity,  but  it 
must  be  tested  by  facts.  We  shall  find  some  scholars 
who  hold  this  view. 

But  there  is  another  possible  solution.  The  prob- 
lem arises,  as  we  saw,  from  the  likenesses  and  differ- 
ences between  Locke  and  the  Deists,  who  were  adjacent 
in  time.  It  may  be  that  they  are  relatively  inde- 
pendent so  far  as  causal  linkages  are  concerned;  it  is 
quite  possible  that  they  do  not  form  one  group;  and  yet 
they  may  be  closely  related  in  another  way.  Perhaps 
we  can  do  fuller  justice  to  the  known  facts  if  we  consider 


Introduction 


i5 


Locke  and  the  Deists  related  as  elements  which,  with 
others,  constitute  a larger  whole;  that  is,  as  parts  of  one 
and  the  same  general  movement.  Lockian  thought  and 
Deism  could  then  be  represented  as  products  or  mani- 
festations of  the  same  Zeitgeist.  They  would  appear  as^ 
protesting  against  the  same  scholastic  tradition  and 
intolerance.  But  they  were  not  the  only  ones  who 
insisted  upon  the  right  of  free  inquiry.  The  spirit  of 
progress  was  abroad;  a new  epoch  was  dawning,  and  it 
had  many  heralds.  There  was  what  we  have  already 
described  as  (the  progressive  movement,)which  was  made 
up  of  several  different  elements.  There  were  the  inde- 
pendent and  more  or  less  rationalistic  thinkers  in  the  field 
of  theology,  there  were  the  founders  of  English  philos- 
ophy, and  the  Cambridge  Platonists,  and  the  Deists 
beginning  with  Herbert,  and  many  others.  All  these 
movements  and  men  taken  together  constitute  one 
general  movement;  and  within  it  Locke  and  Deism 
appeared  as  co-ordinate  parts.  This  would  account  for 
all  resemblances,  would  leave  room  for  differences,  and 
would  not  exclude  a certain  degree  of  interaction.  This 
position  is  not  certainly  and  clearly  taken  by  any  of  those 
who  have  studied  this  period,  though  Windleband  and 
von  Hertling  seem  to  approach  it. 

However  we  should  not  consider  these  possible 
theories  concerning  the  relation  of  Locke  and  English 
Deism  mutually  exclusive.  They  rather  point  out  the 
element  in  the  relation  that  should  be  regarded  as  central, 
which  determines  the  general  type  of  explanation  that 
is  offered;  they  suggest  points  of  view  from  which  we 
can  study  the  period.  The  acceptance  of  one  theory 
does  not  mean  that  the  others  were  entirely  wrong;  it 


1 6 John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

does  not  exclude  the  presence,  in  a subordinate  way,  of 
elements  that  are  central  in  other  theories.  We  have 
a complex  historical  field  which  we  can  view  from  many 
points ; we  are  seeking  the  point  of  view  that  will  enable 
us  to  do  fullest  justice  to  known  facts. 


CHAPTER  II 


SOLUTIONS  OF  THE  PROBLEM  THAT  HAVE  BEEN 
OFFERED 

I.  IN  THE  HISTORIES  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND 
RELATED  STUDIES 

The  problem  concerning  the  relation  of  John  Locke 
and  English  Deism  is  not  new;  there  are,  in  fact,  very 
few  students  of  the  history  of  English  thought  who  have 
not  expressed  their  views  on  it.  The  conditions  that 
gave  rise  to  it  are  so  patent  that  one  cannot  well  read 
Locke  and  the  Deists  without  coming  upon  it.  You 
find  men  close  to  each  other  in  time  who  frequently 
discuss  the  same  problems  and  often  use  the  same 
concepts  in  doing  so ; and  the  question  as  to  their  relation 
is  simply  thrust  upon  you. 

As  might  be  expected,  there  is  not  full  agreement  as 
to  just  what  that  relation  is.  Students  of  the  history 
of  philosophy  are  clearly  aware  of  the  problem,  but  there 
are  perplexing  elements  in  it  that  can  be  explained  in 
different  ways.  The  result  is  that  the  explanations  that 
have  been  offered  do  not  agree.  Yet  in  spite  of  their 
divergence  they  tend  strongly  to  emphasize  all  those 
factors  that  suggest  a close  causal  linkage  between  Locke 
and  Deism. 

Uberweg  barely  touches  the  problem.  He  very 
cautiously  observes  that  “the  philosophy  of  the  so-called 
English  Deists  was  more  or  less  affected  by  the  school 


17 


1 8 John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

of  Locke.”1  What  does  he  mean  by  “the  philosophy 
of  the  so-called  English  Deists”?  Strictly  speaking 
the  Deists  as  a group  had  no  philosophy.  However, 
we  may  speak  of  a deistic  philosophy  of  religion.  If  this 
is  what  he  means,  he  makes  Locke  “more  or  less” 
responsible  for  Deism. 

Kuno  Fischer  does  not  really  discuss  the  relation  of 
Locke  and  the  deistic  movement;  he  calls  attention, 
however,  to  the  dependence  of  Toland  upon  the  Lockian 
epistemology.  He  says:  “Locke’s  Reasonableness  of 

Christianity  appeared  the  year  before  Toland’s  book. 
Toland  went  farther  in  this  direction  and  denied  every- 
thing that  transcends  reason.  He  based  his  religious 
doctrine  especially  on  Locke’s  epistemology;  and  the 
bitter  struggle,  which  he  called  forth  against  himself, 
occasioned  the  attack  of  Bishop  Stillingfleet  on  Locke.”2 
This  is  one  of  the  most  circumspect  statements  that  we 
have  found.  What  he  says  is  fact;  and  he  makes  no 
sweeping  generalizations.  As  will  be  shown  later, 
Lockian  epistemology  is  unimportant  in  the  develop- 
ment of  Toland’s  thesis.  However,  Fischer’s  statement 
is  open  to  several  interpretations:  “Toland  went  farther 
in  this  direction.”  It  is  evident  from  the  context  that 
he  meant  in  the  direction  of  rationalism.  Was  Locke 
responsible  for  Toland,  or  were  they  representatives  of  the 
same  general  movement,  their  respective  points  of  view 
marking  different  stages  in  its  progress?  Fischer  does 
not  tell  us.  Perhaps  he  was  more  prudent  than  others 
in  refraining  from  making  a more  definite  statement. 

1 fjberweg,  History  of  Philosophy  (New  York,  1903),  II,  375. 

2 Kuno  Fischer,  Geschichte  der  neuern  Philosophic  (Heidelberg, 
1904),  X,  514. 


Solutions  of  the  Problem, 


19 


Lechler  touches  upon  this  problem  several  times,  but 
is  also  not  very  specific.  After  describing  the  develop- 
ment of  deistic  thought  up  until  the  last  decades  of  the 
seventeenth  century,  he  says  that  there  were  but  two  y 
things  necessary  for  Deism  to  become  a power:  the  one, 
the  freedom  of  the  press,  which  came  in  1694;  the  other,  1 
an  intellectual  leader  who  could  speak  the  watchword,  , 
and  Locke  was  the  man.1  Later,  in  speaking  of  Locke’s"' 
repudiation  of  the  views  of  Toland  in  his  controversy 
with  Stillingfleet,  Lechler  observes:  “Yet  we  cannot 
avoid  the  conviction  that  Locke  was  self-deceived,  and 
that  he  failed  to  recognize  the  germs  of  opposition  in  his 
own  system,  which  must  necessarily  develop  in  his 
school,  because  in  his  personal  convictions  he  did  not 
wish  to  oppose  in  any  way  the  existing  systems  of  faith.” 
Locke’s  influence  in  shaping  the  deistic  movement  is 
recognized;  but  he  is  not  expressly  called  a Deist.  Yet 
his  systems  of  philosophical  and  religious  speculation  are 
treated  as  if  they  marked  a stage,  perhaps  as  if  they 
formed  a stage  in  the  development  of  the  deistic  move- 
ment. 

Leslie  Stephen,  in  his  generally  thorough  but  some- 
times confusingly  detailed  study  of  English  Thought 
in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  makes  a clear  statement  of  his 
views.  After  speaking  of  the  suggestiveness  of  the 
almost  simultaneous  appearance  of  Locke’s  Reasonable- 
ness of  Christianity  and  Toland’s  Christianity  Not 
Mysterious,  he  mentions  Locke’s  spirited  repudiation 
of  Toland,  which  he  justifies, for  “no  child  or  clergyman  of 
the  present  time  could  accept  the  plenary  inspiration  of 

1 G.  V.  Lechler,  Geschickte  des  englischen  Deismus  (Stuttgart,  1841), 

P-  IS3- 


20  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

the  Scriptures  with  a simpler  faith  than  this  intellectual 
progenitor  of  the  whole  generation  of  eighteenth- century 
iconoclasts — the  teacher  of  Toland  and  Collins,  the 
legitimate  precursor  of  Hume  and  Condillac,  the  phi- 
losopher before  whom  Voltaire  is  never  tired  of  prostrat- 
ing himself  with  unwonted  reverence.”  Later,  in  his 
discussion  of  Toland,  we  learn  that  “the  whole  of  his 
philosophy  was  substantially  derived  from  his  Master, 
Locke  ” ; that  he  “ is  a follower  of  Locke,  and  in  the  path 
which  leads  to  the  purely  sceptical  solution  of  Hume”; 
that  “Locke,  the  Unitarians,  Toland,  form  a genuine 
series,  in  which  Christianity  is  being  gradually  trans- 
muted by  larger  infusions  of  rationalism”;  and  that 
“Collins  was  a favored  disciple  of  Locke.”1 

Thus  according  to  Stephen,  Locke  is  the  father  of  the 
revolutionary  systems  of  the  next  century.  It  is  true 
Locke  himself  strongly  held  to  the  supernatural  factors 
in  religion  and  saw  no  conflict  between  revelation  and  A 
reason ; but  he  was  the  teacher  of  a generation  that  more 
and  more  denied  all  positive  religion.  “Locke  strikes, 
in  all  subjects  of  which  he  treats,  the  keynote  of  English 
speculation  in  the  eighteenth  century.”2  Stephen  makes 
him  very  largely  responsible  for  later  Deism. 

Very  much  in  the  same  spirit  we  read  under  “ Deism,” 
in  the  latest  edition  of  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica: 
“In  England  the  new  philosophy  had  broken  with  time- 
honored  beliefs  more  completely  than  it  had  done  even 
in  France.  Hobbes  was  more  startling  than  Bacon. 
Locke’s  philosophy,  as  well  as  his  theology,  served  as  a 

'Leslie  Stephen,  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century  (New 
York,  1876),  I,  94  £f.,  109,  no. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  94. 


Solutions  of  the  Problem 


21 


school  for  the  Deists.  Men  had  become  weary  of 
Protestant  scholasticism.” 

Though  Falkenberg  says  but  little  that  bears  directly 
on  this  problem,  that  which  he  does  say  is  very  clear. 
In  his  History  of  Modern  Philosophy  he  tells  us  that 
“Locke’s  demand  for  the  subjection  of  faith  to  rational 
criticism  assures  him  an  honorable  place  in  the  history 
of  English  Deism”  and  that  the  “development  of  Deism 
from  Toland  on  is  under  the  direct  influence  of  Rational 
Christianity.  ”l 

Windleband  holds  a more  conservative  view  and 
states  it  very  circumspectly.  He  places  Locke  as  the 
leader  of  the  English  Enlightenment.2  Then  later, 
in  his  discussion  of  natural  religion,  he  notes  the  tendency 
of  the  Enlightenment  to  seek  “the  universal  true 
Christianity  by  means  of  philosophy.  True  Christianity 
is  in  this  sense  identified  with  the  religion  of  reason  or 

1 Pp.  175,  181.  Weber  in  bis  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  391,  says: 
“The  freethinkers,  who  flourished  in  Great  Britain  and  on  the  continent 
at  the  end  of  this  period,  and  the  philosophers  proper,  whom  we  have 
still  to  consider,  are  likewise  descendants  of  Locke.”  Apparently  Locke 
is  as  responsible  for  Deism  as  he  is  for  Empiricism.  H.  E.  Cushman 
in  his  Beginner’s  History  of  Philosophy  (Boston,  1911)  takes  the  same 
position  as  Weber.  He  traces  various  movements  back  to  Locke,  such 
as  the  empirical  idealism  of  Berkeley  and  Hume,  the  sensationalism  of 
the  French  and  Deism.  The  Lockian  philosophy  of  religion  is  made 
responsible  for  the  deistic  movement.  And  A.  K.  Rogers  in  his  Student’s 
History  of  Philosophy  (New  York,  1910)  expresses  almost  the  same 
views.  He  says,  “Deism  was  an  attempt  to  get  rid  of  the  supposed 
irrational  elements  of  Christianity.  It  begins  with  a desire  to  explain 
away  the  mysteries  of  church  dogma,  and  to  show  that  between  revelation 
and  reason  there  is  no  contradiction.  Thus,  in  Locke,  it  calls  man  back 
from  theology  to  the  simplicity  and  reasonableness  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment, whose  one  essential  article  of  faith  is  the  Messiahship  of  Christ.” 
Deism  is  in  the  writings  of  Locke. 

2 W.  Windleband,  A History  of  Philosophy  (New  York,  1893),  p.  439. 


22  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

natural  religion.”1  This  universal,  true  Christianity 
was  at  first  “allowed  the  character  of  a revealed  religion,” 
which  was  in  complete  agreement  with  reason;  revela- 
tion is  above  reason  but  in  harmony  with  it.  Such  was 
the  position  of  Locke  and  Leibnitz.  “Proceeding  from 
this  idea,”  the  Socinians  had  gone  farther,  and,  though 
recognizing  the  necessity  of  revelation,  they  accepted 
only  that  as  revealed  which  was  rationally  accessible. 
The  next  step  was  to  set  aside  revelation  as  superfluous, 
which  was  done  by  the  English  Deists.  Thus  Windle- 
band  clearly  places  Locke  in  this  historical  lineage  of 
Deism,  but  stops  short  of  definitely  identifying  him  with 
the  movement;  he  suggests,  but  does  not  emphasize,  his 
causal  relation  to  it. 

Hoffding’s  view  seems  to  be  very  much  like  that  of 
Windleband,  though  he  expresses  it  less  cautiously.  In 
his  larger  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  it  is  merely 
touched  upon.  “The  displeasure  at  Locke’s  theological 
standpoint  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  it  approxi- 
mated so  closely  to  that  of  the  Deists  that  a work  such 
as  John  Toland’s  Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  which 
appeared  in  1696,  and  which  was  publicly  burnt  at 
Dublin  the  following  year,  seemed  only  to  be  its  natural 
outcome.”2  In  his  Brief  History  of  Modern  Philosophy , 
he  states  his  views  more  plainly,  without,  however, 
committing  himself  very  clearly  to  any  theory  which 
would  make  Locke  the  progenitor  of  the  Deists.  He 
says:  “The  English  Freethinkers  (the  so-called  Deists) 
developed  Locke’s  philosophy  of  religion  more  fully  in 

1 W.  Windleband,  A History  of  Philosophy  (New  York,  1893), 
pp.  487,  488. 

2 Op.  cit.,  p.  381. 


Solutions  of  the  Problem 


23 


the  direction  of  a more  pronounced  rationalism.”1  He 
sees  that  there  is  a close  resemblance  between  Locke’s 
views  and  those  of  the  Deists;  so  much  so  that  Toland’s 
book  seemed  to  be  the  natural  outcome  of  the  Lockian 
position.  The  Deists  merely  developed  Locke’s  philos- 
ophy of  religion  farther  in  the  direction  of  rationalism. 
He  does  not  say  that  Locke  is  a Deist;  but  he  holds  that 
his  philosophy  of  religion  and  the  deistic  doctrines  form 
a continuous  line  of  development. 

In  the  views  of  Windleband  and  Hoffding  there  is 
some  suggestion  of  the  theory  which  presents  Locke 
and  the  Deists  as  one  movement,  the  acknowledged 
divergence  being  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Deists 
from  Toland  on  simply  carry  out  that  which  was 
implicitly  present  in  Locke’s  religious  views  from 
the  beginning.  Radical  Deism  would  then  be  a 
later  and  more  fully  developed  stage  in  the  same 
movement. 

It  is  either  this  view,  or  the  one  which  makes  Locke 
and  the  Deists  constituent  parts  of  one  larger  movement 
embracing  other  elements,  that  we  find  in  von  Hertling. 
He  says:  “Deism  marks  a further  stage  in  the  advancing 
development  of  rationalism  in  England.  Locke  and  the 
theologians  of  Cambridge  belong  to  an  earlier  period; 
but  the  development  is  thoroughly  consistent.”2  How 
much  does  “rationalism  in  England”  include?  Is  it 
made  up  only  of  the  Cambridge  Platonists,  Locke  and 
the  Deists;  or  are  there  also  other  similar  elements, 
which  with  these  constitute  one  movement  ? From  the 

1 A Brief  History  of  Modern  Philosophy  (New  York,  1912),  p.  95. 

2 G.  von  Hertling,  John  Locke  und  die  Schnle  von  Cambridge, 

p.  176. 


24 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


context  we  may  infer  that  perhaps  Tillotson  belonged 
here ; but  we  get  no  definite  answer.1 

2.  IN  THE  SPECIAL  STUDY  BY  CROUS 

In  1910  there  appeared  as  No.  34  in  the  series 
Abhandlungen  zur  Philosophic  und  Hirer,  Geschichte  a 
pamphlet  by  Ernst  Crous,  under  the  title  Die  Religions- 
philosophischen  Lehren  Lockes  und  ihre  Stellung  zu  dem 
Deismus  seiner  Zeit.  The  fore  part  of  this,  that  is  Die 
Religionsphilosophischen  Lehren  Lockes,  had  been  pub- 
lished before  as  his  Doctor’s  thesis,  prepared  under  the 
guidance  of  Benno  Erdmann.  So  far  as  is  known  to  the 
writer,  this  is  the  only  special  study  of  the  relation  of 
Locke  to  Deism  that  has  appeared;  and  it  is  limited  to 
contemporary  Deism.  Crous  devotes  a little  more  than 
one  page  to  the  influence  of  Locke  on  later  Deism.  We 
give  both  his  arguments  and  his  conclusions  in  condensed 
form. 

After  a brief  presentation  of  the  views  of  Herbert  and 
Hobbes,  he  sets  forth  the  essential  elements  of  the  Deism 
of  this  early  stage  as  follows: 

Reason  is  to  be  thoroughly  applied  to  every  field  of  religious 
life:  It  decides  concerning  the  claims  of  revelation;  ....  it 
investigates  the  essence  and  origin  of  religion;  it  places  all  religions, 
Paganism  as  well  as  Christianity,  on  the  same  basis,  in  that  it 
brings  them  all  before  its  own  judgment  seat;  it  seeks  in  all 

1 A.  C.  McGiffert  in  Protestant  Thought  before  Kant  (New  York, 
19 1 1)  discusses  rationalism  in  England  from  almost  the  same  point  of 
view  (pp.  189  ff.).  He  puts  Deism  and  at  least  some  of  the  liberal 
theologians  in  one  group,  but  he  distinguishes  men  like  Tillotson, 
Clarke,  and  Locke  from  the  Deists  and  describes  them  as  “supernatural 
iationalists.” 


Solutions  of  the  Problem 


25 


religions  the  higher  unity  of  the  religion  of  reason  and  nature, 
and  undertakes  to  reduce  Christianity  as  nearly  as  possible 
to  this  ideal;  ....  it  finds  the  essence  of  piety  in  morality 
(pp.  96  ff.). 

Toland,  Collins,  Blount,  and  Locke  accepted  this 
program,  though  Locke  refused  to  go  as  far  as  Blount  and 
Collins,  who  make  reason  our  only  source  of  religious 
knowledge.  But  in  determining  the  relation  between'1 
reason  and  revelation,  which  now  becomes  the  great  , 
question,  Locke  was  the  leader.  He  recognizes  both  as’ 
sources  of  human  knowledge;  however  reason  must 
decide  upon  the  genuineness  and  sense  of  revelation. t 
Thus  in  reality  revelation  is  subjected  to  reason.  This 
was  a clear  statement  of  the  deistic  doctrines.  It  is 
true  we  find  certain  modifications,  but  everywhere  are^ 
the  thoughts  of  Locke  (p.  103). 

Though  Locke,  in  the  matter  of  biblical  criticism,  is 
much  more  careful  than  the  Deists  of  his  time,  he  agrees 
with  them  concerning  the  interpretation  of  the  Bible. 
He  “demands  that  we  understand  the  Scripture  in  the 
literal  sense,  considering,  however,  the  whole  background 
and  all  the  conditions  that  influenced  its  composition” 
(p.  104). 

According  to  the  Deists  the  chief  characteristics  of 
true  religion  are  clearness  and  reasonableness;  reason 
can  reveal  to  us  all  that  is  necessary  to  salvation; 
natural  religion  is  superior  to  revealed  religion.  Locke 
did  not  share  these  views  (pp.  105-6). 

But  when  we  come  to  the  teachings  concerning  God, 
Locke  again  becomes  the  leader  of  the  Deists.  “He 
examines  the  formation  of  our  idea  of  God  and  proves 
the  existence  of  God,  not  from  revelation  or  experience, 


26 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


but  from  reason;  and  asserts  that  God’s  being  is  incom- 
prehensible to  us,  though  God  can  be  known  so  far  as 
such  a knowledge  is  necessary  for  life  and  happiness.” 
The  writings  of  the  Deists  show  plainly  how  influential 
Locke’s  teachings  on  this  point  were  (p.  107). 

“In  complete  agreement  with  contemporary  Deism, 
and  without  any  distinctive  character  of  conception  or 
statement,  Locke  holds  that  prayer,  thanksgiving,  and  a 
virtuous  life  constitute  the  true  worship  of  God.  In 
agreement  with  Blount  and  Bury  he  considers  morality 
the  most  important  element  in  religion”  (p.  109). 

That  Christianity  must  be  reasonable,  and  that  it  is 
really  nothing  else  than  natural  religion,  which  the 
Deists  sought  to  show,  was  essentially  the  opinion  of 
Locke  (pp.  x 10-12). 

“In  the  demand  for  toleration  Locke  stands  on  the 
same  ground  with  all  the  Deists”  (p.  112). 

According  to  Crous  we  can  sum  up  the  relation  of 
Locke’s  philosophy  of  religion  to  contemporary  Deism 
thus  : 

Locke  is  a Deist  in  so  far  as  he  appeals  to  reason  in  all  religious 
matters.  In  the  Deism  of  that  period  and  in  its  field  of  interest 
sometimes  he  is  the  leader,  sometimes  he  is  a fellow- worker;  now 
he  is  forerunner,  again  he  opposes  the  movement  which  is  pressing 
forward  irresistibly.  In  demanding  tolerance  he  was  the  leader 
among  the  Deists.  In  the  doctrine  concerning  God  he  advanced 
their  cause  when  he  applied  his  theory  of  knowledge  also  to  the 
idea  of  God  and  furnished  his  own  particular  proof  of  His  existence. 
In  delimiting  reason  and  revelation  he  brought  to  a close  the 
attempts  of  older  Deism,  and  at  the  same  time  provided  a basis 
for  further  discussion.  It  is  true  that  in  the  question  as  to  the 
essence  of  Christianity  he  offers  no  new  thoughts,  but  he  gave  to 
the  old  deistic  doctrines  their  most  fitting  expression.  In  his 


Solutions  of  the  Problem 


27 


explanation  of  the  Bible,  in  his  conception  of  worship,  and  in  his 
judgment  concerning  heathenism  he  shared,  on  the  whole,  the 
current  views  of  Deism  without  enriching  them  by  his  own  con- 
tributions. In  his  judgment  concerning  the  meaning  and  value 
of  Christianity  he  sought  to  mediate  between  the  Deists  and  their 
opponents,  and,  finally,  in  biblical  criticism  he  turns  altogether 
away  from  Deism  (pp.  1 13-14). 

Later  Deism  was  not  able  to  add  anything  to  the 
discussion  concerning  the  idea  and  being  of  God,  or  to  say 
anything  new  on  toleration.  In  the  spirit  of  Locke  it 
recognized  the  possibility  of  an  external  revelation  but 
made  its  authority  depend  upon  its  conformity  to  reason 
and  moral  truth  and  evaluated  it  as  a means  of  instruc- 
tion or  training.  In  the  treatment  of  the  problem  of 
miracles  they  went  far  beyond  Locke.  In  outspoken 
opposition  to  Locke,  Tindal,  Chubb,  and  Morgan  limit 
Christianity  to  a renewal  of  natural  religion.  But  later 
Deists  show  the  influence  of  Locke:  “Morgan  especially 
conceives  the  meaning  of  Christian  revelation  exactly 
as  Locke  did”  (pp.  114-15). 

3.  RESUME 

It  is  not  difficult  to  sum  up  the  results  at  which  the 
authors  quoted  have  arrived.  Several  of  them,  espe- 
cially tiberweg  and  Fischer,  say  little  that  bears  directly 
on  our  problem.  They  are  content  to  state  the  most 
important  facts  and  stop  there.  They  clearly  recognize 
that  there  is  some  sort  of  relation  between  Locke  and 
Deism,  but  they  venture  no  theory  as  to  what  it  is. 
Windleband  recognizes  a close  relation  between  them, 
but  does  not  place  Locke  among  the  Deists,  though  he 
clearly  holds  that  he  influenced  the  movement.  Von 


28 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


Hertling  recognizes  Locke  and  Deism  and  the  Cambridge 
Platonists  as  distinguishable  parts  of  a larger  movement, 
which  he  calls  “rationalism  in  England,”  and  which  is 
not  further  defined.  But  a large  majority  of  those  who 
have  offered  solutions  to  the  problem  which  we  are 
studying  consider  Locke  very  closely  related  to  Deism 
in  a causal  way,  if  he  is  not  one  of  them:  he  is  their 
“progenitor”;  they  “are  the  descendants  of  Locke”; 
“from  his  theory  of  religion  came  Deism”;  he  “has  an 
honorable  place  in  the  history  of  Deism.”  In  almost  all 
essential  respects  he  is  one  of  them — sometimes  their 
leader,  sometimes  one  who  goes  with  them.  There  is  a 
strong  tendency  to  link  him  up  very  closely  with  the 
movement,  to  make  him  largely  responsible  for  it  or  to 
identify  him  with  it. 

The  investigators  in  the  field  of  the  history  of 
philosophy  whose  views  have  been  set  forth,  with  the 
exception  of  Crous,  have  given  us  their  results,  not  their 
methods.  However  they  had  no  occasion  to  do  so. 
Their  task  was  the  reconstruction,  in  the  form  of  a 
written  account,  of  the  course  of  the  development  of 
thought,  more  especially  of  philosophical  speculation. 
Accordingly  their  chief  purpose  was  to  present  to  us  the 
results  of  their  investigations;  they  may  or  may  not 
indicate  the  methods  that  they  followed.  And  yet  they 
frequently  present  their  results  in  such  a way  that  one 
can  guess  their  methods  with  some  degree  of  certainty. 

Looking  over  the  passages  cited  above  and  studying 
them  in  their  context,  one  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion 
that  the  writers  laid  great  emphasis  upon  the  genetic  or 
developmental  way  of  viewing  history.  The  individual 
systems  appear  as  links  in  one  great  chain  which  extends 


Solutions  of  the  Problem 


29 


from  age  to  age,  from  epoch  to  epoch,  in  the  record  of 
human  thought.  Locke’s  system  was  the  normal  devel- 
opment of  that  which  preceded  him  and  had  in  it  the 
germs  of  that  which  was  to  follow;  or,  using  Stephen’s 
figure,  he  was  the  progenitor  of  the  eighteenth-century 
iconoclasts,  f That  is  the  linear,  the  one-dimensional 
character  of  the  development  of  thought  is  emphasized; 
the  various  systems  are  made  to  appear  as  successive 
emits  in  a linear  series^  This  way  of  looking  at  things 
in  the  past  is  modified  somewhat  in  certain  instances, 
particularly  by  Windleband  (perhaps  also  by  von  Hert- 
ling),  whose  purpose  is  to  trace  the  development  of 
concepts  rather  than  individual  systems.  As  a result 
he  emphasizes  more  than  others  the  contemporary 
relations  of  the  great  leaders.  Historical  movements 
are  made  to  appear  as  the  work  of  many  minds;  the 
great  men  cease  to  be  the  sole  bearers  of  progress; 
however  they  still  remain  leaders.  That  is  Windleband 
emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  course  of  the  development 
of  thought  in  any  given  period  has  breadth  as  well  as 
the  linear  character : it  is  more  like  a web  than  a single 
line. 

In  the  special  study  of  Crous  we  have  a complete 
record  of  his  investigations;  we  can  follow  him  step  by 
step  to  his  conclusions;  his  method  is  as  clear  as  his 
results.  He  too  emphasizes  the  genetic  way  of  interpret- 
ing history;  but  in  selecting  his  characteristic  factors 
or  characteristic  points  of  view,  which  he  traces  from 
early  Deism  through  Locke  to  later  Deism,  as  well  as  in 
determining  Locke’s  relation  to  contemporary  Deism, 
he  is  satisfied  when  he  establishes  resemblance.  Herbert, 
Hobbes,  Toland,  Blount,  and  Collins  assign  a certain 


30  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

authority  to  reason  in  matters  of  religion;  Locke  does 
the  same : therefore  in  this  respect  he  is  a Deist.  All  the 
Deists  advocate  toleration;  so  does  Locke,  and  utters  his 
plea  more  powerfully  than  any  of  them;  therefore  “in 
the  demand  for  toleration  he  was  the  leader  among  the 
Deists.”  Without  any  critical  study  resemblance  is 
naively  taken  as  a criterion  for  relatedness ; the  historical 
background,  in  which  the  resemblance  appears,  seems 
to  have  no  meaning  for  him. 


I 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  METHOD 

I.  A POSSIBLE  SOURCE  OF  ERROR  IN  THE 
GENETIC  METHOD 

We  saw  that  in  the  study  of  the  history  of  the 
development  of  thought  the  genetic  method  was  pre- 
ferred by  those  who  have  investigated  this  particular 
field.  It  is  the  method  that  now  prevails  in  historical 
investigations.  The  idea  of  development  shapes  our 
thinking  when  we  attempt  to  reconstruct  the  past;  our 
age  is  under  the  spell  of  evolution.  But  there  lurk  in 
the  genetic  method,  when  it  is  applied  to  a study  of  the 
progress  of  thought,  certain  dangers  that  we  must  be 
careful  to  avoid.  It  is  a selective  method ; it  takes  from 
the  period  that  is  under  consideration  that  which  later 
became  historically  significant.  But  there  is  danger 
here,  for  when  you  center  attention  on  one  factor  in  a 
period  you  are  likely  to  ignore  or  underestimate  the 
importance  of  other  motives.  That  which  later  became 
historically  important  may  eclipse  all  else.  The  result 
is  that  the  history  as  reconstructed  lacks  elements  that 
were  influential  in  shaping  the  course  of  events  when  the 
history  was  being  made.  The  genetic  or  linear  view  of 
the  development  of  thought  is  that  which  we  get  when 
we  travel  the  main  highways  of  progress:  we  learn  to 
know  the  great  men  whose  thought  marked  epochs  in 
the  world’s  history;  but  we  often  miss  their  lesser  fellows 


31 


32  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

who  formed,  as  it  were,  the  background  on  which  the 
great  men  appeared,  which  helped  to  determine  their 
positions,  and  without  which  it  is  impossible  to  make  any 
historical  reconstruction  of  a period  that  will  do  full 
justice  to  all  its  elements.  The  genetic  method  in  the 
study  of  the  history  of  philosophy  is  not  rejected  here; 
but  attention  is  called  to  a possible  source  of  error  in  its 
use.  If  it  is  not  applied  comprehensively  and  critically, 
we  are  likely  to  miss  factors  that  were  influential  in 
determining  the  movements  in  the  period  that  is  under 
consideration.  It  will  be  used  in  this  study,  but  it  will 
be  applied  in  such  manner  as  is  best  suited  to  our  present 
problem. 

2.  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  DETERMINES 
THE  METHOD 

In  one  sense  it  is  not  difficult  to  define  a proper 
method.  In  general  we  can  say  that  a right  method  is 
such  a mode  of  procedure  as  will  enable  us  to  realize  our 
purposes.  Now  these,  our  purposes,  whatever  else 
they  may  be,  are  not  capriciously  chosen  goals  but  are 
relevant  to  some  particular  field  of  interest.  The  tiller 
of  the  soil  has  problems  pertaining  to  his  sphere  of  action, 
which  are  determined  by  the  needs  to  be  supplied  and 
by  the  other  factors  with  which  he  deals.  The  questions 
that  an  architect  must  answer  grow  out  of  the  situation 
that  he,  as  an  architect,  is  called  upon  to  meet— a build- 
ing is  to  be  reared  by  labor  from  certain  materials,  and 
his  method  of  procedure  at  each  stage  is  chosen  in  view 
of  these  factors.  Likewise  the  student  of  history  finds 
that  his  plan  for  reconstructing  the  past  is  determined 
both  by  the  sort  of  reconstruction  that  is  desired  and  by 


The  Method 


33 


the  character  of  the  materials  that  are  available.  The 
sort  of  reconstruction  that  is  desired  and  the  character 
of  the  given  data  are  the  two  factors  that  constitute  the 
nature  of  a historical  problem.  That  is,  the  nature  of  a 
given  historical  problem  determines  the  method  to  be 
followed  in  solving  it. 

3.  THE  METHOD  INDICATED  EOR  THIS  PROBLEM 

This  investigation  undertakes  to  determine,  as  far 
as  possible,  what  sort  of  relation  exists  between  Locke 
and  English  Deism.  Or  putting  it  in  another  form,  How 
can  we  best  conceive  their  relation,  from  what  point  of 
view  can  we  get  the  best  understanding  of  it?  Which 
one  of  the  possible  theories  concerning  their  relation 
enables  us  to  co-ordinate  the  largest  number  of  relevant 
facts  in  a significant  way  ? 

As  has  been  shown,  they  are  near  each  other  in  time. 
The  span  of  Locke’s  life  from  1632  to  1704  extended  over 
at  least  a part  of  the  life  of  almost  every  one  of  the 
Deists.  But  during  their  productive  periods  he  was  a 
contemporary  of  only  a few  of  them;  the  deistic  move- 
ment proper  did  not  reach  its  period  of  greatest  activity 
until  after  his  death.  Furthermore  Locke  and  Deism 
have  much  in  common;  in  rational  speculation  in  the 
field  of  religion  they  often  discuss  the  same  problems, 
and  in  doing  so  they  use  largely  the  same  concepts. 

This  would  suggest  the  possibility  of  his  having 
influenced  it,  that  Deism  was  in  some  way  and  to  some 
extent  dependent  on  Locke;  for  it  is  a well-known  fact 
that  he  exerted  some  molding  influence  on  almost  every 
movement  of  consequence  of  his  own  and  the  succeeding 
generation. 


34 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


There  are  two  lines  of  investigation  that  are  open  to 
us  here.  On  the  one  hand,  we  may  compare  the  respec- 
tive systems  and  note  the  resemblances  and  differences 
and  then  interpret  this  simple  relation  of  resemblance 
in  terms  of  some  other  relation  which  may  be  closer, 
perhaps  in  terms  of  causal  linkage  or  of  co-ordinate 
relation  as  members  of  a larger  whole.  And  on  the  other 
hand,  we  can  search  the  contemporary  literature  for 
data  that  may  help  us  to  define  the  sort  of  relation  that 
exists  between  them,  for  in  order  to  know  how  Deism 
is  related  to  Locke  we  must  know  how  both  are  related 
to  thinkers  of  their  own  and  previous  periods. 

With  the  situation  stated  in  this  way,  it  would  seem 
that  the  methodological  problem  is  simple.  Get  your 
catalogue  of  likenesses  and  differences  and  interpret  them 
critically,  collect  your  other  data  and  draw  your  con- 
clusions. But  in  making  any  comparisons  whatsoever 
between  Locke  and  Deism  for  the  purpose  of  establish- 
ing likenesses  and  differences,  and  in  searching  out 
historical  linkages  between  them,  we  have  already  tacitly 
assumed  that  we  know  what  we  mean  when  we  speak  of 
Locke  and  English  Deism;  we  presuppose  that  they  are 
clearly  defined  historical  units.  Now  a clear  definition 
of  a system  of  thought,  either  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
parison or  with  a view  to  searching  out  its  historical 
connections,  is  such  a description  as  contains  all  of  its 
characteristic  features,  that  is,  those  elements  that  mark 
it  as  different  from  other  systems  of  thought,  that  set 
boundaries  so  that  you  can  treat  it  as  something  definite 
and  clearly  distinguishable.  Hence  if  you  want  to  find 
out  what  a system  of  thought  really  is,  you  cannot  do 
so  by  studying  it  in  its  isolation;  you  must  study  it  in 


The  Method 


35 


connection  with  other  related  systems ; definition  points 
you  beyond  the  thing  defined  to  the  background  in 
which  it  appears. 

Furthermore  when  you  undertake  to  define  two 
systems  of  thought  for  the  purpose  of  making  a com- 
parison between  them,  it  is  assumed  that  the  comparison 
shall  have  meaning  relevant  to  some  purpose.  In  the 
present  instance  the  comparison  between  Locke  and 
English  Deism  is  to  have  significance  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  sort  and  degree  of  relation  that  exists  between 
them.  For  this  end  mere  likeness  is  of  little  or  no  value. 
It  could  have  no  more  sense  or  significance  for  the 
purpose  in  view  than  there  would  be  in  saying  that  two 
men  resemble  each  other  in  that  both  have  excellent 
health,  when  the  purpose  is  to  compare  them  as  scholars. 
If  likenesses  and  differences,  which  constitute  com- 
parison, are  to  have  meaning,  they  must  be  relevant 
to  the  field  of  interest,  which  is  determined  by  our 
purposes. 

But  a further  question  now  arises.  How  can  we 
know  when  a given  likeness  or  difference  has  significance 
for  the  determination  of  the  kind  and  degree  of  relation, 
or  when  is  a comparison  meaningful  for  our  purpose  ? 
To  answer  this  concretely:  We  find  both  Locke  and  the 
Deists  urging  toleration.  Is  it  significant  for  the  solu- 
tion of  our  problem  to  say  that  Locke  and  the  Deists  are 
alike  in  this  respect  ? Not  at  all,  for  we  shall  see  other 
men  and  other  groups  of  men  advocating  it  also.  Again 
we  find  both  Locke  and  the  Deists  magnifying  the  impor- 
tance of  grounding  religion  rationally  and  emphasizing 
natural  religion.  Here  we  have  another  resemblance, 
but  we  cannot  tell  what  it  means  until  we  have  examined 


36  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

other  systems  adjacent  in  time  and  have  determined 
what  role  these  motives  played  in  them.  That  is,  if, 
in  the  determination  of  the  relation  between  Locke  and 
Deism,  we  are  to  use  comparison,  the  likenesses  and 
differences  that  we  use  must  be  significant  for  our 
purposes,  and  we  can  recognize  such  significance  only  by 
studying  them  on  the  background  of  the  thought  of  the 
age  in  which  these  systems  appeared. 

One  feature,  therefore,  of  our  problem  is  a study  of 
Locke  and  Deism  in  relation  to  English  thought  in  the 
seventeenth  century  and  the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  which  is  the  period  in  which  these  systems  were 
developed. 

However  it  may  not  be  necessary  for  us  to  concern 
ourselves  with  all  the  various  fields  of  human  interest 
of  this  age;  it  is  possible  that  that  which  is  relevant  to 
our  purpose  can  be  found  within  a comparatively  small 
and  well-defined  portion  of  it.  But  in  order  to  get  the 
general  background  and  to  define  in  it  our  particular 
field  of  investigation,  we  must  first  make  a survey  in 
large  outline  of  the  thought  of  the  age.  We  must,  in  a 
general  way,  see  what  men  are  thinking  about  and  what 
motives  control  their  thinking.  We  must  note  what 
general  tendencies  prevail.  Then  we  can  define  systems, 
first  in  terms  of  interests  or  subjects  thought  about,  and 
second  in  terms  of  tendencies  of  thought  or  points  of 
view.  And  having  defined  Locke  and  Deism  in  this  way, 
we  shall  have  a foundation  for  making  comparisons  and 
getting  other  historical  data  that  will  enlighten  us  con- 
cerning the  relation  that  exists  between  them. 

When  we  seek  to  bring  the  thought  of  this  age  into 
a comprehensive  outline,  we  can  probably  do  it  to  best 


The  Method 


37 


advantage  by  grouping  it  about  four  chief  centers  of 
interest. 

First,  there  were  the  politico-economic  interests' 
which  concerned  everybody.  Probably  in  no  other 
sphere  of  life  is  the  evidence  so  plain  that  this  was  a 
period  of  transition.  Within  less  than  half  a century 
the  government  had  been  overthrown  three  times. 
Perhaps  in  no  other  period  of  English  history  has 
political  life  been  so  intense.  There  were  long-continued 
and  bitter  parliamentary  and  military  conflicts,  and 
the  public  debate  by  means  of  books  and  pamphlets  was/ 
most  vigorous.1 

Second,  there  were  the  religion  and  theological 
interests,  in  which  we,  at  least  for  the  seventeenth 
century,  include  the  ethical.  Perhaps  the  age  was  more 
noted  for  sectarian  rivalry  than  for  piety.  But  be 
that  as  it  may,  the  situation  in  the  field  of  organized 
religion — and  this  included  almost  everybody — was 
intense.  The  principles  of  toleration  were  slowly 
gaining;  but  the  rule  of  the  Peace  of  Augsburg  was  to  a 
large  extent  enforced  by  the  party  in  power.2  The  " 
administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  church  was  entangled 
with  the  political  fortunes  of  the  nation.  All  parties 

1 “It  has  been  computed  that  within  the  twenty  years  from  1640  to 
1660,  not  less  than  tjiirty  thousand  pamphlets  and  treatises  issued  from 
the  press  on  the  subject  of  ecclesiastical  and  civil  government.” — M. 
Curtis,  Locke's  Ethical  Philosophy  (Leipzig,  1890),  p.  4. 

2 During  the  controversies  that  accompanied  and  followed  the 
Reformation,  there  was  a modus  vivendi  agreed  upon  at  the  Diet  of 
Augsburg  in  1555,  according  to  which  the  princes  could  select  the  type 
of  faith  they  preferred  and  enforce  religious  conformity  to  it  in  their~! 
respective  realms.  The  principle  of  the  religious  peace  of  Augsburg  was  J 
cujus  regio  ejus  religio. 


38 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


agreed  in  the  conviction  that  the  state  must  take  account 
of  the  religious  welfare  of  its  members.1  Thousands  of 
clergymen  were  turned  out  of  their  pulpits  because  they 
f'refused  to  recognize  the  changes  ordered  by  those  in 
L authority.2  There  were  also  the  vigorous  pamphlet 
debates,  to  which  almost  all  of  the  great  men  of  the  day 
contributed.3  However  toward  the  close  of  the  seven-1 
teenth  century  and  during  the  fore  part  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  the  religious  life  of  the  nation  waned.4  J 

Third,  there  were  the  scientific  interests,  which 
occupied  the  attention  of  some  of  the  greatest  minds  of 
the  age.  In  true  Baconian  spirit  men  were  ceasing  to 
reason  out  how  things  must  be  and  were  beginning  to 
observe  how  they  are.  Perhaps  no  fact  has  more  sig- 
nificance in  this  connection  than  the  founding  of  the 
Royal  Society  for  Improving  Natural  Knowledge.  It 
was  the  century  of  Harvey,  Boyle,  Sydenham,  and 
Newton.  The  number  of  real  scientists  was  growing, 
but  there  were  still  comparatively  few. 

Fourth,  there  were  the  philosbphical  interests,  which 
were  represented  by  a still  smaller  number  of  learned 
men.  Bacon  was  perhaps  rather  a maker  of  programs 
than  a philosopher;  Hobbes  conceived  a great  mechan- 
ical system,  but  he  stood  alone  and  had  practically  no 
followers;  Locke  founded  the  empirical  school  of 
philosophy;  and  the  Cambridge  Platonists  were  an 

1 Bourne,  Life  of  John  Locke,  I,  1-66. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  96. 

3 Hobbes,  Milton,  Boyle,  Newton,  Locke,  and  many  other  scholarly 
laymen,  and  almost  all  of  the  prominent  clergymen. 

4 Abbey  and  Overton,  The  English  Church  in  the  Eighteenth  Century 
(London,  1878),  I,  1,  2. 


The  Method 


39 


influential  group.  There  are  never  many  philosophers 
in  any  period,  and  there  were  not  many  here;  but  some 
of  them  were  pathfinders. 

There  were  these  four  great  fields  of  human  interest. 
Within  each  one  of  these  four  fields,  there  were  two 
divergent  tendencies,  the  conservative  and  the  liberal. 
And  though  all  shades  of  opinions  were  represented, 
broadly  there  were  but  two  parties,  the  conservative 
and  the  liberal. 

The  conservative  party  represented  the  hold  that  *]• 
tradition  always  has  on  the  minds  of  many  men.  It 
sought  to  avoid  change,  to  maintain  things  just  as  they 
had  been ; it  was  prone  to  appeal  to  authority,  to  deter- 
mine issues  of  today  by  yesterday.  In  politics  it 
generally  stood  for  the  divine  right  of  kings;  in  religious 
matters,  for  revived  scholasticism  in  theology  and  for 
intolerance;1  in  science  it  opposed  the  Baconian  reform; 
and  in  philosophy  it  was  still  quoting  Aristotle  and  the  j 
Schoolmen.2 

Over  against  this  conservative,  tradition-loving 
group  was  the  critical  or  rationalistic  or  liberal  party. 
As  we  shall  see  later,  it  protested  against  tradition  and 
authority  in  the  name  of  reason  and  nature.3  It  used 

bishop  Sprat  in  1667  felt  that  it  was  necessary  “to  defend  the 
Fellows  from  the  attacks  and  criticisms  of  Aristotelian  philosophers. 
....  He  tells  us,  indeed,  that  the  objects  and  cavils  of  the  detractors  of 
so  noble  an  Institution,  did  make  it  necessary  for  him  to  write  of  it,  not 
in  the  way  of  a plain  history,  but  as  an  apology.” — Weld,  History  of  the 
Royal  Society,  I,  Preface. 

2 Bourne,  op.  cit.,  I,  47. 

3 These  two  focal  concepts  of  progressive  speculation  were  inherited 
from  a former  period;  an  account  of  their  origin  and  use  would  be  inter- 
esting, but  it  would  not  be  relevant  to  our  problem. 


40 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


these  two  concepts  for  correcting  or  criticizing  or  ground- 
ing institutions  and  for  constructing  systems.  It 
represented  a constructive  and  progressive  motive  as 
well  as  critical ; it  was  by  no  means  merely  the  expression 
of  a negative  spirit. 

Though  these  two  tendencies  of  thought  are  present 
in  each  of  the  four  fields  of  interest  described  above,  for 
the  purposes  of  this  investigation  we  can  limit  our  atten- 
tion almost  wholly  to  the  rationalistic-critical  move- 
ment, for  it  is  here  that  we  find  Locke  and  the  Deists. 
The  conservative  motive  in  the  thought  of  England  of 
this  period  concerns  us  only  as  a common  object  of 
attack  for  all  the  progressive  thinkers;  hence  it  has  a 
negatively  determinative  value. 

We  shall  now  submit  a tentative  definition  of  Lockian 
thought  and  of  Deism.  As  we  shall  see  later,  it  will  be 
inadequate ; in  some  respects  we  shall  require  something 
more  definite.  But  it  is  sufficient  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  more  closely  our  field  of  investigation  and 
for  pointing  out  the  lines  that  must  be  followed.  In 
making  this  preliminary  definition  for  our  guidance,  we 
have  no  difficulty  in  getting  Locke’s  views;  we  know 
where  to  look  for  them,  they  are  easily  accessible.  But 
when  we  come  to  the  Deists  the  task  is  not  so  simple. 
As  is  generally  the  case  with  a movement  or  school  of 
thinkers,  it  does  not  have  a clear  outline.  We  are,  as 
it  were,  feeling  our  way,  looking  for  the  path  that  will 
lead  us  to  our  goal.  For  the  present  we  accept  as  proper 
representatives  of  the  deistic  movement  only  those 
thinkers  who  have  been  generally  recognized  as  con- 
stituting the  movement  when  it  was  at  its  height— 
Blount,  Toland,  Collins,  Tindal,  Wollaston,  Woolston, 


The  Method 


4i 


Morgan,  Chubb,  and  Herbert  who  was  the  father  of  the 
movement  in  England.1 

In  politics  Locke  was  liberal;  the  Deists  showed 
little  or  no  interest. 

In  theology  and  religion  Locke  was  rationalistic  and 
critical  in  method  and  conservative  in  results;2  the 
Deists  were  rationalistic  and  critical  in  method,  and  in 
their  results  were  increasingly  hostile  to  positive  Chris- 
tianity.3 

In  science  Locke  was  liberal  and  progressive;  the 
Deists  showed  no  interest.4 

In  philosophy  Locke  was  progressive,  his  method 
was  rationalistic  and  critical;  in  so  far  as  individual 
Deists  had  a system  of  philosophy,  it  represented  the 
new  movements. 

We  could  define  in  like  manner  any  other  men  or 
movements  of  this  time,  but  it  is  not  necessary.  We 

1 Hoffding,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  I,  379;  Falkenberg, 
History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  p.  179. 

2 Essay,  IV,  xviii,  5,  6. 

3 Toland  wrote  Christianity  Not  Mysterious  to  prove  that  there  was 
nothing  in  religion  that  was  above  reason.  He  accepted  miracles  (pp.  47, 
90,  147)  and  assumes  the  divine  origin  of  Scripture  (Preface,  pp.  xv, 
xxiv,  4,  18,  38,  41,  and  elsewhere).  When  we  come  to  Tindal,  we  find 
in  Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation  (London,  1735)  a certain  hostility  to 
miracles  which  is  not  well  defined;  they  have  no  evidential  value  (pp. 
200,  370).  “There  are  no  miracles  recorded  in  the  Bible,  but  many  of 
the  like  nature  are  to  be  found  in  pagan  histories”  (p.  192).  He  unhesi- 
tatingly sets  up  natural  religion  as  the  norm  for  all  religions  (pp.  59,  67, 
69).  Morgan  asserts  that  so-called  supernatural  revelation  cannot  be 
relied  upon,  for  there  is  confusion  everywhere  and  man  has  nothing  left 
but  reason  ( Physico-Theology ).  These  opinions  may  be  taken  as  typical 
of  the  deistic  movement  when  it  was  at  its  height. 

4 Bourne  in  his  Life  of  John  Locke  gives  several  accounts  of  observa- 
tions that  he  made  in  medicine  and  of  his  interest  in  the  scientific  dis- 
coveries of  Boyle,  Sydenham,  and  Newton. 


42 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


shall  have  occasion  to  refer  to  their  formative  principles 
and  to  their  conclusions,  but  it  would  not  further  our 
purpose  to  define  them  here. 

From  the  definitions  of  Locke  and  Deism  just  given, 
it  is  clear  that  our  field  of  investigation  is  limited;  it 
covers  only  a part  of  the  whole  sphere  of  interests  of 
England  of  the  seventeenth  century.  Toleration  has  a 
political  aspect,  but  it  can  be  considered  along  with  the 
religious  interests.  The  deistic  philosophy  and  its 
relations  are  unimportant.  Both  will  be  studied  with 
the  direct  internal  evidences  of  dependence  of  the  Deists 
on  Locke.  Thus  our  investigation  is  limited  almost 
exclusively  to  the  theological  and  religious  field  and  to 
the  liberal  thinkers  in  it. 

4.  RESULT  OF  THIS  STUDY  OF  METHOD 

In  summing  up  this  study  of  method  we  find  that 
we  can  determine  the  sort  and  degree  of  relation 
that  exists  between  Locke  and  English  Deism,  first,  by 
making  comparisons — -that  is,  by  setting  forth  likenesses 
and  differences,  and  then  interpreting  them  critically; 
secondly,  by  collecting  and  interpreting  other  relevant 
historical  data.  Both  of  these  operations  involve  clear 
definition  which  is  the  determination  of  characteristic 
features;  and  this  can  be  done  only  with  reference  to 
the  whole  background  on  which  Locke  and  Deism 
appeared.  Thus  our  investigation  leads  to  a more  or 
less  extended  study  of  the  whole  liberal  movement  of 
this  period. 

But  we  are  confronted  at  once  by  an  embarrassing 
situation.  We  are  to  make  a comparison,  and  a compari- 
son presupposes  that  we  have  already  clearly  defined  the 


The  Method 


43 


elements  that  are  being  compared;  whereas  we  have 
thus  far  only  tentative  definitions  of  Lockian  thought 
and  Deism.  There  is  confusion  and  contradiction  here 
that  cannot  be  avoided.  It  arises  from  the  fact  that 
in  the  last  analysis  definition  and  comparison  are  not 
separable  processes.  Perhaps  we  should  say  that  they 
are  the  same  process  regarded  from  the  points  of  view  of 
different  interests.  In  definition  we  set  forth  the  char- 
acteristic features  of  that  which  is  defined  for  the  pur- 
pose of  identification,  and  in  comparison  we  do  the 
same  for  the  purpose  of  studying  it  in  certain  relations. 
The  two  processes  advance  pari  passu.  There  can  be 
no  clear  definition  which  is  not  ultimately  a comparison, 
and  there  is  no  comparison  which  does  not  at  least  to 
some  extent  define.  In  this  study  we  shall  gradually 
approach  our  definition  of  Locke’s  religious  views  and 
of  Deism  by  the  progressive  elimination  of  factors  that 
by  critical  comparison  are  found  to  be  irrelevant.  We 
shall  then  see  what  the  likenesses  and  differences  that 
exist  between  Locke  and  Deism  mean  in  terms  of  some 
other  relation. 

With  this  understanding  of  the  scope  or  our  investi- 
gation, we  shall  first  compare  Locke  and  Deism  with 
respect  to  their  point  of  view.  Both  were  rationalistic, 
both  appealed  to  nature  and  reason  in  their  speculations. 
We  shall  study  the  use  that  was  made  by  them  and  by 
others  of  these  two  focal  concepts. 

Then  we  shall  compare  the  conclusions  at  which  they 
arrive  concerning  disputed  points  in  the  field  of  theo- 
logical and  religious  interests.  But  in  order  to  do  this 
we  must  take  into  consideration  the  teachings  of  their 
contemporaries  who  discussed  the  same  subjects. 


44 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


And  finally  we  shall  examine  the  direct  evidences  of 
relation  between  Locke  and  Deism. 

This  is  simply  the  genetic  method  with  more  emphasis 
than  usual  placed  upon  the  study  of  contemporary 
thought.  It  aims  to  avoid  the  error  that  is  likely  to  be 
made  if  the  linear  character  of  the  development  of  any 
movement  is  so  emphasized  that  significant  factors  are 
neglected.  A number  of  those  whose  views  have  been 
quoted  in  chapter  ii  seem  to  have  committed  this  error. 
It  is  as  if  they  found  certain  elements  in  Locke,  and  find- 
ing them  in  Deism,  perhaps  further  developed,  they 
conclude,  apparently  without  any  further  investigation, 
that  Locke  accounted  wholly  or  in  very  large  measure 
for  Deism  or  was  a part  of  the  deistic  movement.1 

This  method  also  differs  widely  from  that  which 
Crous  followed  in  his  special  study,  as  set  forth  in  the 
preceding  chapter.  He  also  makes  comparisons  between 
Locke  and  Deism.  But  in  the  method  that  is  advocated 
here,  agreements  and  differences  are  studied  critically  on 
the  background  of  what  others  were  thinking  at  the  same 
time,  and  they  are  interpreted  in  the  light  of  con- 
temporary thought.  Whereas  Crous  simply  noted  like- 
nesses and  differences,  and,  without  determining  their 
significance  by  a more  extended  comparison  with  what 
other  men  were  then  thinking,  rather  naively  balances 
his  list  of  likenesses  and  differences  and  concludes  that 
in  most  respects  Locke  was  a Deist. 

1 If  we  may  venture  a theory  as  to  whence  this  conviction  arose,  we 
would  suggest  that  it  may  be  due  to  Voltaire,  who  considered  Locke  the 
father  of  all  eighteenth-century  movements,  including  the  very  radical 
systems  of  France.  When  the  writers  of  histories  of  philosophy  discuss 
Voltaire,  their  style  has  the  vividness  that  is  characteristic  of  the  pres- 
entation of  first-hand  information;  while  their  description  of  the  English 
Deists  often  has  a hesitant  and  somewhat  uncertain  manner  which  may 
indicate  that  their  information  is,  in  part  at  least,  second  hand. 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  TWO  FOCAL  CONCEPTS 

At  this  time  everybody,  at  least  every  progressive 
thinker,  appealed  to  nature  and  reason  in  grounding 
institutions  and  principles.  In  this  Locke  and  the 
Deists  agree;  both  were  rationalistic  and  critical  in 
method,  as  were  also  the  other  representatives  of  the 
progressive  movement.  The  Deists  differed  from  Locke 
and  the  other  liberal  thinkers  in  that  they  applied  the 
rationalistic  method  more  radically. 

In  setting  forth  the  use  that  was  made  of  these  two 
focal  concepts  of  speculative  thought  in  England  in  the 
seventeenth  century  and  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  it  will  be  convenient  to  study  the  progressive 
thinkers  in  three  groups:  the  Rational  Theologians, 
the  Philosophers  among  whom  is  Locke,  and  the 
Deists. 

I.  ORIGIN  OF  THE  TWO  FOCAL  CONCEPTS  OF 
RATIONALISTIC-CRITICAL 
SPECULATION 

We  have  described  Locke,  Deism,  and  certain  other 
men  and  movements  of  this  age  as  liberal  or  progressive, 
that  is,  as  rationalistic  and  critical.  This  is  descriptive 
of  their  intellectual  attitude  toward  the  problems  they 
were  considering.  They  were  not  prone  to  appeal  to 
authority;  they  rather  protested  against  authority,  or 
scholasticism  and  tradition,  in  the  name  of  freedom  of 


45 


46 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


thought.  They  emphasized  free  investigation.  In  the 
first  chapter  we  saw  that  this  was  the  normal  result  of 
the  progressive  emancipation  of  man  intellectually, 
scientifically,  religiously,  politically.  This  movement 
had  its  roots  far  back  in  the  centuries.  Man  brought  to 
light  again  the  treasures  of  the  ancient  world,  and  this 
stimulated  independent  thought.  He  discovered  nature, 
and  himself  as  a part  of  it,  and  also  that  these  ideas  did 
not  fit  the  authoritatively  transmitted  systems.  Some 
seeing  saw  not,  but  many  followed  the  new  vision  of 
truth;  and  their  mental  horizon  grew  until  it  could  no 
longer  be  forced  to  fit  mediaeval  forms.  And  each 
discovery  or  invention  was  not  merely  so  much  achieved ; 
newly  discovered  truth  became  at  once  a stimulus  to 
seek  more  truth.  A new  spirit  was  moving,  and  moving 
mightily  in  the  dawning  of  a new  age. 

But  not  only  were  scientific  and  philosophical  systems 
challenged;  all  institutions,  human  and  divine,  were 
called  upon  to  give  an  account  of  themselves.  Once 
man  had  discovered  nature,  he  began  to  explain  things  in 
terms  of  nature.  In  this  he  was  helped  by  the  new 
learning,  which  enabled  him  to  know  the  prominent  part 
that  the  concept  of  nature  had  played  in  the  speculations 
of  Greek  and  Roman  thinkers.  Before  this,  explanation 
had  been  almost  entirely  in  terms  of  the  supernatural; 
but  now,  in  the  new  age,  the  concept  of  nature  is  used 
v.as  an  ultimate  for  grounding  institutions.  Grotius 
bases  the  authority  of  law,  not  on  theological  sanctions, 
but  on  human  nature.  Society  is  founded  on  principles 
that  are  in  man — ex  principiis  homini  internist  And 
Hobbes  would  account  for  the  state  by  making  it  a 

1 Hoffding,  Brie}  History  0}  Modern  Philosophy,  p.  11. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


47 


convenient  device  for  escaping  conditions  that  were 
intolerable.  Yet  these  conditions,  which  made  neces- 
sary a society  ordered  under  laws,  sprang  from  the 
fundamental  principles  of  human  nature.  In  other 
words,  the  state  was  negatively  grounded  in  nature. 

Rationalism  was  another  motive  in  the  critical 
method  which  was  influential  in  determining  its  results. 
This,  however,  was  not  foreign  to  the  spirit  of  scholas- 
ticism when  it  was  at  its  height.  In  fact  the  great 
systems  of  Albertus  Magnus  and  Thomas  Aquinas  had 
in  them  the  germs  of  that  which  later  effected  their 
overthrow.  Albert  recognized  the  natural  law  of  reason 
as  having  authority  in  matters  of  religion.  However 
there  are  questions  for  which  philosophy  has  no  final 
answer  “and  must  remain  standing  before  the  antinomy 
of  different  possibilities.”  Here  revelation  decides. 
“Revelation  is  above  reason,  but  not  contrary  to 
reason.”1  The  position  taken  by  Thomas  Aquinas  is 
essentially  the  same — that  knowledge,  which  man  by  his 
unaided  power  can  acquire,  that  is,  philosophical  knowl- 
edge, is  but  a lower  stage  in  the  realm  of  nature,  which 
is  completed  by  revelation  in  the  realm  of  grace.  And 
though  the  Scotists  increased  the  dividing  gulf  between 
reason  and  revelation,  when  the  new  age  came  we  find 
the  leaders  of  the  progressive  tendency  more  and  more 
appealing  to  reason,  and  in  the  field  of  religion  they  give 
it  an  authority  along  with  revelation,  and  the  most 
radical  finally  place  it  above  revelation.  At  first  “they 
conceive  the  relation  between  nature  and  revealed 
religion  quite  in  accordance  with  the  example  of  Albert 
and  Thomas;  revelation  is  above  reason  but  in  harmony 

1 Windleband,  A History  of  Philosophy,  p.  321. 


48 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


with  reason;  it  is  the  necessary  supplement  to  natural 
knowledge.”1 

Accordingly  it  was  to  be  expected  that,  once  the 
rationalistic  critical  movement  had  begun  in  England, 
religion  would  not  long  remain  unchallenged.  It  was 
also  to  be  expected  that  when  it  was  challenged  it  would 
be  in  the  name  of  nature  and  reason.  If  religion  is  true 
we  should  be  able  to  know  its  truths  by  a rational 
process,  and  we  should  find  that  it  has  its  foundations  in 
the  very  nature  of  things.  In  the  period  that  we  are 
studying  we  find  men  using  these  two  concepts  in  the 
study  of  religious  problems.  They  are  the  elements 
which  constitute  the  rationalistic-critical  method.2 

Nature  and  reason  will  be  treated  separately  in  this 
study.  However,  in  doing  so  we  shall  at  times  do 
violence  to  certain  systems.  For  though  they  are 
generally  distinguishable  factors  or  motives  in  the 
speculation  of  this  period,  they  are  by  some  writers 
linked  together  in  a way  that  is  most  puzzling.  Even 
that  widely  used  inherited  expression  “natural  light”  is 
not  at  all  clear  when  we  come  to  analyze  it.  It  is  made 
to  stand  for  that  natural  mental  equipment  of  man  by 
which  he  comes  into  the  possession  of  knowledge;  hence 
it  includes  reason.  Thus  reason  would  appear  as  a part 
of  nature;  and  as  a matter  of  fact  it  is  often  treated  as 
such.  And  again  it  seems  to  include  not  only  the  innate 

1 Windleband,  A History  of  Philosophy , p.  487. 

2 This  brief  account  of  the  source  of  the  two  motives,  that  we  are 
here  considering  as  applied  in  matters  of  religion,  is  in  no  sense  an 
exhaustive  discussion  of  their  genesis;  that  lies  beyond  the  purpose 
of  this  study.  We  are  undertaking  a study  of  certain  problems  in  which 
they  are  involved  and  by  way  of  introduction  have  indicated  their 
probable  origin,  which  is  sufficient  for  the  present  purposes. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


49 


capacities  of  man,  but  also  that  truth,  more  especially 
religious  and  moral  truth,  which  he  can  know  from  the 
world  about  him.  We  shall  find  that  there  is  no  con- 
sistent usage  of  the  term  reason  or  natural  light.  Its 
meaning  varies  often  in  the  same  writer.  It  is  probable 
that  some  used  it  without  any  clear  notion  as  to  just 
what  they  meant  by  it. 

There  are  also  different  senses  of  the  concept  nature. 
It  sometimes  is  just  the  sensible  world,  the  mechanically 
ordered  realm  about  us.  As  such  it  stands  in  contrast 
with  the  spiritual  world  including  God  and  man,  or  with 
the  supernatural.  Again  it  is  made  to  include  both  of 
these.  Then  it  is  the  whole  of  reality,  the  sum  total 
of  all  being;  and  in  this  sense  nothing  is  supernatural. 
Sometimes  it  seems  to  be  an  exaggerated  idea  of  the 
immanence  of  God  in  His  world.  Then  nature  and  God 
become  almost  identical;  what  nature  does  is  the  act  of 
Deity.  And  often  it  means  the  native  capacities  in  man, 
his  natural  endowment  by  which  he  is  able  to  know 
truth,  especially  principles  of  action,  God  and  his  duty 
toward  Him.  And  there  are  those  who  consider  nature 
an  eternal,  unchangeable  order,  apparently  independent 
of  God,  to  which  God  and  men  in  willing  and  acting 
must  conform.  We  shall  find  some  men  consistently 
holding  to  one  or  another  of  these  views,  while  others 
seem  to  use  the  term  in  several  different  senses. 

The  limitation  of  such  a study  as  this  prevents  an 
exhaustive  presentation  of  the  part  that  this  concept  of 
nature  plays  in  all  of  the  important  systems  that  were 
produced  by  the  liberal  thinkers  of  this  period;  the 
investigation  will  therefore  be  limited  to  those  that  were 
typical  or  influential. 


So 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


2.  THE  USE  OF  THE  CONCEPT  OF  NATURE 
A.  THE  RATIONAL  THEOLOGIANS 

> Richard  Hooker’s  Ecclesiastical  Polity  was  much 
quoted  by  all  parties  in  this  period,  including  the  Deists. 
Locke  refers  to  him  as  the  “judicious  Hooker”  in  his 
Essay  and  speaks  of  him  as  an  authority  in  his  Two 
Treatises  of  Government. 

e is  seeking  to  derive  order,  more  especially  ecclesi- 
astical order,  not  only  from  revelation,  but  also  from 
(^nature.  All  government  is  based  on  this,1  whatever 
form  the  government  may  taked^But  nature  is  not 
conceived  as  something  entirely  separate  from  God;  it 
“is  nothing  else  but  His  instrument.”3  Nature  as  well 
as  revelation  teaches  us  that  order  must  take  the  place 
of  contention.  “But  of  this  we  are  right  sure,  that 
nature,  Scripture,  and  experience  itself,  have  all  taught 
the  world  to  seek  for  the  ending  of  contentions.”  This 
results  in  establishing  order.4  Natural  law  is  estab- 
lished by  God;  it  is  from  God,  by  God’s  command.5 
Thus  according  to  Hooker  God  is  the  author  of  nature, 
her  laws  are  of  His  making,  her  voice  is  His  instrument; 
hence  he  can  well  say:  “obedience  of  creatures  unto  the 
law  of  nature  is  the  stay  of  the  whole  world.”6  Things 
revealed  in  Scripture  or  in  nature  have  the  same  divine 
authority.7  For  nature  is  of  God,  her  order  is  from  Him, 

1 Essay,  IV,  xvii,  7;  Two  Treatises  of  Government,  Book  II,  chap.  ii. 

2 Hooker,  Ecclesiastical  Polity,  Works  (Oxford,  1888),  I,  146; 

P-  243- 

3 Ibid.,  pp.  210,  227.  5 Ibid,.,  pp.  206,  207. 

4 Ibid.,  p.  166.  6 Ibid.,  p.  208. 

7 John  Tulloch,  Rational  Theology  and  Christian  Philosophy  (London, 
1872),  I,  51. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


5i 


her  message  is  His  word  to  us  for  our  guidance,  natural 
law  is  by  His  authority. 

Even  Stillingfleet,  who  later  became  Locke’s  critic, 
at  least  in  his  early  period  did  not  hesitate  to  say  “the 
law  of  nature  binds  indispensably,  as  it  depends  not 
upon  any  arbitrary  constitution,  but  is  founded  on  the 
intrinsical  nature  of  good  and  evil  in  things  themselves.” 
Such  a law  “if  we  respect  the  rise,  extent  and  immuta- 
bility of  it,  may  be  called  deservedly  the  law  of  nature; 
but  if  we  look  at  the  emanation,  efflux  and  origin  of  it, 
it  is  divine  law,”  for  “it  depends  upon  the  will  of  God” 
and  therefore  the  obligation  must  come  from  Him.1 
And  yet  he  tends  to  regard  this  law  of  nature,  in  its 
unchangeableness,  as  independent  of  t God,  for  he  also 
says:  “The  law  of  nature,  where  it  is  clearly  intelligible, 
is  paramount  and  cannot  be  superseded  by  any  positive 
human  or  divine  enactments.”2  God  “cannot  change 
the  nature  of  moral  obedience.  He  cannot  make  good 
evil  or  evil  good.”3  It  seems  that  we  have  here  two 
different  motives:  the  first  is  the  voice  of  Hooker,  the 
second  is  like  the  view  of  the  Cambridge  Platonists. 

In  Tillotson,  whom,  according  to  Collins,  “all 
English  freethinkers  own  as  their  head,”4  we  find  a like 

1 That  which  is  deduced  from  the  “perceptive  law  of  nature  is 
of  divine  right.”  Quoted  by  Tulloch  from  Stillingfleet’s  Irenicum, 
pp.  427,  428. 

2 Tulloch,  op.  cit.,  I,  430. 

3 In  establishing  and  shaping  church  polity,  Stillingfleet  appeals 
not  only  to  Scripture  and  tradition  but  also  to  that  which  nature 
dictates.  He  thus  deduces  the  fundamental  principles  for  organizing 
the  church  (Tulloch,  I,  437-38).  The  “light  and  the  law  of  nature 
should  guarantee  the  right  of  appeal”  (ibid.,  p.  441). 

4 A.  Collins,  A Discourse  on  Freethinking  (London,  1713),  p.  171. 


52 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


use  of  nature  as  an  ultimate  term  for  giving  account  of 
religion.  He  considered  natural  knowledge  of  God  the 
foundation  for  the  ideas  of  good  and  evil  and  for  all 
revealed  religion,1  the  surest  ground  of  religion.2  In 
fact,  “Christianity  hath  hardly  imposed  any  other  laws 
upon  us  but  what  are  enacted  in  our  natures,  or  are 
agreeable  to  the  prime  and  fundamental  laws  of  it.”3 

We  may  think  that  something  of  this  kind  was  to  be 
expected  from  Tillotson,  whose  liberalism  was  recog- 
nized, though  his  orthodoxy  was  not  seriously  challenged; 
but  surely  such  a positive  defender  of  Christianity 
against  Deism  as  Sherlock  will  sound  a more  positive 
note.  In  his  book,  The  Trial  of  the  Witnesses,  which 
appeared  in  1729,  and  in  a few  years  ran  through  fourteen 
editions,  we  have  “the  very  centre  of  the  orthodox 
position.”4  He  says  in  a sermon  that  the  law  established 
proper  social  relations  which,  often  disregarded,  give 
occasion  for  repentance.  Hence  “repentance  had  refer- 
ence to  the  law  of  nature  against  which  men  had 
offended.”5  He  refers  to  the  “law  of  reason  and  nature,” 
which  had  been  darkened;  yet  “the  general  principles  of 
religion”  were  revealed  in  human  nature.6  Tindal 
quotes  Sherlock  on  the  title-page  of  Christianity  as  Old 
as  Creation  as  follows:  “The  religion  of  the  Gospel  is  the 
true  original  religion  of  reason  and  nature.”  Thus 

1 John  Tillotson,  Works  (London,  1720),  I,  405,  406. 

2 Ibid.,  I,  436,  579. 

3 Ibid.  (9th  ed.,  1743),  I,  128-74. 

4 Stephen,  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  I,  243. 

3 T.  Sherlock,  Discourses  Preached  on  Several  Occasions  (Oxford, 
1797),  V,  137. 

6 Ibid.,  V,  136. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


53 


nature  is  a datum  from  which,  by  a normal  use  of  our 
faculties,  we  can  know  religious  truths  without  revela- 
tion. Both  Tillotson  and  Sherlock  are  less  clear  than 
Hooker  as  to  what  they  mean  by  nature,  but  they  go 
beyond  him  in  magnifying  its  importance  in  problems 
of  religion. 

B.  THE  PHILOSOPHERS 

Turning  from  the  theologians  to  the  philosophers, 
including  the  Christian  philosophers  of  Cambridge  (we 
shall  consider  Herbert  with  the  Deists),  we  find  that 
Bacon’s  reforms  emphasize  nature,  and  that  he  recog- 
nized natural  theology,  although  he  assigned  it  a very 
modest  role.  Hobbes  in  his  world  of  matter  and  motion 
reasons  “back  from  the  world  to  God,”  although  God  is 
really  incomprehensible  to  man;  yet  “if  we  went  back 
far  enough  we  should  necessarily  reach  an  eternal  cause 
which  did  not  in  its  turn  have  a cause.”1  And  organized 
society  is  devised  as  an  escape  from  an  intolerable  state 
of  nature;  that  is,  the  state  is  naturally  though  negatively 
grounded.  Moral  duties  “have  their  elementary  basis 
in  human  nature,  but  they  derive  all  their  social  or 
organic  effect  from  the  supreme  political  power”;  and 
religion,  though  it  has  its  truths  guaranteed  by  the 
authority  of  the  sovereign,  “has  a natural  foundation  in 
human  fear.”2  In  both  Bacon  and  Hobbes  philosophy 
and  theology  are  sharply  separated  from  each  other,  the 
natural  stands  in  a clear  contrast  with  the  supernatural. 
Their  line  of  thought  “takes  as  its  foundation  the  data 
of  external  or  internal  nature,  and  seeks  starting  from 

1 Hoffding,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  I,  273. 

3 Tulloch,  op.  cit.,  II,  27,  28. 


54 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


these  to  arrive,  by  means  of  induction  or  deduction,  at 
further  results.” 

Among  the  philosophers  “there  is  another  tend- 
ency connected  historically  with  Neo-Platonism,  which 
believes  there  is  a foundation  for  the  highest  ideas, 
more  especially  ethical  ideas,  which  is  exalted  above  all 
experience.”1  For  the  Cambridge  Platonists,  who  were 
among  the  chief  opponents  of  Hobbes,  there  are  eternal 
truths  objectively  real  and  independent  of  the  knowing 
human  subject.  There  are  ultimate  fixed  standards  of 
morals,2  and  religion  must  conform  to  similar  norms. 
If  it  does  not  refine,  temper,  and  govern  practice,  it 
“falls  short  of  the  very  principles  of  nature.”3  For 
Culverwell,  who  if  not  of  this  school  is  near  to  it,  nature 
is  “ the  origin  of  existence,  it  is  the  very  genius  of  entity”; 
it  “speaks  the  action  of  existence,”  and  it  is  the  principle 
working  in  spirituals  as  well  as  “the  source  of  motion 
and  rest  in  corporeals.”4  And  the  law  of  nature  is  from 
the  eternal  law;  as  Aquinas  said,  “The  law  of  nature  is 
nothing  but  the  copying  out  of  the  eternal  law,  and  the 

1 Hoffding,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  I,  287,  288. 

2 “It  is  impossible  anything  should  be  by  will  only,  that  is,  without 
a nature  or  entity,  or  that  the  nature  and  essence  of  anything  should  be 
arbitrary.”  And  concerning  the  moral  law:  Suppose  such  a law  to  be 
established,  it  must  be  either  right  to  obey  it,  and  wrong  to  disobey  it,  or 
indifferent  whether  we  obey  it  or  disobey  it.  But  a law  which  it  is 
indifferent  whether  we  obey  or  not  cannot,  it  is  evident,  be  the  source  of 
moral  distinctions;  and  on  the  contrary  supposition,  if  it  is  right  to  obey 
the  law,  and  wrong  to  disobey  it,  these  distinctions  must  have  had  an 
existence  antecedent  to  the  law  (R.  Cudworth,  Immutable  Morality 
[London,  1731],  Book  I,  chap.  i).  And  in  like  spirit,  “Moral  laws  are 
laws  of  themselves,  without  sanction  by  will”  (Whichcote  as  quoted  by 
Tulloch,  op.  cit.,  II,  106). 

3 Tulloch,  op.  cit.,  II,  106. 

4 N.  Culverwell,  The  Light  of  Nature  (London,  1857),  pp.  38,  39. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


55 


imprinting  of  it  upon  the  breast  of  a rational  being.” 
But  in  Culverwell  a sort  of  Christian  pantheistic  view  of 
nature  prevails,  which  makes  it  dependent  on  or  even 
identical  with  God,  rather  than  the  Platonic  motive 
which  has  just  been  mentioned.  This  eternal  law  is  not 
distinguishable  from  God.1 

Taking  the  school  as  a whole,  they  sought  to  account 
for  the  highest  ideas  by  assuming  eternal  and  immutable 
standards  or  archetypes,  which  with  some  men  seem  to 
constitute  a realm  of  reals  separate  from  God;  while  in 
others  the  standards  and  the  eternal  law  of  nature  seem 
to  be  an  expression  of  God  Himself.  It  was  character- 
istic of  the  school  to  hold  that  our  knowledge  of  the  law 
of  nature  was  an  immediate  certainty  innate  in  the  mind 
of  man.2 

When  we  come  to  Locke  the  concept  of  nature, 
although  very  important  in  some  connections,  seems  to 
play  a less  conspicuous  part.  He  uses  it  in  several 
senses  and  is  not  always  clear.  In  the  Essay  he  refers 
to  the  law  of  nature  frequently,  and  sometimes  in 
important  connections.  Because  he  denies  innate  laws 
he  does  not  wish  to  be  understood  as  denying  that  there 
is  a law  of  nature,  which  we  can  know  by  proper  use  of 
our  senses  and  faculties,  that  is,  by  the  light  of  nature 
without  revelation.3  This  law  of  nature  seems,  at  least 

1 Ibid.,  pp.  so,  79,  98. 

2 The  devout  scientist  Boyle  saw  in  nature  a revelation  of  God 
sufficiently  clear  to  enable  man  to  know  Him  and  to  grasp  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  natural  religion,  which  is  “the  foundation  upon 
which  revealed  religion  ought  to  be  superstructed.”  From  nature  we 
get  as  it  were  the  stock  upon  which  Christianity  must  be  engrafted 
(R.  Boyle’s  Works  [London,  1744],  V,  46,  685). 

3 John  Locke,  Works,  I,  44;  also  Essay,  I,  iii,  13. 


56  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

in  one  form,  to  concern  our  duty  toward  God,  as  that 
can  be  inferred  by  the  unaided  capacities  of  man.1  This 
appears  to  be  the  same  as  “divine  law,”  for  he  says  that 
by  this  he  means  “that  law  which  God  has  set  to  the 
actions  of  men,  whether  promulgated  to  them  by  the 
light  of  nature,  or  the  voice  of  revelation.”2  There  is  an 
order  that  arises  from  the  nature  of  things,  which  we  can 
know  by  a proper  application  of  our  faculties.  We  may 
infer  that  this  order  is  from  God,  for  He  is  the  Creator 
and  Author  of  all  things.3  Moral  law  is  a part  of  the  law 
of  nature,  and  has  God  as  its  author.4 

In  discussing  civil  government,  especially  in  the 
second  book,  he  frequently  refers  to  the  “state  of 
nature,”  apparently  meaning  thereby  the  condition  of 
the  race  when  socially  unorganized.  But  man  is  not 
lawless  here.  “The  state  of  nature  has  a law  of  nature 
to  govern  it,  which  obliges  everyone;  and  reason,  which 
is  that  law,  teaches  all  mankind,  who  will  but  consult  it, 
that  being  all  equal  and  independent,  no  one  ought  to 
harm  another  in  his  life,  health,  liberty,  or  possessions.” 
There  is  such  a thing  as  “equality  of  men  by  nature”; 

1 Boyle’s  Works,  I,  37,  38;  Essay,  I,  iii,  6.  “I  grant  the  existence 
of  God  is  so  many  ways  manifest,  and  the  obedience  we  owe  Him  so 
congruous  to  the  light  of  reason,  that  a great  part  of  mankind  give 
testimony  to  the  law  of  nature.”  The  true  ground  of  morality  “can 
only  be  the  will  and  law  of  a God,  who  sees  men  in  the  dark,  has  in  His 
hands  rewards  and  punishments,”  etc. 

2 Essay,  II,  xxviii,  8,  n;  Government,  II,  ii,  6. 

3 He  seems  to  have  the  same  thought  in  mind  when  he  says,  “Reason 
is  natural  revelation  whereby  the  eternal  Father  of  light  and  fountain 
of  all  knowledge,  communicates  to  mankind  that  portion  of  the  truth 
which  he  has  laid  within  the  reach  of  their  natural  faculties”  [Essay, 
IV,  xix,  4). 

4 Ibid.,  I,  iii,  12. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


57 


that  is,  by  virtue  of  what  man  really  is.1  Here  the  state 
of  nature  is  set  over  against  organized  society,  and  the 
law  of  nature  over  against  positive  law. 

Yet  it  must  be  admitted  that  Locke,  when  compared 
with  others,  makes  but  little  use  of  the  concept  of  nature 
in  constructing  his  system;  when  he  does  so  it  is  prin- 
cipally in  the  spirit  of  Hooker.  Nature  is  a divine 
order  which  we  can  know;  and  her  laws  are  God’s  laws 
which  He  there  reveals  to  us.  He  certainly  differs  widely 
from  the  Cambridge  Platonists. 

c.  THE  DEISTS 

When  we  come  to  the  Deists  we  find  great  variety 
of  opinion.  But  though  they  differ  as  to  what  nature  is, 
all  agree  in  assigning  it  an  important  place  in  the  study 
of  all  religious  problems.  It  is  an  ultimate  norm  for 
testing  religious  truth. 

In  the  system  of  Herbert  of  Cherbury,  who  is 
generally  recognized  as  the  founder  of  Deism,  there  are 
four  groups  of  our  numerous  human  faculties:  natural 
instinct,  sensus  internus,  sensus  externus,  and  discursus. 
Of  these,  natural  instinct  is  the  most  certain.  From  it 
we  have  the  “common  notions”  which  are  innate  in  all 
men.  Among  these  “common  notions”  we  find  his 
five  fundamental  principles  of  all  religion.  “For 
Herbert,  natural  means  much  the  same  as  divine.  For 
him,  as  for  his  friend  Grotius,  the  law  of  nature  is  the  law 
of  God  and  of  supreme  authority.”  We  find  him  writing 
in  one  place  deurn  sive  naturam.2 

1 Governmetit,  II,  ii,  5. 

2 W.  R.  Sorley,  Mind  (1894),  p.  501. 


58  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

And  coming  to  the  less  important  deistical  writers 
just  before  Toland  and  Collins,  we  find  Blount  speaking 
of  his  five  articles,  which  follow  closely  those  of  Herbert, 
as  “grounded  upon  the  law  of  nature,”  which  is  “ God’s 
universal  Magna  Charta,  enacted  by  the  all-wise  and 
Supreme  Being  from  the  beginning  of  the  world.”1  He 
also  asserts  that  there  is  a sanction  arising  “from  the 
nature  of  things”  before  any  human  law.  This  is  much 
in  the  spirit  of  Hooker.2  Gildon  before  his  conversion 
from  Deism  wrote  of  “nature,  or  that  sacred  and  supreme 
cause  of  all  things,  which  we  term  God.”3  Thomas 
Burnet  used  almost  the  same  words.4  God’s  immanence 
is  so  magnified  that  it  seems  to  suggest  a sort  of 
pantheism. 

Though  Toland  speaks  frequenty  of  “natural  law,” 
“natural  reason,”  and  “natural  religion,”  it  is  difficult 
to  say  just  what  he  means  by  “ natural.”  It  is  clear  that 
in  many  instances  he  has  in  mind  that  which  is  neither 
God-given  nor  man-made,  but  it  is  impossible  to  define 
the  content  of  the  term  more  definitely.5 

For  Collins  the  term  scarcely  exists.  He  speaks 
of  “natural  light,”  but  this  is  in  a paragraph  from 
Tillotson.6 

Tindal,  who  with  Wollaston  represents  the  best 
scholarship  and  thought  among  the  Deists,  makes  very 

1 C.  Blount,  Religio  Laid  (London,  1683),  p.  94. 

2 Miscellaneous  Works  (London,  1695),  p.  93. 

3 Preface  to  Oracles  of  Reason  (London,  1693). 

4 Archiologiae  Philosophicae  (London,  1729),  p.  xxii. 

3 Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  46;  Nazarenus  (London,  1718),  p.  67; 
Letters  to  Serena  (London,  1704),  p.  117;  A Collection  of  Several  Pieces, 
etc.  (London,  1726),  II,  139. 

6 A Discourse  on  Freethinking , p.  173. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


59 


frequent  appeals  to  nature.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the 
concept  has  greater  prominence  in  the  systems  of  these 
two  men  than  in  that  of  any  other  Deist.  Tindal 
mentions  frequently  the  “law  of  nature”  which  is 
known  to  all  creatures.  It  is  perfect,  eternal,  unchange- 
able, and  the  gospel  was  not  intended  to  change  it;1 
all  religions  acknowledge  it  and  it  must  be  obeyed.2 
He  even  asserts  that  God’s  laws  are  built  on  the  eternal 
reason  of  things,  and  that  there  is  an  unalterable  reason 
of  things  according  to  which  God  must  act  when  He 
acts.3  We  know  by  reason  that  this  is  true.  You 
cannot  prove  anything  to  be  God’s  will  except  that 
which  His  nature  and  the  nature  of  things  point  out  to 
be  His  will.4  We  have  the  “light  of  nature”  which  is 
none  other  than  the  “voice  of  God  Himself.”5  The 
“book  of  nature”  is  in  characters  “legible  by  the  whole 
world  ” ; he  who  runs  may  read.  The  title  of  his  book  is 
Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  or  The  Gospel,  a Re  publi- 
cation of  the  Religion  of  Nature.  Thus  nature  appears 
as  that  which  stands  out  in  contrast  with  revelation.  It 
is  the  instrument  of  the  primitive  revelation  or  it  is  the 
primitive  revelation  itself.  Though  he  makes  frequent 
use  of  the  concept,  it  is  not  further  defined. 

Wollaston  emphasizes  “the  great  law  of  nature,  nr 
rather  as  we  shall  afterwards  find  reason  to  call  it,  of  the 
author  of  nature.”  It  is  that  no  intelligent  being  should 
contradict  truth  or  that  he  should  treat  everything  as 
being  what  it  is.6  The  infinite  original  cause  is  the 

1 Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  p.  8. 

2 Ibid.,  pp.  u-12.  4 Ibid.,  pp.  246,  247. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  124.  s Ibid.,  p.  273. 

6 W.  Wollaston,  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  (London,  1759),  p.  41. 


6o 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


author  of  nature  and  what  is  done  in  it.1  For  Wollaston 
nature  is  God’s  handiwork,  wherein  His  acts  appear, 
from  which  His  law,  which  is  the  law  of  nature,  can  be 
known. 

In  the  writings  of  Woolston  nature  seems  to  play  no 
part. 

Morgan  placed  the  ultimate  foundation  of  religion 
in  nature,  not  in  revelation.2  From  nature  we  can  know 
“the  eternal  immutable  rules  and  principles  of  moral 
truth,”  which  are  always  the  same  and  known  to  all 
men,  and  which  constitute  natural  religion.3  He  goes 
so  far  toward  the  Cambridge  school  as  to  teach  that  God 
does  not  create  good  and  evil,  that  there  is  a rule  of 
action  prior  to  God’s  willing.  Yet  nature  is  not  clearly 
defined;  we  cannot  be  sure  what  he  understood  by  it. 
It  may  be  understood  either  in  the  sense  of  Hooker  or  in 
the  sense  of  the  Cambridge  Platonists,  but  its  importance 
in  his  system  is  evident. 

Bolingbroke  finds  our  duties  set  forth  so  plainly 
in  “the  constitution  of  our  nature”  that  we  cannot  fail 
to  know  them.4  More  circumspect  than  some  of  his 
fellow-Deists,  he  holds  that  Christianity  is  founded  on 
the  universal  law  of  nature,  and  that  God  teaches  the 
fundamental  principle  of  this  law;  although  it  is  not  just 
a republication  of  it.5  This  universal  law  of  nature  is  the 

1 W.  Wollaston,  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  (London,  1759), 
pp.  129,  287. 

2 Thomas  Morgan,  The  Moral  Philosopher  (London,  1740),  III,  126; 
Physico-Theology  (London,  1741),  pp.  143  fL;  Tracts  (London  1726), 
Preface,  p.  xvii. 

3 The  Moral  Philosopher,  I,  94. 

4 H.  Bolingbroke,  Works  (London,  1809),  VI,  281. 

5 Ibid.,  p.  31  x. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


61 


foundation  of  everything.1  He  gives  us  no  further  deter- 
mination of  nature  or  natural  law.  Is  it  God’s  creature, 
God’s  instrument  for  grounding  things  ? Whether  it  has 
the  same  meaning  as  in  Hooker’s  system  or  is  something 
independent  of  God  as  the  Platonists  taught  he  does  not 
tell  us. 

Chubb  wrote  An  Enquiry  into  the  Ground  and  Founda- 
tion of  Morality,  in  which  he  undertook  to  show  “that 
religion  is  founded  in  nature,”  and  that  this  pure  religion 
of  nature  “is  grounded  upon  the  unalterable  nature  and 
the  eternal  reason  of  things.”2  He  starts  out  from  the 
assumption  that  “there  is  a natural  and  essential 
difference  in  things,”  which  is  the  “ground  and  founda- 
tion of  moral  truth;”3  and  divine  rectitude  is  God’s 
acting  in  harmony  with  such  difference.  His  acts  are 
always  in  harmony  with  the  essential  difference  in  things.4 
This  is  clearly  the  doctrine  of  the  philosophers  of  Cam- 
bridge. Though  he  is  the  only  Deist  who  announces  it 
in  unambiguous  terms,  it  may  be  in  the  background  of 
the  teaching  of  Morgan  and  Bolingbroke. 

D.  CONCLUSION 

In  this  study  of  the  place  of  the  concept  of  nature  in 
English  thought  of  the  period  that  we 'are  considering 
we  have  found  some  confusion.  Few  thinkers  hold 
consistently  to  one  sense  of  the  term.  However  we  are 

1 Ibid..,  pp.  345  ff.  In  this  passage  he  vigorously  rejects  the  teach- 
ing of  Hobbes,  which  bases  morality  on  civil  enactment. 

2 Thomas  Chubb,  A n Enquiry  into  the  Ground  and  Foundation  of 
Morality  (London,  1745),  p.  40. 

3 Chubb,  An  Inquiry  Concerning  Redemption  (London,  1743),  p.  35. 

* Ibid.,  p.  37. 


62 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


justified  in  drawing  several  conclusions  that  are  relevant 
to  our  problem.  In  some  form  or  other  the  concept  of 
nature  is  present  in  the  speculations  of  almost  every 
liberal  thinker  that  we  have  considered.  The  age  was 
prone  to  believe  that  institutions  and  principles  were 
adequately  grounded  only  when  it  was  proved  that  they 
were  natural.  Nature  is  the  foundation  of  economies 
and  institutions;  it  determines  their  character  and  gives 
them  authority. 

But  when  it  comes  to  defining  just  what  was  meant 
by  nature,  there  are  radical  differences.  The  views  that 
were  held  seem  to  fall  into  two  groups.  On  the  one 
hand,  we  find  God  and  nature  more  or  less  closely  linked; 
it  is  His  creation,  its  laws  are  ordained  by  Him,  it  reveals 
His  will,  and  sometimes  it  seems  to  be  identical  with  Him. 
And  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  conceived  as  eternal,  immu- 
table, and  at  least  in  some  sense  independent  of  God,  an 
order  distinct  from  God  to  which  His  willing  must 
conform;  and  sometimes  the  writings  of  one  man  seem 
to  show  both  motives.  But  whatever  the  conception 
of  nature,  in  practically  every  system  “natural  law,” 
“natural  light,”  “the  book  of  nature,”  “the  religion  of 
nature,”  stand  out  in  contrast  on  the  one  hand  with 
man-made  institutions,  on  the  other  with  supernatural 
revelation.  It  is  placed  over  against  that  which  is 
positive,  whether  human  or  divine.  In  the  considera- 
tion of  the  religious  problem,  which  chiefly  concerns  us 
here,  nature  is  an  order  or  a datum  that  is  contrasted 
with  God’s  dealing  with  man  in  that  special  revelation 
which  we  find  in  the  Bible. 

Generally  speaking  Locke  and  the  Deists  under- 
stand the  term  in  the  same  way.  With  the  exception  of 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


63 


Chubb,  and  perhaps  also  of  Morgan  and  Bolingbroke, 
they  stand  in  the  line  that  comes  down  from  Hooker. 
The  Cambridge  way  of  thinking  does  not  seem  to  have 
influenced  the  Deists  until  we  reach  the  period  of  their 
decline. 

We  have  here  a similarity  between  Locke  and  Deism 
when  it  was  at  its  height.  Both  use  the  same  concept 
and  they  seem  to  understand  it  in  the  same  way.  But 
the  likeness  is  just  as  marked  between  the  Deists  and 
certain  prominent  theologians  and  philosophers,  many 
of  whom  lived  before  Locke.  It  was  the  point  of  view 
or  method  that  prevailed  at  that  time.  Just  as  scholars 
today  are  likely  to  organize  the  data  of  a given  science 
according  to  the  genetic  method  because  it  is  so  widely 
accepted,  so  the  leaders  of  English  thought  two  or  three 
hundred  years  ago  sought  to  ground  all  institutions  and 
principles  in  nature.  Locke  and  the  Deists  stand  in  the 
main  line  of  the  progressive  movement.  When  we  study 
critically  their  resemblance  in  the  use  of  the  concept  of 
nature,  we  cannot  infer  any  other  closer  relation  from  it. 
Later,  in  considering  natural  religion,  we  shall  see  how 
Locke  and  the  Deists  are  related  in  the  importance  that 
they  assigned  to  the  concept  of  nature  in  this  relation. 

3.  THE  USE  OF  THE  CONCEPT  OF  REASON 

The  general  movement  of  the  age  was  toward  free 
inquiry.  Inherited  systems  and  institutions  were  sub- 
jected to  criticism;  it  was  no  longer  enough  that  a con- 
viction had  behind  it  hoary  tradition.  If  anything  was 
to  survive,  it  could  do  so  only  under  the  condition  that 
good  reasons  were  given  why  intelligent  men  should  hold 
it.  There  is  only  one  way  for  a man  to  know  truth,  and 


64 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


that  is  by  a proper  use  of  his  reason;  whatever  is 
accepted  must  be  rationally  grounded.  Such  was  the 
spirit  of  the  liberal  movement  in  England  at  this  time. 

A.  THE  RATIONAL  THEOLOGIANS 

Beginning  with  “the  judicious  Hooker  ” we  find  that 
he  appeals  to  reason  with  a frequency  that  is  surprising. 
Though  he  argues  that  it  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  ground 
that  which  is  necessary  to  salvation,1  he  also  holds  that 
“there  are  but  two  ways  whereby  the  spirit  leadeth  men 
into  all  truth  ....  one,  that  which  we  call  by  a special 
divine  excellency,  Revelation;  the  other,  Reason.”2 
For  the  earnestness  of  conviction  does  not  guarantee 
the  truth  of  opinions  but  the  “soundness  of  those 
reasons  whereupon  the  same  is  built.”  Only  thus  can 
we  know  that  they  are  from  the  Holy  Spirit  and  not 
from  an  evil  spirit  that  might  deceive  us.3  It  is  by  the 

1 Ecclesiastical  Polity,  Works,  I,  231,  232,  234,  281.  He  expressly 
taught  that  the  law  of  reason  does  not  contain  all  duties  that  bind 
reasonable  creatures,  but  only  those  duties  that  men  by  using  their 
natural  wit  may  or  should  discover,  which  are  common  to  all. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  150. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  151.  The  conviction  that  we  believe  on  a basis  of  ade- 
quate reason  is  developed  at  some  length  (pp.  321-30).  Even  in  matters 
of  faith  we  must  grant  judgment  some  place.  Belief  cannot  ignore 
evidence,  though  the  authority  of  human  judgment  is  not  as  strong  as 
the  testing  of  God  himself  (p.  323).  “For  men  to  be  tied  and  led  by 
authority,  as  it  were  by  a kind  of  capacity  of  judgment,  and  though  there 
be  reason  to  the  contrary  not  to  listen  unto  it,  but  to  follow  like  beasts 
the  first  in  the  herd,  they  know  not  nor  care  not  whither,  this  were 
brutish.  Again,  that  authority  of  man  should  prevail  with  men,  either 
against  or  above  reason,  is  no  part  of  our  belief”  (p.  324).  “Shall  I 
add  further,  that  the  force  of  arguments  drawn  from  the  authority  of 
Scripture  itself,  as  Scriptures  commonly  are  alleged,  shall  (being  sifted) 
be  found  to  depend  upon  the  strength  of  this  so  much  despised  and 
debased  authority  of  man  ? Surely  it  doth  and  that  oftener  than  we  are 
aware  of”  (pp.  299,  328). 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


65 


light  of  reason  that  we  know  good  from  evil;  reason 
directs  the  will  by  recognizing  the  good.1  This  light  of 
reason  is  from  God.  The  meaning  of  Romans  2:14  is 
“that  by  force  of  the  light  of  reason  wherewith  God 
illuminateth  everyone  which  cometh  into  the  world,” 
etc.2  In  fact  the  law  of  reason  is  a part  of  God’s 
eternal  law;  that  part  which  men  may  find  by  reason  and 
to  which  they  may  know  themselves  to  be  bound.3 
There  are  lengthy  passages  in  which  he  refers  on  almost 
every  page  to  the  “light  of  reason,”  “the  law  of  reason,” 
and  “right  reason.” 

Thus  according  to  Hooker  the  role  of  reason  is  of 
fundamental  importance.  It  can  know  a part  of  God’s 
law  for  us  and,  though  it  cannot  reveal  to  us  all  that  is 
necessary  for  salvation,  only  on  the  basis  of  sound 
reason  can  we  know  when  a belief  is  wrought  by  the 
Holy  Spirit.  He  is  seeking  to  give  an  intelligent  reason, 
a reason  other  than  tradition  for  the  faith  that  is  in  him. 
The  conviction  that  lies  in  the  background  of  his  thinking 
is  that  we  can  know  the  truth  of  our  beliefs  only  by  “ the 
soundness  of  those  reasons  whereupon  the  same  is 

1 Ibid.,  pp.  222,  223,  225  ft.  “And  the  law  of  reason  or  human 
nature  is  that  which  men  by  discourse  of  natural  reason  have  rightly 
found  out  themselves  to  be  all  forever  bound  unto  in  their  actions.” 
Such  laws  are  in  harmony  with  nature  and  can  be  investigated  by  reason 
without  the  aid  of  revelation;  and  knowledge  of  such  laws  is  general — 
the  world  has  ever  been  acquainted  with  them.  “ Law  rational,  therefore, 
which  men  commonly  used  to  call  the  law  of  nature,  meaning  thereby 
the  law  which  human  nature  knoweth  itself  in  reason  universally  bound 
unto,  which  also  for  that  cause  may  be  termed  most  fitly  the  law  of 
reason;  this  law,  I say,  comprehendeth  all  those  things  which  men  by  the 
light  of  their  natural  understanding  evidently  know,  or  at  leastwise  may 
know”  (pp.  233-34). 

2 Ibid.,  p.  227. 


3 Ibid.,  p.  205. 


66 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


built.”  This  involves  a principle  that  is  of  far-reaching 
consequence:  religious  belief  must  be  rationally 

grounded.1 

Chillingworth  after  his  reconversion  to  Protes- 
tantism demands  a “rational  conviction  at  the  root  of 
his  religion.”  He  is  certain  “that  God  has  given  us 
reason  to  discern  between  truth  and  falsehood,”  and  he 
who  does  not  use  his  reason  does  not  know  why  he 
believes  the  truth.  Though  he  asserts  his  belief  in 
revelation  most  vigorously  he  requires  that  faith 
should  be  rationally  certified.2  Jeremy  Taylor  held 
practically  the  same  view.  Man  should  follow  his  own 
reason,  guided  only  by  revelation,  not  by  human  author- 
ity. Revelation  is  not  challenged  in  the  name  of  reason 
but  reason  provides  grounds  for  accepting  beliefs.3 

Stillingfleet  has  very  little  to  say  about  reason  in 
matters  of  religion  but  his  silence  becomes  eloquent 
when  we  remember  that  his  criticism  of  Locke  was 
occasioned  by  Toland’s  use  of  Locke’s  “new  way  of 
ideas  ” and  that  in  this  controversy  Stillingfleet  sought 
to  identify  Locke  with  the  Unitarians.  He  objects  to 
Locke’s  doctrine  of  ideas  but  his  appeal  to  reason  is 

1 “The  work  remains  an  enduring  monument  of  all  the  highest 
principles  of  Christian  rationalism — of  that  spirit  and  tendency  of 
thought  which  everywhere  ascends  from  tradition  or  dogmas  to 
principles,  and  which  tests  all  questions,  not  with  reference  to  external 
rules  or  authorities,  but  to  the  indestructible  and  enlightened  instincts 
of  the  Christian  consciousness”  (Tulloch,  Rational  Theology  and  Christian 
Philosophy,  I,  53).  This  same  principle  perhaps  in  a somewhat  more 
rationalistic  form  was  asserted  by  Lord  Falkland  {ibid.,  pp.  161-64). 
And  John  Hales  of  Eaton  “is  the  representative — the  next  after  Hooker 
— of  that  catholicity  yet  rationality  of  Christian  sentiment  which  has 
been  the  peculiar  glory  of  the  Church  of  England”  {ibid.,  p.  260). 

3 Ibid.,  pp.  331,  332.  3 Ibid.,  p.  404. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


67 


scarcely  touched  upon;  he  did  not  find  it  objectionable. 
It  is  significant  that  he  put  in  a headline  “Vindication 
of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity  ....  from  Scripture, 
Antiquity  and  Reason.” 

The  orthodox  Sherlock  did  not  hesitate  to  say  that 
if  “the  Gospel  represents  to  us  the  law  of  nature,  it 
need  only  to  appeal  to  the  reason  of  mankind  for  its 
authority,”1  and  that  “the  Gospel  is  the  true  original 
religion  of  reason  and  nature.”2  Warburton  goes  so  far 
as  to  teach  that  “the  image  of  God  in  which  man  was  at 
first  created  lay  in  the  faculty  of  reason  only.”3 

These  men  were  among  the  most  prominent  church- 
men of  their  times.  They  were  theologians  who  exerted 
a great  influence  in  shaping  the  theology  of  the  church, 
and,  so  far  as  the  writer  has  observed,  with  the  exception 
of  Tillotson,  their  orthodoxy  was  never  questioned. 
Therefore  their  rationalistic  way  of  looking  at  things  is 
all  the  more  significant.  Religious  conviction  that 
rests  merely  on  authority  has  an  uncertain  foundation. 
When  reasonable  beings  such  as  men  believe  anything, 
it  should  be  because  of  sound  reasons.  Revelation  is 
not  challenged,  but  the  acceptance  of  revelation  must 
have  a rational  basis. 

B.  THE  PHILOSOPHERS 

The  teaching  of  Hobbes  concerning  the  place  of 
reason  in  matters  of  revelation  are  found  in  the  thirty- 
second  chapter  of  the  Leviathan.  Though  he  magnifies 
the  authority  of  the  Bible  in  a manner  inconsistent  with 

1 Discourses  Preached  on  Several  Occasions,  V,  143. 

2 Ibid.,  pp.  134,  142. 

3 Quoted  by  Pattison,  Essays  and  Reviews  (London,  1861),  p.  269. 


68 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


his  theories,  he  recognizes  reason  as  an  instrument  given 
by  God  for  knowing  true  religion,  and  thus  it  is  in  a 
sense  God’s  word.  However,  the  Bible  may  well  contain 
some  things  that  are  above  reason,  although  it  cannot 
give  us  anything  that  is  contrary  to  reason. 

The  Cambridge  Platonists  represent  something  new 
in  Protestantism.  As  Tulloch  expresses  it,  it  was  the 
first  effort  among  Protestants  “to  wed  Christianity  and 
philosophy”  and  “to  form  the  union  on  the  indestruc- 
tible basis  of  reason  and  the  essential  elements  of  our 
higher  humanity.”  They  were  devoutly  Christian,  but 
thoroughly  rationalistic.  Writing  in  the  spirit  of  the 
school  and  in  its  defense,  an  author  who  hides  himself 
behind  the  initials  of  his  name  is  quoted  by  Tulloch  as 
follows:  It  is  absurd  to  accuse  them  “of  harkening  too 
much  to  their  own  reason.  For  reason  is  that  faculty 
whereby  a man  must  judge  of  everything;  nor  can  a man 
believe  anything  unless  he  have  some  reason  for  it,” 
whether  it  be  “the  light  of  nature,”  “the  candle  of  the 
Lord  ” in  the  soul  of  every  man,  or  revelation.  The  most 
ancient  should  prove  to  be  the  most  rational  and  the 
most  rational  the  most  ancient.  “Nothing  is  true  in 
divinity  which  is  false  in  philosophy  or  on  the  contrary.”1 

Turning  to  these  Christian  philosophers  themselves, 
Whichcote  formulates  the  statement  of  the  relation  that 
obtains  between  reason  and  religion  which  is  accepted 
by  the  other  members  of  the  school.  Reason  is  not  to  be 
taken  lightly,  for  it  is  from  God.  Hence  there  is  no 
inconsistency  in  calling  upon  men  to  use  it,  for  “the 
spirit  in  man  is  the  candle  of  the  Lord,  lighted  by  God 
and  lighting  man  to  God.”2  He  has  given  two  lights  to 

1 Tulloch,  op.  cit.,  II,  41,  42.  1 Ibid..,  pp.  99,  no. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


69 


guide  us  on  our  way,  the  light  of  reason  which  is  ours  by 
creation,  and  the  light  of  scripture  which  is  revealed  by 
Him,1  to  which  reason  is  not  opposed.  “There  can  be 
no  faith  without  reason,  nor  yet  any  higher  reason  with- 
out faith.”2  And  John  Smith  in  like  spirit  preaches  that 
religion  does  not  extinguish  reason,  but  rather  fosters  it. 
They  who  “live  most  in  the  exercise  of  religion  shall  find 
the  reason  most  enlarged.”3  Tulloch  sums  up  his 
position  by  saying,  “that  religion  cannot  be  separated 
from  reason,  nor  morals  from  piety,  was  of  the  nature  of 
an  axiomatic  truth  to  him.”4  Cudworth  held  the  same 
views  as  to  the  harmony  between  philosophy  and 
religion,  between  reason  and  faith.5  Man,  God’s 
creature,  bears  his  image,  “is  endowed  with  the  divine 
reason,”  the  intuitions  of  which  are  eternal.6  Moore 
also  was  a preacher  of  the  rights  of  reason.  To  take 
reason  away  from  the  priest,  under  whatsoever  pretext, 
is  “to  disrobe  the  priest”  and  “to  rob  Christianity  of 
that  special  prerogative  it  has  above  all  other  religions 
in  the  world — namely  that  it  dares  appeal  unto  reason. 

. ...  For  take  away  reason  and  all  religions  are  alike 
true;  as  the  light  being  removed  all  things  are  of  one 
color.”7  In  Culverwell’s  Discourse  on  the  Light  of  Nature 
we  probably  have  the  most  eloquent  discussion  of  the 
relation  of  reason  and  faith  that  this  school  of  pietistic 
rationalists  produced.  His  avowed  purpose  is  “to 
give  unto  reason  the  things  that  are  reason’s,  and  unto 
faith  the  things  that  are  faith’s”;  to  give  faith  her  “full 

1 Ibid.,  pp.  113,  1 14.  5 Ibid.,  pp.  233,  234. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  116.  6 Ibid.,  p.  300. 

3 Ibid.,  pp.  184,  185.  1 Ibid.,  pp.  353,  354. 

*Ibid.,  p.  188. 


70 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


scope  and  latitude,  and  to  give  reason  also  her  just 
bounds  and  limits”;  and  he  significantly  adds  “this  is 
the  first-born,  but  the  other  has  the  blessing.”1  Reason 
is  a royal  gift  of  the  Creator;2  it  discovers  the  moral  light 
founded  in  natural  light  that  is,  in  the  light  of  reason,  and 
that  “there  is  nothing  in  the  mysteries  of  the  Gospel 
contrary  to  the  light  of  reason.”3  By  reason  man  can 
know  the  restraining  laws  that  God  has  set,  but  it  does 
not  make  the  law.4  It  has  its  authority  from  heaven. 
“To  obey  right  reason  is  to  be  persuaded  by  God  him- 
self.”5 But  as  the  soul  is  the  shadow  of  the  Deity,  “so 
reason  also  is  a weak  and  faint  resemblance  of  God 
himself,”  planted  in  us  by  God.6  Even  the  movings 
and  revelation  of  the  Holy  Ghost  “are  a rational  light, 
as  rational  as  a demonstration.”7  Before  there  can  be 
faith  in  any  soul  “there  must  be  a knowledge  of  the 
proposition  to  be  believed.”  Before  you  understand 
the  terms  of  a proposition  “you  can  no  more  believe  it 
than  if  it  came  to  you  in  an  unknown  tongue.”8  How- 
ever there  are  certain  matters  of  faith  which  shall  forever 
be  above  reason,  though  not  contrary  to  it.9 

The  school  taught  that  faith  rests  on  rational 
grounds,  that  we  believe  on  the  basis  of  adequate  reasons. 
Our  ability  to  apprehend  truth  rationally  is  a gift  of  God, 

1 Culverwell,  Discourse  on  the  Light  of  Nature,  p.  17. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  18. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  25.  6 Ibid.,  p.  153. 

4 Ibid.,  pp.  79,  90,  98.  7 Ibid.,  pp.  161-62. 

3 Ibid.,  pp.  99-101.  8 Ibid.,  p.  216. 

9 Ibid.,  pp.  229-32.  Tulloch  in  English  Puritanism  and  Its  Leaders, 
speaking  of  Milton,  said  that  a “ liberal  rationalising  spirit  ” distinguished 
certain  parts  of  Christian  Doctrine  (p.  271).  He  also  makes  a like 
observation  concerning  Baxter  (p.  381). 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


7i 


by  which  we  know  His  will  and  what  is  worthy  of  belief. 
By  it  we  distinguish  the  true  from  the  false.  The  office 
and  importance  of  reason  is  magnified,  it  is  of  God,  it  is 
divine;  and  yet  they  are  careful  to  assert  that  it  has  its 
limits.  There  are  truths  that  faith  apprehends  which 
are  above  reason,  though  not  contrary  to  it. 

When  we  come  to  Locke  we  find  the  same  rationalistic 
way  of  viewing  things  that  we  find  among  the  more 
liberal  theologians  and  the  Cambridge  Platonists. 
Probably  he  is  somewhat  less  enthusiastic  than  Cudworth 
and  Culverwell,  but  he  is  as  outspoken  as  any  of  his 
predecessors;  he  gives  to  the  problem  concerning  the 
relation  of  reason  and  faith  the  most  systematic  expres- 
sion that  it  has  thus  far  received.  It  was  a topic  to 
which  he  devoted  much  thought.  He  returns  to  it  again 
and  again,  often  when  least  expected.  Though  a genetic 
study  of  the  development  of  his  opinions  from  year  to 
year  might  show  that  during  the  last  decade  of  his  life 
he  emphasized  more  than  formerly  the  importance  of  a 
positive  revelation,  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  changed 
his  views  in  any  essential  respect. 

We  find  his  full  discussion  of  the  problem  in  the 
seventeenth,  eighteenth,  and  nineteenth  chapters  of  the 
fourth  book  of  the  Essay.  The  eighteenth  chapter  bears 
the  title  “Of  Faith  and  Reason  and  Their  Distinct 
Province.”  We  shall  let  Locke  speak  for  himself. 

He  defines  reason  as  “natural  revelation,  whereby 
the  eternal  Father  of  light  and  fountain  of  all  knowledge, 
communicates  to  mankind  that  portion  of  truth  which  he 
has  laid  within  reach  of  their  natural  faculties;  revela- 
tion is  natural  reason  enlarged  by  a new  set  of  dis- 
coveries, communicated  by  God  immediately,  which 


72 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


reason  vouches  the  truth  of,  by  the  testimony  and  proofs 
it  gives,  that  they  come  from  God.  So  that  he  that 
takes  away  reason  to  make  way  for  revelation,  puts  out 
the  light  of  both,  and  does  much  what  the  same,  as  if  he 
would  persuade  a man  to  put  out  his  eyes,  the  better  to 
receive  the  remote  light  of  an  invisible  star  by  a 
telescope.”1 

Speaking  of  “enthusiasm”  he  says  that  if  God 
expects  us  to  assent  to  the  truth  of  any  proposition,  “He 
either  evidences  that  truth  by  the  usual  methods  of 
natural  reason,  or  else  makes  it  known  to  be  a truth  which 
He  would  have  us  assent  to  by  His  authority;  and  con- 
vinces us  that  it  is  from  Him,  by  some  marks  which 
reason  cannot  be  mistaken  in.  Reason  must  be  our  last 
judge  and  guide  in  everything.  I do  not  mean  that  we 
must  consult  reason  and  examine  whether  a proposition 
revealed  from  God  can  be  made  out  by  our  natural 
principles,  and  if  it  cannot,  that  then  we  may  reject  it; 
but  consult  it  we  must,  and  by  it  examine,  whether  it  be 
a revelation  from  God  or  no.”  And  if  reason  finds  “it  to 
be  revealed  from  God,  reason  then  declares  for  it  ...  . 
and  makes  it  one  of  her  dictates.”  Without  reason  we 
could  not  know  truth  from  vain  conceits.2  If  a man 
believes  without  reason  for  believing,  he  does  not  seek 
the  truth,  nor  does  he  obey  his  Maker  who  gave  him 
those  faculties  to  keep  him  from  error.3  But  unaided 
reason  cannot  discover  everything.  There  are  some 
truths  that  are  above  reason,  and  here  revelation  should 
have  the  greater  weight.4  “But  no  proposition  can  be 
received  for  divine  revelation,  or  obtain  the  assent  due 

1 Essay,  IV,  xix,  4.  3 Ibid.,  IV,  xvii,  24. 

a Ibid.,  IV,  xix,  14.  < Ibid.,  IV,  xviii,  6,  7,  8. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


73 


to  all  such,  if  it  be  contradictory  to  our  clear  intuitive 

knowledge For  faith  can  never  convince  us  of 

anything  that  contradicts  our  knowledge.”1 

Perhaps  of  all  the  quotations  from  Locke  concerning 
reason  that  have  been  or  might  be  given,  the  most 
characteristic  one  is:  “Reason  must  be  our  last  judge 
and  guide  in  everything.”  God  gave  it  to  us  to  use;  by 
it  alone  we  can  know  truth  from  error.  We  believe  on 
the  basis  of  sufficient  reason.  Faith  is  rationally 
grounded,  reason  certifies  revelation,  and  the  content  of 
faith  is  rational.  He  repeatedly  emphasizes  the  widely 
accepted  doctrine  that  nothing  in  revelation  can  be 
contrary  to  reason,  though  it  may  enable  us  to  know 
some  things  that  are  above  reason.2 

Thus  far  in  our  study  of  the  use  that  is  made  of  reason 
in  speculation  concerning  religious  problems,  we  have 
found  little  difference  of  opinion  among  the  men  that 
we  have  met.  Some  go  a little  farther  than  others  in 
magnifying  the  office  of  reason  in  matters  of  religion,  but 
there  is  no  essential  difference.  Though  Locke  is  much 
more  elaborate  in  his  statement  of  the  relation  between 
faith  and  reason,  he  simply  systematizes  the  teaching 
from  Hooker  down.  When  the  great  bishop  asserted 
that  earnestness  of  conviction  did  not  guarantee  the 
truth  of  opinions  “but  the  soundness  of  those  reasons 
whereupon  the  same  is  built,”  he  struck  the  keynote  of 
progressive  theology  in  England  during  the  next  century. 

1 Ibid.,  IV,  xviii,  5. 

2 In  like  spirit  Boyle  held  that  God  had  given  man  reason  by  which 
he  could  know  the  principles  of  natural  religion,  but  that  this  was  not 
enough  (Works,  V,  46).  By  reason  we  know  that  there  are  things  above 
reason  (Works,  IV,  39  ff.),  which  are  not  contradictory  to  it  (Works,  V, 
65,  682).  It  needs  the  help  of  revelation  (Works,  III,  414). 


74 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


C.  THE  DEISTS 

When  we  come  to  the  Deists  we  move  in  a different 
atmosphere.  Some  of  them  in  their  teaching  differed 
only  a little  from  the  more  liberal  theologians.  Yet 
the  divergence  is  significant  and  can  be  easily  detected. 
Reason  becomes  something  more  and  revelation  some- 
thing less. 

Beginning  again  with  Herbert  of  Cherbury,  we  find 
that  “natural  instinct”  gives  man  the  greatest  certainty 
and  that  it  accounts  for  his  “common  notions,”  and  that 
from  these  he  gets  his  five  articles  of  “the  true  Catholic 
Church,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  religion  of  reason,”  which 
was  the  primitive,  pure  religion  of  man.  Whatever  is 
contrary  to  them  is  contrary  to  reason  and  therefore 
false;  but  that  which  conforms  to  reason,  though  above 
it,  may  be  revealed.1 

Blount  felt  obliged  to  stand  by  “common  reason” 
rather  than  debase  his  “understanding  in  divine  mys- 
teries.”2 Reason  is  supreme;  it  gives  us  the  fundamental 
articles  of  religion,  and  all  those  who  live  according 
to  the  rule  of  reason  are  Christians.3  “What  proceeds 
from  common  reason,  we  know  to  be  true,  but  what 
proceeds  from  faith  we  only  believe.”4  The  test  to 
which  all  extraordinary  biblical  accounts  are  subjected 
is  that  of  reason.5  Blount  writes  carelessly,  but  reason 
means  more  and  positive  religion  means  less  than  for 
anyone  considered  thus  far.  This  is  the  first  statement 

1 W.  R.  Sorley,  Mind  (1894),  p.  501. 

2 Religio  Laid,  pp.  26-30. 

3 Ibid.,  pp.  16,  95. 

4 Blount,  Philostratus  (London,  1680),  Book  I,  chap,  v,  illustration  6. 

5 Oracles  of  Reason,  p.  33. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


75 


that  we  have  found  of  the  doctrine  that  unaided  reason 
can  grasp  enough  religious  truth  to  mark  a man  as  a 
Christian. 

Toland’s  contribution  to  the  movement  as  well  as  his 
general  position  is  summed  up  in  the  unabbreviated 
title  of  his  book , Christianity  Not  Mysterious;  or  a Treatise 
Showing  That  There  Is  Nothing  in  the  Gospel  Contrary  to 
Reason,  nor  above  It,  and  That  No  Christian  Doctrine  Can 
Be  Properly  Called  a Mystery.  Scripture  and  reason 
agree  very  well.1  Christianity  was  divinely  revealed 
from  heaven.2  Yet  the  proof  of  the  divinity  of  Scripture 
rests  upon  reason 3 and  there  is  nothing  in  it  above 
reason;4  yet  that  which  reason  reveals  to  us  is  not  the 
full  gospel.5  Toland  is  almost  as  enthusiastic  as  Culver- 
well  in  magnifying  the  importance  of  reason.  His  denial 
that  there  can  be  anything  above  reason  is  an  important 
change;  it  marks  a stage  in  the  growth  of  deistic 
rationalism. 

Collins  is  still  more  radical.  “Christ,  the  first 
begotten  of  God,  is  nothing  else  but  reason,  of  which  all 
mankind  are  partakers,  and  that  whosoever  live  by 
reason  ....  are  Christians;  and  that  such  were 
Socrates  and  the  like.”6 

For  Tindal  reason  is  the  great  mark  of  dignity  of 
man,  “since  our  reason  for  kind,  though  not  for  degree 
is  of  the  same  nature  with  that  of  God;  nay,  it  is  our 

1 Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  Preface,  pp.  xv,  25,  26. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  xxv.  3 Ibid.,  p.  46.  4 Ibid.,  pp.  97,  120. 

5 A Collection  of  Several  Pieces,  etc.,  pp.  138-41. 

6 A Discourse  on  Freethinking,  pp.  123,  124.  Sebastian  Franck  and 

Croonhert  had  held  the  same  views  (Hoff ding,  History  of  Modern 

Philosophy,  I,  60). 


76 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


reason  which  makes  us  the  image  of  God.”  It  is  the 
inspiration  of  the  Almighty.1  By  it  we  distinguish  false 
religion  from  the  true.2  In  fact  the  religion  of  the  Gospel 
is  but  the  religion  of  reason.3  Both  are  in  complete 
agreement.4  By  magnifying  revelation  we  weaken  the 
force  of  natural  religion  and  strike  at  the  foundation  of 
all  religion. s For  nothing  can  be  accepted  by  intelligent 
beings  which  is  above  the  use  of  reason.6  Tindal 
conceives  reason  practically  in  the  sense  of  Toland. 
However,  when  he  considers  the  question  of  revelation 
he  applies  it  much  more  radically.  The  religion  of 
reason  as  a norm  for  all  religions  is  vigorously  asserted. 

For  Wollaston  the  religion  of  nature  is  but  a system  of 
theistic  ethics,  virtue  is  but  the  product  of  reason  and 
truth,  which  every  man  has.  He  finds  no  necessity  for 
revelation.  To  be  governed  by  reason  is  imposed 
by  God  on  rational  beings.7 

Bolingbroke,  almost  in  the  very  words  of  Tindal, 
teaches  that  we  cannot  assume  that  religious  truths  are 
above  reason,8  which  reveals  to  us  the  entire  content  of 
natural  religion.9  Reason  was  never  subdued  by 

1 Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  pp.  22-24,  194. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  66. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  79. 

4 Ibid.,  pp.  191,  179. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  178. 

6 “If  the  Scripture  was  designed  to  be  understood,  it  must  be 
within  the  reach  of  human  understanding;  and  consequently  it  can’t 
contain  propositions  that  are  either  above  or  below  human  understand- 
ing” {ibid.,  p.  222). 

7 The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,  pp.  35,  76  ff.,  86,  87,  402. 

8 Bolingbroke,  Works,  VI,  282  ff. 

9 Ibid.,  p.  281. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


77 


revelation,  “but  revelation  was  subjected  to  reason.”1 
In  fact,  he  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  he  who  claims  a 
revelation  added  to  reason  is  mad.2 

In  Morgan  there  is  a strange  contradiction.  He 
seems  to  have  been  influenced  by  different  motives  at 
different  times.  In  the  volume  of  collected  tracts  he 
speaks  the  language  of  Hooker,  the  Platonists,  and  Locke, 
and  claims  that  by  revelation  we  get  knowledge  of  things 
which  unaided  reason  could  not  grasp.  In  this  sense  we 
can  believe  things  above  reason.3  And  yet  this  revela- 
tion is  elsewhere  not  highly  esteemed.  He  speaks  of  the 
“so-called  supernatural  revelation,”  which  is  confusion 
on  all  sides,  so  that  there  is  nothing  left  but  to  judge  of 
it  all  by  reason.4  For  nothing  miraculous  or  super- 
stitious can  have  any  authority  superior  to  reason.5 
Revelation  can  give  us  nothing  above  reason.6  Reason 
is  the  ultimate,  sure,  and  certain  court  to  which  revelation 
must  eventually  appeal.7  Morgan  accepts  revelation 
as  a fact,  but  denies  that  it  can  give  us  anything  above 
reason.8 

1 Ibid.,  pp.  288,  290. 

1 Ibid.,  pp.  170,  171.  5 The  Moral  Philosopher,  III,  134. 

3 Tracts,  p.  18.  6 Ibid.,  pp.  84  ff. 

4 Physico-Theology , pp.  144  2.  1 Physico-Theology,  pp.  328  2. 

8 Thus  The  Moral  Philosopher  and  Physico-Theology  flatly  contradict 
the  position  taken  in  the  volume  of  Tracts.  The  latter  appeared  in  1726 
and  bears  the  marks  of  immaturity.  It  is  distinctly  on  a lower  level  than 
The  Moral  Philosopher  and  Physico-Theology  which  appeared  about  a 
dozen  years  later.  In  it  he  also  stands  closer  to  the  orthodox  view  and 
seeks  to  emphasize  revelation;  when  he  refers  to  it  he  speaks  with  a 
certain  reverence.  It  is  probable  that  this  represents  an  earlier  stage 
in  his  development  and  that  his  views  changed  between  1726  and  1737, 
when  the  first  volume  of  The  Moral  Philosopher  appeared.  We  can 
safely  take  the  more  radical  views  of  his  later  period  as  representative. 


78  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

Chubb  has  nothing  to  add  to  that  which  the  other 
Deists  have  said.  He  admits  the  fact  of  revelation, 
sometimes  with  hesitation;1  generally  it  is  assumed  as  a 
matter  of  course.2  But  if  men  are  to  come  into  the  right 
relation  with  Christ,  they  must  submit  themselves  “to 
the  law  of  reason  or  the  rule  of  righteousness,  which 
Christ  requires.”3  For  reason  is  the  proper  judge  of 
all  parts  of  revelation  and  must  reject  certain  things 
in  it  as  being  contrary  to  it.4 

f 

D.  CONCLUSION 

Looking  back  over  what  these  men  have  said  con- 
cerning the  use  of  reason,  from  the  great  Hooker  to  the 
candlemaker  Chubb,  one  cannot  help  being  impressed 
by  the  marked  likenesses  and  also  by  the  radical  dif- 
ferences that  appear.  There  was  an  ever-increasing 
conviction  that  mere  authority  was  an  inadequate 
foundation  for  the  faith  of  rational  beings.  It  is  true 
traditionalism  yet  lingered  as  a potent  factor  in  the 
more  conservative  thought  of  the  times.  Many  leaders 
in  the  church  and  in  academic  circles  still  lived  in  the 
atmosphere  of  an  age  that  was  dying : they  were  wont  to 
appeal  to  that  which  was  rather  than  to  encourage  free 
inquiry.  But  against  this  conservative  tradition-loving 
tendency,  there  stood  the  party  of  progress.  We  have 
considered  a number  of  the  leaders  and  have  studied 

1 A Discourse  Concerning  Reason  (London,  1746),  p.  11. 

2 The  True  Gospel  of  Jesus  Christ  Asserted  (London,  1741),  pp.  14, 
IS,  19- 

3 Ibid.,  p.  5. 

■>  A Discourse  Concerning  Reason , pp.  12,  13,  19. 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


79 


their  way  of  looking  at  things.  We  find  that  in  a 
genuinely  rationalistic  spirit  they  protest  against  the 
reactionary  narrowness  of  the  conservative  party  and 
attempt  to  demonstrate  the  claims  of  religion. 

The  demonstrations  that  were  given  were  of  course 
rationalistic.  We  must  not  be  confused  here;  we  are 
likely  to  think  of  rationalism  as  meaning  that  which 
appeared  later  on  the  Continent,  more  especially  in 
Germany.  But  a characteristic  feature  of  this  conti- 
nental rationalism  is  its  hostile  attitude  toward  positive 
religion.  Here  in  England  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
and  also  later  though  in  less  degree,  rationalism  is  a way 
of  thinking  rather  than  a type  of  doctrinal  system.  It  is 
a tendency  or  point  of  view,  a way  of  approach  to 
problems,  it  is  a persistent  demand  that  all  things 
believed  shall  be  rational.  The  most  striking  thing 
about  this  period  is  that  all  parties  agree  in  this  con- 
viction, the  Churchmen  and  the  Dissenters,  the  progres- 
sive orthodox  clergy  as  well  as  the  Arminians,  Socinians, 
and  Deists.  All  creeds  and  religion  itself  must  stand 
or  fall  according  as  they  meet  the  test  of  the  prevailing 
rationalism.  If  we  are  to  accept  revelation  and  hold 
to  positive  religion,  it  must  be  for  adequate  reasons.  At 
the  opening  of  the  century  Hooker  laid  down,  and  by  his 
own  course  illustrated,  the  principle  that  “the  truth  of 
opinions”  is  guaranteed  by  “the  soundness  of  those 
reasons  whereupon  the  same  is  built.”  This  rationalistic- 
critical  motive  dominated  the  speculations  of  the  pro- 
gressive thinkers  of  the  succeeding  period.  At  the  end 
of  the  century  Locke  stated  the  same  principle  in  a 
more  elaborate  and  systematic  form,  and  we  find  it 
applied  by  such  champions  of  orthodoxy  as  Stillingfleet 


80  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

and  Sherlock,  as  well  as  by  the  whole  race  of  Deists. 
There  was  no  essential  difference  as  to  the  demand  that 
religion  must  be  rationally  grounded. 

But  though  there  was  this  complete  agreement 
concerning  the  fundamental  attitude  or  principle,  there 
was  great  divergence  of  results  when  it  was  applied. 
The  favorite  statement  of  the  relation  between  the 
content  of  revelation  and  reason  is  the  scholastic  formula, 
that  revelation  may  contain  truths  that  are  above 
reason,  but  cannot  give  anything  that  is  contrary  to  it. 
This  is  clearly  involved  in  Hooker’s  teaching  and  was 
expressly  accepted  by  practically  everybody  except  the 
Deists.  We  saw  that  even  some  of  the  earlier  Deists 
held  to  it  without  question.  Locke  asserted  and 
defended  this  principle  and  thus  stood  in  the  line  of  the 
rational  theologians,  the  Cambridge  Platonists,  and  a 
number  of  other  progressive  leaders  of  a more  conserva- 
tive type.  But  when  we  come  to  the  period  of  the 
greatest  influence  of  the  deistic  movement,  we  find  a 
very  different  response  to  the  demand  for  rationality 
in  matters  of  religion.  Toland  flatly  asserted  that  not 
only  must  religious  truth  not  contradict  reason,  but  also 
that  it  cannot  be  above  reason,  and  that  anything  that 
is  above  reason  must  be  rejected  as  not  being  a part  of 
true  Christianity.  This  is  the  keynote  of  the  deistic 
conception  of  the  relation  between  reason  and  positive 
religion.  It  is  repeated  by  later  representatives  of  the 
movement,  sometimes  in  the  spirit  of  Toland,  but 
frequently  it  is  more  radically  applied.  In  some 
instances  revealed  religion  is  declared  to  be  superfluous 
and  its  documents  hopelessly  confused.  The  English 
rationalistic-critical  movement  of  this  period  becomes,  in 


The  Two  Focal  Concepts 


81 


its  later  deistic  development,  aggressively  hostile  to  all 
positive  Christianity. 

In  a word,  the  period  that  we  are  studying  was 
thoroughly  rationalistic.  Practically  everybody,  cer- 
tainly every  progressive  thinker,  held  that  religious  belief 
was  based  on  adequate  reasons.  Locke  and  such  men 
of  his  generation  as  Tillotson,  Stillingfleet,  and  Sherlock, 
and  before  him  the  Cambridge  Platonists  and  the  rational 
theologians,  accepted  revelation  as  a fact  and  believed 
that  it  could  give  us  that  which  was  above  reason, 
though  not  contrary  to  reason. 

Deism,  except  in  the  very  beginning,  held  that  if 
there  was  such  a thing  as  revelation,  it  could  not  give  us 
anything  above  reason,  and  became  more  and  more 
hostile  to  positive  Christianity. 

Therefore  it  is  evident  that  rationalism,  although 
common  both  to  Locke  and  Deism,  is  not  peculiar  to 
either.  It  is,  however,  characteristic  of  the  age  in  which 
they  flourished;  and  in  so  far  as  Locke  or  the  Deists 
show  this  rationalistic  tendency,  they  exemplify  the 
working  of  the  common  spirit  of  their  times. 

And  when  we  consider  the  distinguishing  features, 
those  elements  that  marked  and  characterized  the  deistic 
movement  as  a distinct  tendency  in  religious  thought,  we 
find  that  it  differs  from  all  others  in  its  radical  application 
of  this  rationalistic  principle.  Here  Locke  and  the 
Deists  are  far  apart.  Both  were  rationalistic  and  critical 
in  their  method,  but  they  differ  widely  in  the  manner 
in  which  they  applied  this  method.  Locke  was  con- 
servative; the  Deists  were  radical.  To  say  that  the 
radical  rationalism  of  Deism  is  only  the  conservative 
rationalism  of  Locke  further  developed,  is  to  state  a 


82 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


dangerous  half-truth  that  misrepresents  the  situation. 
It  would  be  true  under  one  condition — that  Locke  was 
the  only  rationalist  of  this  period,  or  the  only  rationalist 
that  exerted  any  influence.  But  we  know  that  there 
were  many  others,  that  the  whole  atmosphere  of  pro- 
gressive thought  was  rationalistic.  Deism  took  this 
rationalistic  tendency,  that  characterized  at  least  the 
entire  progressive  movement  of  this  age,  and  gave  it  that 
radical  application  which  marks  the  deistic  movement. 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  MAIN  POINTS  IN  THE  RELIGIOUS 
DISCUSSIONS  OF  THIS  PERIOD 

A thorough  study  of  the  views  held  in  England  in 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  would  be  a 
great  undertaking.  It  was  an  age  of  individualism  in 
religious  opinion.  Sects  were  multiplying  rapidly  and 
the  rationalistic  movement  resulted  in  a great  variety 
of  beliefs.  A survey  of  these  with  a view  to  producing  a 
doctrinal  history  of  the  period  would  be  an  almost 
endless  task.  But  the  purpose  of  this  investigation  is 
the  determination  of  the  kind  and  degree  of  relation  that 
exists  between  Locke  and  English  Deism.  For  this  it  is 
not  necessary  to  reconstruct  the  systems  of  divinity  of 
each  man,  and  then  trace  linkages.  We  can  limit  our 
attention  to  the  main  points  of  the  religious  debate  that 
was  then  in  progress.  For  it  is  among  these  that  we 
shall  find  the  marks  that  distinguish  and  relate  Locke 
and  Deism.  Peripheral  religious  factors  also  vary,  but 
they  are  seldom  significant,  and  when  they  are  they  are 
generally  closely  joined  to  some  cardinal  point  of 
debate.  Therefore  we  will  not  miss  matters  of  impor- 
tance by  limiting  the  scope  of  this  investigation  to  the 
chief  topics  that  were  discussed. 

I.  CONCERNING  GOD 
A.  PROOFS  OF  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 

If  we  were  to  judge  of  the  religious  faith  of  this  age 
by  the  language  of  the  controversies,  we  might  conclude 

83 


84 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


that  it  was  a time  of  great  apostasy,  when  unbelievers 
and  misbelievers  were  numerous  and  aggressive.  Per- 
haps the  favorite  epithet  for  an  opponent  was  “atheist,”- 
which  seldom  meant  a denial  of  the  existence  of  God,  but 
only  rejection  of  the  system  of  doctrine  which  was  held  , 
by  the  ecclesiastic  who  was  doing  the  scolding.  Many 
men  who  had  elements  of  greatness  lived  in  the  dwarfing 
atmosphere  of  intolerance  and  suffered  and  unfortu- 
nately caused  others  to  suffer  from  rabies  theologicum. 
It  was  probably  an  age  of  belief  rather  than  of  unbelief, 
although  it  is  true  that  religious  faith  was  conceived 
, largely  as  dead  assent  to  doctrines  rather  than  as  a 
living  motive  force  in  life.  But  men  were  seriously 
interested  in  religion,  and,  at  least  among  those  whose 
influence  was  sufficient  to  cause  their  opinions  to  survive 
in  books,  there  is  practically  no  trace  of  atheism,  although 
men  were  talking  about  it  all  the  time. 

We  may  say  that  everybody  believed  that  there  was 
a God.  Men  did  not  occupy  themselves  very  much  in 
trying  to  prove  His  existence.  They  were  busy  testing 
and  proving  religion.  Generally  it  was  assumed  without 
much  comment  that  man  knew  God  and  his  duties 
toward  Him  either  by  common  notions  that  were  innate 
or  by  the  use  of  reason  which  formulated  proofs.  Con- 
trary to  a common  belief  the  Deists  paid  little  attention 
to  this  part  of  natural  theology;  several  of  them  do  not 
even  mention  it.  But  Locke  laid  great  emphasis  upon, 
what  he  calls  his  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God.1 

1 The  fact  that  the  existence  of  God  was  not  challenged  by  any  party 
probably  accounts  for  the  small  amount  of  attention  that  was  given  to 
proving  it.  For  our  purposes  the  views  held  by  others  are  not  significant; 
they  cast  little  or  no  light  on  the  relation  of  Locke  and  Deism.  It  is  not 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions 


85 


He  is  not  only  full  and  explicit,  but  he  returns  to  it 
again  and  again.  It  appears  in  a number  of  places  in 
his  works,  often  very  unexpectedly.  Instead  of  assum- 
ing that  there  is  a God,  or  of  barely  touching  upon  the 
way  in  which  we  know  it,  as  do  the  Deists,  he  system- 
atically develops  his  own  proof,  perhaps  recognizes  the 
cosmological  proof  and  explicitly  rejects  that  of  Anselm. 

He  regards  our  knowledge  of  God  as  very  certain. 
In  fact  he  speaks  of  it  as  a “demonstration.”  He 
believes  that  he  can  show  that  man  by  the  “use  of  his 
natural  abilities”  can  attain  to  knowledge  of  God* 1  which 
cannot  be  doubted,  for  “it  is  as  certain  that  there  is  a 
God  as  that  the  opposite  angles  made  by  the  inter- 
section of  two  straight  lines  are  equal.”  In  the  opening 
paragraphs  of  the  tenth  chapter  of  the  fourth  book  of 
the  Essay,  where  he  presents  his  so-called  “demonstra- 
tion,” he  says  that  the  evidence  of  God’s  existence  is 
“equal  to  mathematical  certainty.”  He  then  proceeds 
to  give  his  proof,  which  is  as  follows : 


I think  it  is  beyond  question,  that  man  has  a clear  idea  of  his 
own  being;  he  knows  certainly  he  exists,  and  that  he  is  something 
. . . . that  actually  exists.  In  the  next  place,  man  knows  by 
an  intuitive  certainty,2  that  bare  nothing  can  no  more  produce 
any  real  being  than  it  can  be  equal  to  two  right  angles If 


necessary  that  we  should  consider  them  here.  Though  the  proof  of  the 
existence  of  God  was  not  a point  in  the  deistic  controversy,  it  is  presented 
here  because  it  tends  to  show  that  the  Deists  are  independent  of  the 
influence  of  Locke. 

1 Essay,  IV,  x,  2,  3,  4. 

2 The  significance  of  Locke’s  psychological  and  genetic  account  of 
the  idea  of  God  has  been  much  debated  in  Germany.  Crous  gives  a 
good  resume  of  the  views  held  by  those  who  have  discussed  the  subject 
(pp.  20-21). 


86 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


therefore  we  know  there  is  some  real  being  and  that  nonentity 
‘ cannot  produce  any  real  being,  it  is  an  evident  demonstration  that 
from  eternity,  there  has  been  something;  since  what  was  not  from 
-)  eternity  had  a beginning;  and  what  had  a beginning  must  be 
produced  by  something  else.  Next,  it  is  evident,  that  what  had 
its  being  and  beginning  from  another,  must  also  have  all  that  which 
is  in  and  belongs  to  its  being,  from  another. 

The  eternal  source  of  being  must  also  be  the  source 
of  all  power.  Hence  it  is  all  powerful;  and  of  all 
knowledge,  hence  most  knowing;  and  this  is  what  we 
call  God.  “From  what  has  been  said  it  is  plain  to  me 
we  have  a more  certain  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a 
God  than  of  anything  our  senses  have  not  immediately 
discovered  to  us.  Nay,  I presume  I may  say  that  we 
more  certainly  know  that  there  is  a God  than  that  there 
is  anything  else  without  us.”1 

In  several  places  he  seems  to  infer  God  from  the 
observed  purpose  and  order  of  the  world.  “For  the 
visible  marks  of  extraordinary  wisdom  and  power  appear 
so  plainly  in  all  the  works  of  the  creation,  that  a rational ' 
creature,  who  will  but  seriously  reflect  upon  them, 
cannot  miss  the  discovery  of  a Deity.”2  And  again, 
speaking  of  the  eye,  he  says  “the  structure  of  that  one 
part  is  sufficient  to  convince  of  an  all-wise  Contriver. 
And  he  has  so  visible  a claim  to  us  as  his  workmanship 
that  one  of  the  ordinary  appellations  of  God  in  Scripture 

V 

1 Essay,  IV,  iii,  iff.;  x,  6;  xi,  i,  13;  xvii,  ?;  ij Day. 

/ / 

1 Ibid.,  I,  iii,  9.  This  may  be  understood, ''teleologically;  it  may  also 
be  read  cosmologically.  Crous  well  observes  that  this  is  essentially 
cosmological,  and  is  distinguished  from  his  ordinary  or  cosmological 
proof  in  the  stricter  sense  of  the  word  by  the  fact  that  the  latter  takes 
as  its  starting-point  the  intuitive  knowledge  of  our  own  ego  (Crous, 
p.  27). 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions 


87 


isjGod,  our  Maker.”1  That  Locke  here  is  making  use 
of  the  argument  from  design  is  very  doubtful.  If  he  is, 
it  is  neither  clearly  nor  adequately  stated,  and  it  is  so 
far  from  being  emphasized  that  it  appears  only 
incidentally. 

His  attitude  toward  the  ontological  proof  is  moder- 
ately skeptical  in  the  Essay  and  aggressively  critical  in 
an  unpublished  paper  that  Lord  King  included  in  his 
work  on  Locke.  In  the  former  he  is  content  to  observe 
that  there  are  temperamental  differences,  and  that  for 
this  reason  some  arguments  have  more  force  with  some 
men  than  with  others.  Yet  he  thinks  that  he  may  say 
that  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  from  the  idea  of  a 
most  perfect  being  “is  an  ill  way  of  establishing  this 
truth.”2  In  his  commonplace  book  for  1696,  under  the 
heading  Deus,  he  discussed  “Descartes’  proof  of  God 
from  the  idea  of  necessary  existence.”  He  rejects  it, 
because  you  can  just  as  easily  prove  eternal  matter  as 
eternal  spirit;  and,  furthermore,  although  we  can  prove 
real  being  from  real  being  we  cannot  prove  real  being 
from  the  mere  idea  of  it.3 

Locke’s  demonstration  is  but  a special  application 
of  the  well-known  cosmological  proof.  It  is  very 

1 Government,  pp.  1-53.  Locke  is  arguing  concerning  the  authority 
of  parents  over  their  children;  they  have  such  authority  because  they 
gave  them  being.  He  contrasts  this  with  the  complete  authorship  of 
our  being  which  is  in  God.  It  is  not  so  much  the  order  of  the  parts  of 
the  eye  as  such  that  proves  the  existence  of  an  all-wise  Contriver  as  it 
is  God’s  authorship  of  our  being,  that  gives  Him  authority  over  us,  that 
concerns  Locke. 

' 2 Essay,  IV,  x,  7. 

3 The  relation  of  Locke  to  the  Cartesian  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God  was  frequently  discussed  in  Germany  during  the  last  century. 
Crous  has  made  a good  digest  of  the  discussion  (pp.  25-26) . 


J 


88  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

doubtful  whether  he  uses  the  teleological  proof,  and  we 
have  just  seen  that  he  expressly  rejected  the  ontological, 
mentioning  it  as  from  Descartes. 

Turning  to  the  Deists  we  find  that  Herbert  was  sure 
of  God’s  existence  because  he  found  the  idea  of  God,  as 
well  as  the  other  articles  of  natural  religion,  among  the 
- common  notions  that  are  given  by  natural  instinct,  and 
are  innate  and  of  all  knowledge  most  certain.  Blount 
seems  to  accept  Herbert’s  views  here,  just  as  he  did  in 
case  of  the  other  articles  of  natural  religion.1  Toland 
is  not  clear.  He  says  that  reason  is  our  ground  for 
certainty  that  God  exists,  and  in  the  same  passage  he 
appeals  to  common  notions,  apparently  in  the  same 
sense  as  Herbert.  He  also  speaks  of  common  notions 
elsewhere.2  Collins  seems  to  know  nothing  about 
innate  principles  in  this  connection.  However  in  one 
place,  quoting  from  the  opening  of  Hobbes’s  De  Homine, 
he  recognizes  the  importance  of  teleology  as  a proof  of 
God’s  existence.  We  must  conclude  from  the  adapta- 
tion of  organs  that  they  were  made  for  their  respective 
needs  by  an  understanding  being.  He  who  would  not 
reason  thus  “ought  to  be  esteemed  destitute  of  under- 
standing.”3 Tindal  knows  of  only  one  thing  that  is 
innate  in  man;  that  is  desire  for  happiness.4  But  we 
can  know  that  there  is  a God  “from  the  marks  we  dis-"' 
cern  in  the  laws  of  the  universe  and  its  government.” t 
From  those  “we  can  demonstrate  it  to  be  governed  by  a 
God  of  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness,”  and  he  who 

1 Blount.  Miscellaneous  Works,  p.  136. 

2 Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  p.  31. 

3 A Discourse  on  Freetkinking,  p.  104. 

♦ Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  p.  22. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions 


89 


* cannot  grasp  this  by  his  reason  cannot  know  that  there 
is  a good  and  wise  God.1  Wollaston  expressly  rejects 
innate  knowledge  of  God,2  but  appeals  to  the  cosmo- 
logical proof  at  least  twice,3  and  refers  to  the  argument 
from  purpose,  although  he  does  not  work  this  out 
clearly.  Morgan  is  impressed  with  the  unity,  order, 
wisdom,  and  design  of  the  world.  “All  nature  shines 
with  Deity,  and  divine  truth  and  perfection  irresistibly 
makes  its  way  to  every  rational  attentive  mind.”4  The 
other  Deists  do  not  seem  to  have  any  interest  in  prov- 
ing the  existence  of  God.  (They  assume  it  as  an  * 
unquestioned  fact,  and  devote  most  of  their  attention 
to  the  relation  of  natural  and  revealed  religion.' 

Accordingly  it  appears  that  the  Deists  as  a class 
seldom  touch  the  problem.  Although  at  first  they 
emphasize  innate  principles  as  a ground  for  our  belief 
in  God’s  existence,  as  the  movement  approached  its 
most  active  and  influential  stage  this  gave  way  to  the 
teleological  proof  and  also,  in  case  of  Wollaston,  to  the 
cosmological  proof.  However  they  do  not  seem  to  have 
made  a clear  distinction  between  the  last  two  argu- 
ments. For  instance,  we  cannot  be  certain  that  Tindal 
did  not  reason  cosmologically.  But  the  proof  of  Anselm 
does  not  seem  to  have  appealed  to  them.  It  is  not 
certain  that  any  Deist  mentions  it. 

Summing  up  our  results  and  comparing  them  with 
Locke’s  views,  we  find  that  early  Deism  taught  that  we 
have  innate  ideas  of  God,  which  Locke  and  Wollaston 

1 Ibid,.,  p.  191. 

2 The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,  p.  36. 

3Ibid.,'pp.  1145.,  156. 

4 Physico-Theology,  pp.  140  ff. 


90 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


expressly  rejected.  It  seems  that  Tindal  also  rejected 
it  and  it  was  not  mentioned  by  the  other  Deists.  In 
this  respect,  later  Deism  agreed  with  Locke. } 

Locke’s  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  was  the  cos- 
mological one.  He  thought  it  had  the  certainty  of 
mathematical  demonstration.  Perhaps  this  was  referred 
to  by  Tindal,  but  we  find  no  trace  of  it  in  any  other  Deist. 
Thus  in  his  main  proof  Locke  seems  to  have  exerted  no 
influence  on  the  Deists. 

It  is  uncertain  whether  Locke  recognized  the  teleo- 
logical proof.1  This  was  more  widely  held  among  the 
Deists  than  any  other.  Here  the  difference  between 
them  is  very  marked. 

Locke  expressly  rejected  the  ontological  proof.  The 
Deists  appear  to  have  been  silent  about  it. 

B.  THE  RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD 

a)  Providence. — There  is  a widespread  conviction 
that  the  Deists  denied  divine  Providence;  that  they  so 
reduced  the  supernatural  that  the  doctrine  of  the 
immanence  of  God  in  the  world  of  our  impressions 
disappears.  The  God  of  the  Deists  is  often  made  to 
appear  as  the  apex  of  an  abstract  world-system,  a creative 
being  that  started  the  world-process  and  then  withdrew 
and  is  now  separated  and  isolated  from  it;  this  is  the 

1 Locke’s  practical  neglect  of  the  teleological  proof  becomes  all  the 
more  striking  when  we  remember  that  both  Newton  and  Boyle,  who  were 
his  friends,  with  whom  he  often  discussed  religious  problems,  emphasize 
the  argument  from  design.  Was  Locke’s  failure  to  use  this  proof  due 
to  his  keener  critical  sense  which  enabled  him  to  see  its  weaknesses  that 
were  brought  out  later?  We  have  found  nothing  that  casts  light  on 
this. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  91 

“absentee  God”  of  literature.1  It  is  a tradition  that  is 
not  well  founded;  the  Deists  who  have  survived  in 
history  did  not  hold  such  views. 

Nowhere  does  Locke  give  us  a specific  statement  of 
his  conception  of  Providence.  In  fact  he  seldom  men- 
tions it.  He  conceives  God  as  very  clearly  related  to 
our  well-being  here,2  as  the  supreme  Preserver  of  man- 
kind,3 and  through  the  bounty  of  His  Providence  has 
made  the  useful  needs  cheap  and  within  the  reach  of 
all.4  “He  is  constantly  bringing  about  his  purposes  by  - 
ordinary  means.”  He  makes  use  of  miracles  “only  in 
cases  that  require  them”  for  the  evidencing  of  some 
revelation  or  mission  to  be  sent  from  him.  In  fact,  as 
will  appear  later,  Locke’s  whole  conception  of  God’s 
dealings  with  man,  in  revealing  to  him  the  plan  of  salva- 
tion and  certifying  it  by  miracles  and  fulfilled  prophecies, 
and  in  making  it  effective,  assumes  an  active  immanence 
of  God. 

Locke  repeated  the  prevailing  views  of  Providence 
and  had  no  particular  reason  to  discuss  it.  It  is  to  be 
regretted  that  Fraser,  in  the  notes  of  his  critical  edition 
of  the  Essay,  does  not  give  his  reason  for  saying  that  the 

1 Deism  “has  come  into  use  as  a technical  term  for  one  specific  ' 
metaphysical  doctrine  as  to  the  relation  of  God  to  the  universe,  assumed 
to  have  been  characteristic  of  the  Deists,  and  to  have  distinguished  them 
from  atheists,  pantheists,  and  theists — the  belief,  namely,  that  the  first 
cause  of  the  universe  is  a personal  God,  who  is,  however,  not  only  distinct 
from  the  world  but  apart  from  it  and  its  concerns”  ( Encyclopaedia  * 
Britannica,  art.  “Deism”). 

2 Bourne,  Life  of  John  Locke,  I,  180,  396. 

3 Locke,  Works,  VII,  85  ff. 

4 Reasonableness  of  Christianity,  Works,  VII,  85. 


92 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


idea  of  God  “is  found  in  very  various  stages  of  develop- 
ment, and  with  Locke  himself  is  external  and  mechanical, 
excluding  immanence  in  the  actuality  of  the  world  of 
experience.  It  is  the  deistical  idea,  in  short.”  The 
writer  finds  no  justification  for  this  assertion  concerning 
Locke,  nor  for  this  imputation  concerning  the  Deists, 
as  will  appear  later.  Both  accepted  the  providential 
dealings  of  God  with  His  world  as  a fact,  as  did  almost 
everybody  else.1 

Turning  to  the  Deists,2  Blount  is  as  outspoken  in  his 
belief  that  God  does  “lead  and  guide  all  our  thoughts, 
words,  and  actions”  as  any  orthodox  believer,3  that 
God  leads  men,4  that  a great  political  event  was  the  act 
of  God.5  Toland  and  Collins  are  silent  on  the  subject. 
But  Tindal  quotes  approvingly  from  Clarke’s  Boylean 
lecture  and  holds  that  “ God  preserves  the  world  by  his 
continual  all- wise  Providence.”6  He  believes  that  the 
Jews,  as  God’s  chosen  people,  were  cared  for  provi- 
dentially.7 Wollaston  taught  that  “God  who  gives 
existence  to  the.  world,  does  also  govern  it  by  his  Provi- 

1 Fraser,  Locke's  Essay  Concerning  the  Human  Understanding 
(Oxford,  1894),  I,  99;  Essay,  IV,  xvi,  13. 

2 Richard  Willis  in  Occasional  Papers  (London,  1697),  p.  13,  entered 
into  the  deistic  controversy  and  finds  no  objection  whatever  to  the 
deistic  doctrine  of  Providence;  he  quotes  the  particular  Deist  against 
whom  his  attack  is  directed;  from  this  we  learn  that  he  held  that  God 
superintends  the  actions  of  men. 

3 Religio  Laid,  pp.  59,  60.  4 Ibid.,  pp.  63,  64. 

3 Ibid.,  pp.  66,  81,  83,  85.  This  is  mentioned  in  a number  of  places. 
His  implicit  belief  in  Providence  and  the  frequency  with  which  he 
expresses  it  would  impress  any  reader  with  this  or  any  other  work  of 
Blount. 

6 Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  p.  364. 

1 1bid.,  p.  197. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  93 

dence,”  and  this  even  concerns  “particular  cases  relating 
to  rational  beings.”1  Morgan,  in  the  Preface  to  Physico- 
Theology,  expresses  the  conviction  that  he  demonstrates 
“the  being,  providence,  continual  presence,  and  incessant 
agency  and  concurrence  of  the  Deity  in  all  the  works  and 
ways  of  nature.”  He  also  criticizes  those  who  would  see 
the  world  running  as  a perfect  clock  without  the  Maker. 
He  adds  that  such  teaching  may  be  good  philosophy,  but 
it  is  poor  divinity.2  But  in  a significant  passage  he 
vigorously  criticizes  those  who  do  not  see  God  acting 
through  the  laws  of  His  world.  He  can  “discover  no 
difference  ....  between  such  sort  of  Deism  and 
atheism  itself.”3  The  context  indicates  that  he  is 
defending  the  doctrine  of  Providence  against  those  who 
would  reduce  to  a minimum  the  supernatural  factor  in 
the  ongoing  of  the  world.  If  there  were  Deists  who  held 
such  views,  they  were  not  among  the  leaders  of  the 
movement  and  leave  no  mark  upon  it.4  Strange  as  it 
may  seem,  Chubb,  the  least  educated  of  the  Deists,  is  the 
only  one  who  has  given  a systematic  statement  of  the 
doctrine  of  Providence.  There  is  a general  Providence, 
by  which  God  at  the  creation  put  the  world  under  such 
laws  as  result  in  making  proper  provisions  for  the  needs 
of  the  animal  part  of  creation.5  Then  there  is  special 

1 The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,  pp.  170,  171,  176,  279. 

2 Physico-Theology,  pp.  25  if.  The  seventh  chapter  is  under  the 
heading,  “Of  Divine  Providence,  or  God’s  Preserving  and  Governing 
the  World.”  He  expressly  accepts  both  general  and  special  Providence. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  61. 

4 Boyle  also  makes  a very  vigorous  defense  of  Providence;  it  seems 
to  have  been  called  forth  by  some  definite  attack.  But  there  is  no  clue 
as  to  who  made  the  attack  {Works,  V,  46). 

5 A Short  Dissertation  on  Providence,  Tracts,  I,  142  ff. 


94  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

Providence,  which  is  a special  interposition  of  God 
outside  of  the  normal  order,  hence  miraculous.  For 
instance,  a man  passes  a loose  wall  and  it  falls  after  he 
has  reached  a point  of  safety;  such  a conception  of 
Providence  “is  controverted  among  Christians.”  It  is 
inconceivable  that  God  should  be  almost  perpetually 
interfering,  that  there  should  be  a sort  of  “perpetual 
patchwork.”  But  he  asserts  without  hesitation  his 
conviction  that  God,  for  certain  great  ends,  does  interfere 
in  the  ongoing  of  the  world.1 

Accordingly  we  find  no  essential  difference  between 
the  doctrine  of  Providence  as  set  forth  by  Locke  and 
as  held  by  all  the  leading  Deists.  Both  accept  the  y 
prevailing  view  of  God’s  relation  to  the  world.  Since 
it  is  a point  on  which  there  is  no  difference  of  opinion,  it 
cannot  in  any  way  contribute  to  the  solution  of  our 
special  problem.  This  presentation  is  called  forth  by 
the  more  or  less  widespread  belief  that  the  Deists  as  a 
class  denied  Providence  as  commonly  understood,  that 
this  was  a distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  deistic 
movement,  and  that  it  was  a point  of  dispute  in  the 
deistic  controversy. 

h)  Miracles. — It  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to 
Locke  that  the  fact  of  miracles  could  ever  be  seriously  >’ 
challenged.  He  accepted  them  as  events  that  actually 
took  place,  which  reason  convinces  us  are  sufficiently 
attested  in  history.  “Miracles,  which  are  well  attested, 
do  not  only  find  credit  themselves,  but  give  it  also  to 
other  truths,  which  need  such  confirmation.”2  He 
appeals  to  them  frequently  as  testimonies  wrought  of 

1 A Short  Dissertation  on  Providence,  Tracts,  I,  pp.  149  ff. 

2 Essay,  IV,  xvi,  13;  xix,  15. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  95 

God  to  convince  men  of  the  truth  of  His  revelation.  In 
his  Essay  on  Miracles  he  says  that  they  are  the  “bases 
on  which  divine  mission  is  always  established,  and  con- 
sequently that  foundation  on  which  the  believers  of  any 
divine  revelation  must  ultimately  bottom  their  faith.”1 
They  certified  the  Messiahship  of  Jesus  to  the  Jews, 
they  are  the  credentials  which  God  has  given  the  bearers 
of  His  message  to  the  world.2  Locke  frequently  empha- 
sizes the  evidential  value  of  miracles.  His  form  of 
statement  may  vary;  sometimes  he  is  less  extreme 
than  at  others;  but  whenever  he  touches  revelation  his 
discussion  is  permeated  by  the  conviction  that  it  is 
miraculously  attested. 

This  tendency  in  Locke  to  magnify  the  importance 
of  the  evidential  value  of  miracles  was  not  peculiar  to 
him.  Even  the  liberal  Tillotson  held  that  miracles 
were  reasonable  and  may  become,  as  in  the  case  of 
biblical  miracles,  a convincing  proof  of  revelation. 
This  was  also  the  opinion  of  Clarke.3  Even  the  chemist 
Boyle  not  only  held  that  miracles  are  a proof  of  the 
Christian  religion,  but  went  so  far  as  to  assert  that  they 
were  necessary  to  support  Christianity.4  As  we  shall 
see  later,  miracles  were  considered  such  an  important 
part  of  the  economy  of  revelation  that  to  challenge  them 
was  considered  the  same  as  to  challenge  supernatural 
revelation  itself  and  also  all  positive  religion. 

Between  this  view  and  the  general  deistic  attitude 
toward  miracles  there  is  a great  contrast.  Their 
evidential  value  is  at  first  questioned,  then  denied,  and 

1 Locke,  Works,  X,  264;  also  pp.  259  ff.  2 Ibid.,  VII,  32. 

3 McGiffert,  Protestant  Thought  before  Kant,  pp.  200,  210. 

4 Boyle,  Works,  V,  48,  52. 


96 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


the  fact  of  the  miracles  is  made  to  appear  less  and  less 
probable,  and  eventually  impossible.  For  Herbert 
alleged  miracles  and  so-called  revelation  seemed  to  go 
together.  Although  he  does  not  deny  them,  they  could  v 
have  meaning  only  for  those  who  witnessed  them.  For 
us  they  are  uncertain  tradition.1  It  is  difficult  to  gather 
from  Blount’s  writings  just  what  opinion  he  held  con- 
cerning miracles.  He  accepts  the  account  of  the  pente- 
costal  gift  of  tongues,2  believes  that  some  accounts,  such 
as  that  of  Lazarus  and  Dives,  are  founded  on  truth,  but 
enlarged  and  therefore  need  interpretation,3  defends 
Burnet’s  critically  skeptical  attitude  toward  Old  Testa- 
ment miracles,4  and  says,  when  expressing  uncertainty 
concerning  certain  miracles  connected  with  the  birth  of 
Christ,  that  “to  believe  in  any  stories  that  are  not 
approved  by  the  public  authority  of  our  Church  is 
superstition;  whereas  to  believe  them  that  are,  is 
religion.”5  He  also  questions  the  evidential  value  of 
miracles.  He  would  not  depend  upon  them  lest  Simon 
Magus  be  his  rival;  and,  furthermore,  both  miracles  and 
doctrine  come  to  us  by  tradition.  It  is  the  spirit  of 
Herbert.6  Though  Blount  did  not  reject  miracles,  his  4 
attitude  was  often  skeptical  and  hostile.  This  was  the '} 
beginning  of  the  deistic  criticism  of  miracles. 

Coming  to  the  leading  Deists  we  find  great  difference 
of  opinion  concerning  miracles.  Some  surprise  us  by 

1 Lechler,  Geschichte  des  englischen  Deismus,  pp.  48  ff. 

2 Miscellaneous  Works,  pp.  165,  166. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  32. 

4 Ibid.,  pp.  2 ff. 

s Philo  stratus,  Book  I,  chap,  iv,  illustration  1. 

6 Ibid.,  chap,  v,  illustrations  6 and  7. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  97 

their  conservative  views,  while  others  are  radical  in  their  * 
criticism.  Toland,  when  he  is  arguing  that  Christianity 
is  not  mysterious,  says  plainly  that  “Christ  proves  his 
authority  and  Gospel  by  such  works  and  miracles  as  the 
stiffnecked  Jews  themselves  could  not  deny  to  be 
divine.”1  However  a miracle  cannot  be  contrary  to.^- 
reason.2  He  also  accepts  their  evidential  value.3  But 
a quarter  of  a century  after  the  publication  of  Christianity 
Not  Mysterious,  he  expressed  himself  very  skeptically  on 
the  Old  Testament  miracles.  He  thought  that  not  more 
than  one-third  of  them  were  real  miracles.  The  pillar 
of  cloud  was  smoke  and  the  fire  “ a human  contrivance.”4  - 
It  is  probable  that  Toland  became  more  liberal  and 
perhaps  less  cautious  in  his  later  years.  But  even  in  his 
early  publications  the  evidential  value  of  miracles  is  not 
so  great  as  with  Locke  and  Boyle  and  other  progressive 
leaders. 

Collins  seems  to  accept  miracles  as  a fact,5  although 
he  is  inclined  to  explain  away  some  of  them.6  However 
a miracle  is  not  sufficient  to  give  authority  to  a prophetn 
attempting  to  prove  anything  contrary  to  natural 
religion.7  In  fact  even  “the  miracles  wrought  by  Jesus 

1 Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  p.  47.  He  defines  a miracle  in  much 
the  same  sense  as  Locke  and  Clarke:  “A  miracle  then  is  some  action 
exceeding  all  human  power  and  which  the  laws  of  nature  cannot  perform 
by  their  ordinary  operations”  (p.  144). 

2 Ibid.,  p.  145.  *Ibid.,  p.  147. 

4 Hodegus  (London,  1720),  pp.  5 ff. 

s A Discourse  of  the  Grounds  and  Reasons  of  the  Christian  Religion 

(London,  1737),  p.  33. 

6 A Discourse  on  Freethinking,  p.  160. 

7 Ibid.,  pp.  174,  175. 


98 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


are,  according  to  the  Gospel  scheme,  no  absolute  proof 
of  his  being  the  Messias,  or  of  the  truth  of  Christianity.”1 

Tindal,  though  hostile  to  miracles,  does  not  expressly 
deny  them,  nor  does  he  say  that  the  Deists  deny  them,2 
but  he  believes  there  are  many  miracles  found  elsewhere 
that  are  of  like  nature  to  those  of  the  Bible.  In  fact 
“ there  are  no  miracles  recorded  in  the  Bible,  but  many  of 
the  like  nature  are  to  be  found  in  pagan  histories”;3 
they  have  no  evidential  value  if  evil  as  well  as  good 
beings  can  perform  them.4  He  calls  attention  to  Clarke’s 
Boylean  lecture,  in  which  Clarke  claims  that  there  are 
indifferent  or  possible  doctrines,  in  addition  to  positive 
or  ethical,  which  can  be  believed  on  the  witness  of 
miracles.5  Then  Tindal  adds:  “Here  these  Deists  beg 
leave  to  differ  with  him,”  both  as  to  whether  there  are 
indifferent  doctrines  and  as  to  whether  they  can  be 
proved  by  miracles. 

Wollaston  is  silent  concerning  miracles.  Apparently 
they  have  no  place  in  the  religion  of  nature,  which  he 
delineated. 

Woolston,  in  the  sixth  discourse  on  the  miracles  of 
our  Savior,  denies  that  there  was  such  an  event  as  the 
carnal  resurrection  of  Jesus,  and  asserts  that  the  accounts 
of  it  are  absurd,  impossible,  and  inaccurate.  One  might 
almost  conclude  from  his  discussion  of  it  that  Jesus  was 
an  impostor.  At  least  this  much  is  clear  to  him,  many 
of  the  miracles  recorded  by  the  evangelists  were  never 
wrought,  and  those  of  Jesus  “as  they  are  nowadays 

1 A Discourse  of  the  Grounds  and  Reasons  of  the  Christian  Religion , 
P-  33- 

2 Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  pp.  373  ff. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  192.  4 Ibid.,  p.  200. 


s Ibid.,  p.  370. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  99 

understood,  make  nothing  for  his  authority  and  Messiah- 
ship.”1  Woolston  undertakes  to  explain  these  accounts 
allegorically.  His  attitude  toward  them  is  often  that  of 
coarse  jesting. 

Although  Bolingbroke  at  times  refers  to  miracles  in  a 
somewhat  uncertain  way,2  he  accepts  them  as  con- 
firmations of  revelation  wrought  by  God  for  the  estab- 
lishing of  the  Christian  religion.  Christ  “proved  his 
assertion  at  the  same  time  by  his  miracles.”3  Boling- 
broke’s  doctrine  of  miracles  is  that  of  the  orthodox  men 
of  his  times — that  is,  he  accepted  miracles  as  historical 
facts,  out  of  the  ordinary,  wrought  by  God  to  attest  the 
truth  of  His  revelation  to  man. 

Morgan,  in  the  second  volume  of  The  Moral  Phi- 
losopher, seems  to  hold  almost  the  same  opinion  con- 
cerning miracles  that  we  found  in  Tindal;4  but  in  the 
first  volume  he  simply  assumes  miracles  as  matters  of 
fact5  and  believes  that  the  power  of  working  miracles  has 
no  connection  with  truth.  False  prophets  also  per- 
formed them.6  The  historical  fact  is  not  challenged; 
the  evidential  value  is  denied. 

Chubb  agrees  with  Morgan;  at  times  he  seems  to 
assume  a somewhat  skeptical  attitude  toward  miracles;7 

1 A Discourse  on  the  Miracles  of  Our  Saviour  (London,  1728),  pp.  3-5. 

2 Works,  VI,  240,  258,  259. 

s Ibid.,  p.  351.  “The  faith,  which  God  himself  came  to  earth  to 
publish,  which  was  confirmed  by  miracles,  and  recorded  by  divine 
inspiration,”  etc.  Stupendous  miracles  accompany  God’s  revelation  of 
His  Son  (pp.  283,  285).  St.  Paul  “worked  indeed  now  and  then  a mir- 
acle, as  it  was  given  him  to  work  them”  (p.  288). 

4 The  Moral  Philosopher,  II,  50  ff. 

s Ibid.,  I,  79.  6 Ibid.,  pp.  89,  98,  99. 

7 The  True  Gospel  of  Jesus  Christ  Asserted , pp.  43  ff. 


ioo  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

but  he  believes  that  they  actually  occurred,  though  they 
cannot  afford  certain,  but  only  probable,  proof  that  a 
revelation  is  divine.1 

Generally  speaking  the  deistic  attitude  toward 
miracles  was  hostile.  However,  few  doubted  that  they 
actually  occurred.  Some  of  the  biblical  accounts  might 
be  questioned  or  even  denied,  but  special  divine  inter- 
vention in  the  course  of  the  world  was  not  challenged. 
Some  of  the  Deists  held  that  miracles  might  be  performed 
by  other  powers — by  evil  spirits  or  even  by  the  devil. 
The  miraculous  as  such  was  not  considered  impossible; 
but,  with  the  exception  of  Toland  and  Bolingbroke,  the 
Deists  rejected  the  evidential  value  of  miracles.  They 
cannot  prove  the  truth  of  revelation.  This  was  a radical 
departure  from  the  prevailing  opinion  of  the  times. 

This  attitude  toward  miracles  stands  in  marked 
contrast  with  that  of  Locke.  Nowhere  in  his  writings 
do  we  find  anything  that  suggests  the  hostile  criticism  of 
miracles  that  characterizes  the  Deists.  The  lion  of 
rationalism  is  made  to  lie  down  in  peace  with  the  lamb 
of  traditionalism  and  not  devour  it.  For  him  miracles 
are  facts  in  history,  so  well  authenticated  that  we  must 
believe  them.  They  were  special  acts  of  God,  wrought 
by  Him  to  certify  to  the  truth  of  His  messengers,  so  that 
the  man  of  sound  reason  had  adequate  ground  for 
accepting  His  revelation.  Locke’s  rationalism  did  not 
venture  beyond  the  beaten  paths,  while  the  deistic 
rationalism  opened  up  new  lines  of  criticism.  It 

1 The  True  Gospel  of  Christ  Asserted,  pp.  8 ff.;  An  Enquiry  Con- 
cerning Redemption,  pp.  105, 106;  Remarks  on  Britannicus Letters  (London, 
1734),  p.  1.  In  the  latter  part  of  The  True  Gospel  of  Christ  Asserted, 
he  assumes  a very  critical  and  somewhat  skeptical  attitude  toward 
miracles,  but  he  nowhere  denies  them  as  historical  events. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions 


xoi 


questioned  certain  biblical  records  of  miraculous  events 
and  attacked  the  long-cherished  Christian  conviction 
that  miracles  were  an  argument,  perhaps  an  unanswer- 
able argument,  for  the  divine  origin  of  the  Scriptures 
of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments.  The  contrast  between 
these  two  views  is  marked.  Locke  accepts  the  scriptural 
accounts  just  as  he  finds  them,  and  gives  what  he 
considers  adequate  reasons  for  doing  so,  and  concludes 
that  we  have  in  the  miracles  of  the  Bible  historical  facts 
and  divine  witnesses  to  its  truth.  The  Deists  challenged 
at  least  some  accounts  of  miracles  and  almost  unani- 
mously denied  their  evidential  value.  Theirs  was 
another  and  a very  different  spirit. 

2.  REVELATION  AND  SCRIPTURE 

We  have  learned  that  neither  Locke  nor  the  Deists 
conceived  God  as  dwelling  in  isolation,  unconcerned  for 
the  welfare  of  his  world.  We  would  therefore  naturally 
expect  that  they  would  think  of  the  Creator  and  Ruler 
and  Upholder  of  the  universe  as  having  some  special 
designs  for  man’s  well-being,  some  plans  or  principles  for 
directing  his  life  which  He  would  make  known  to  man. 
This  is  what  we  find  both  Locke  and  the  Deists  teaching. 
Everybody  believed  that  God  reveals  His  will,  that  man  . 
can  know  what  God  would  have  him  do,  and  that  rewards 
or  punishments  are  ours  according  as  we  obey  or  disobey  , 
God’s  will.  The  fact  of  revelation  is  never  challenged. 
But  when  we  go  beyond  this  opinions  differ  widely. 
Assuming  that  there  is  a revelation,  some  further  ques- 
tions arise.  How  is  it  given,  how  does  God  make  known 
His  will  to  man,  how  does  the  Infinite  communicate  to  the 
finite  ? And,  again,  assuming  that  there  is  a revelation, 


102 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


what  is  God’s  message  to  man,  what  does  He  com- 
municate to  us,  what  is  the  content  of  revelation  ? Can 
we  take  the  Bible  just  as  it  is  to  be  His  revelation? 
These  questions  lead  us  to  one  of  the  chief  battle  grounds 
of  the  deistic  controversy.  Perhaps  in  no  other  field  can 
we  see  so  clearly  the  lines  that  divide  the  Deists  from  the 
more  orthodox  men  of  the  period  that  we  are  studying. 

If  you  know  a man’s  attitude  toward  revelation,  you  can 
classify  him  quite  accurately.  Here,  as  in  the  case  of 
miracles,  there  is  a radical  difference  between  Locke  and 
Deism.  We  shall  see  that  this  difference  pertains  to  the 
relative  importance  that  is  assigned  to  reason  and 
nature,  as  over  against  the  supernatural  factor,  in 
mediating  revelation,  and  to  the  consequent  conception 
of  the  contents  of  revelation.  In  the  preceding  chapter 
we  considered  the  place  of  reason  and  nature  in  religious 
matters.  It  will  therefore  not  be  necessary  for  us  to 
make  an  extensive  survey  of  the  opinions  of  other  writers 
of  the  liberal  movement. 

Though  Locke  does  not  give  us  a full  and  systematic 
discussion  of  revelation,  he  has  indicated  plainly  what 
he  holds  concerning  it,  so  that  we  can  reconstruct  his 
views  with  confidence.  Worcester  is  right  in  asserting 
that  Locke  assumes  the  possibility  of  revelation  without 
remark.1  We  may  go  farther  and  say  that  Locke 
assumes  the  fact  of  revelation,  which  he  undertakes  to 
define,  limit,  and  rationalize  as  far  as  possible.  In  the 
Essay,  Book  IV,  chapters  xviii  and  xix,  he  discusses 
Faith  and  Reason  and  Enthusiasm,  and  makes  many 
references  to  revelation.  He  defines  faith  as  assent  to  / 

1 E.  E.  Worcester,  The  Religious  Opinions  of  John  Locke  (Geneva, 
N.Y.,  1889),  p.  23. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  103 

a proposition  “not  thus  made  out  by  the  deductions  of 
reason,  but  upon  the  credit  of  the  proposer,  as  coming 
from  God,  in  some  extraordinary  way  of  communication. 
This  way  of  discovering  truth  to  men  we  call  revelation.”1 
Perhaps  his  best  definition  of  revelation  is  given  in  the 
passage  already  quoted  in  the  study  of  reason  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  in  which  reason  and  revelation  are 
contrasted.  “Reason  is  natural  revelation,  whereby 
the  eternal  Father  of  light  and  fountain  of  all  knowledge 
communicates  to  mankind  that  portion  of  truth  which  he 
has  laid  within  the  reach  of  their  natural  faculties; 
revelation  is  natural  reason  enlarged  by  a new  set  of  - 
discoveries  communicated  by  God  immediately;  which 
reason  vouches  the  truth  of,  by  the  testimony  and  proof 
it  gives  that  they  come  from  God.”  So  that  to  deny 
reason  in  the  interest  of  revelation  “puts  out  the  light 
of  both.”2 

Reason  and  revelation  in  the  narrower  sense  are  set 
over  against  each  other.  Both  are  from  God.  Each 
brings  to  us  some  portion  of  God’s  truth;  revelation 
enlarges  natural  reason  by  giving  man  something  from 
God  immediately,  by  some  extraordinary  means  of 
communication,  which  is  vouched  for  by  reason. 

Locke  clearly  teaches  that  revelation  is  no  ordinary 
communication;  its  supernatural  character  never  seems 
to  have  been  questioned  by  him.  We  have  just  seen, 
in  the  preceding  section,  that  he  is  convinced  that  its 
bearers  come  with  the  special  stamp  of  divine  approval 
in  the  miracles  that  God  enabled  them  to  perform. 
Being  no  ordinary  communication  from  God,  it  was 

1 Essay,  IV,  xviii,  2. 

2 Ibid.,  IV,  xix,  4. 


ic?4  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

natural  that  it  should  be  accompanied  by  extraordinary 
events. 

He  also  holds  that  revelation  brings  us  some  things 
that  unaided  reason  could  never  discover;  it  thus 
v.  becomes  supplemental  to  natural  light.  There  are 
things  that  are  above  the  reach  of  reason,  of  which  we 
can  have  no  knowledge;  yet  these  “when  revealed  are 
the  proper  matter  of  faith,”  such  as  the  rebellion  of 
angels,  the  resurrection  of  the  dead  and  the  like;1  and 
in  certain  things  where  reason  can  give  us  but  probabil- 
ity, revelation  “must  carry  it  against  the  probable  con- 
jecture of  reason.”  In  the  Reasonableness  of  Christianity,  ~ 
he  was  disposed  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  that  which  we 
have  from  revelation,  that  reason  could  not  discover. 
He  emphasized  the  contrast  between  the  ethics  of  natural 
and  revealed  religion. 

He  also  teaches  that  we  accept  revelation  because 
reason  certifies  to  its  being  revelation.  Though  revela- 
tion is  supernatural  and  can  give  man  that  which  is 
above  reason,  it  cannot  be  accepted  on  its  own  authority.2  ’ 
We  saw  in  the  preceding  chapter  that  it  had  its  creden- 
tials from  reason:  and  when  we  receive  anything  as 
revealed  by  God  our  assurance  can  be  “no  greater  than 
our  knowledge  is  that  it  is  a revelation  from  God.”3 

1 Essay,  IV,  xviii,  7.  2 Ibid..,  6. 

3 Ibid.,  IV,  xviii,  5.  “Whatever  God  hath  revealed  is  certainly 

true;  no  doubt  can  be  made  of  it.  This  is  the  proper  object  of  faith;  but 
whether  it  be  a divine  revelation  or  no,  reason  must  judge;  which  can 
never  permit  the  mind  to  reject  a greater  evidence  to  embrace  what  is 
less  evident,  not  allow  it  to  entertain  probability  in  opposition  to  knowl- 
edge and  certainty.  There  can  be  no  evidence  that  any  traditional 
revelation  is  of  divine  original,  in  the  words  we  receive  it,  and  in  the 
sense  we  understand  it,  so  clear  and  so  certain,  as  that  of  the  principles 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions 


io5 

Hence  faith  is  a persuasion  short  of  knowledge.* 1  But 
once  we  are  persuaded  by  sound  reason  that  a revelation 
is  from  God,  “we  may  as  well  doubt  of  our  own  being,  as 
we  can  whether  any  revelation  from  God  is  true.”2 

The  closing  paragraph  of  Locke’s  first  letter  to 
Stillingfleet  gives  his  attitude  toward  the  Holy  Scripture. 
It  is  his  constant  guide;  it  contains  infallible  truth,  and 
he  is  ready  to  condemn  and  quit  any  opinion  once  it 
is  shown  to  be  contrary  to  any  revelation  in  Holy 
Scripture.3 

Though  Locke’s  attitude  toward  revelation  is 
thoroughly  rationalistic,  the  conclusion  at  which  he 
finally  arrives  is  very  conservative.  He  is  convinced 
that  he  has  sufficient  reason  for  believing  that  the 
Scriptures  are  God’s  revelation  to  man  with  full  divine 
authority,  supernaturally  given  and  certified  by  miracles 
and  prophecy. 

Locke  accepted  prophecy  and  its  fulfilment  as  fact. 
For  him  it  was  not  just  a special  part  of  God’s  super- 
natural revelation  to  man.  It  was  given,  as  the  rest 
of  the  Bible,  in  a manner  that  is  out  of  the  ordinary. 


of  reason;  and  therefore  nothing  that  is  contrary  to,  and  inconsistent 
with,  the  clear  and  self-evident  dictates  of  reason  has  a right  to  be  urged 
or  assented  to  as  a matter  of  faith,  wherein  reason  hath  nothing  to  do. 
Whatsoever  is  divine  revelation  ought  to  overrule  all  our  opinions, 
prejudices,  and  interests,  and  hath  a right  to  be  received  with  full  assent  ” 
(Essay,  IV,  xviii,  10). 

1 Locke,  Works,  VI,  144.  This  term  played  an  important  part  in  his 
controversy  with  Stillingfleet. 

2 Essay,  IV,  xvi,  14.  “Not  to  believe  what  he  has  revealed  . . . . 

calls  his  veracity  into  question For  the  holy  inspired  writings 

being  all  of  the  same  divine  authority,  must  all  equally  in  every  article 
be  fundamental,  and  necessary  to  be  believed”  (Works,  VII,  234). 

3 Locke,  Works,  IV,  96. 


106  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

But  much  of  it  has  been  fulfilled  in  the  later  stages  of  the 
revealing  of  the  plan  of  salvation;  and  this  becomes  the 
proof  of  the  divine  character  of  all  revelation.  This  is 
an  additional  witness  to  the  truth  of  Scripture,  which,  as 
we  have  just  seen,  Locke  considered  synonymous  with 
revelation.  Miracles  and  prophecies  fulfilled  are 
evidences  for  revelation  that  no  man  with  sound  reason 
can  reject.  Paul  confirmed  the  gospel  by  two  sorts  of 
arguments:  the  one  was  the  revelations  made  concerning 
our  Savior,  by  types  and  figures  and  prophecies  of  Him; 
the  other  by  miracles.1  “Christ,  now  He  is  come,  so 
exactly  answers  the  types,  prefigurations  and  predictions 
of  Him,  in  the  Old  Testament,  that  presently,  upon 
turning  our  eyes  upon  Him,  he  visibly  appears  to  be  the 
person  designed”;  and  the  obscurity  of  many  passages 
becomes  clear.2  Thus  the  New  Testament  has,  in 
addition  to  the  miracles  that  were  wrought  by  Christ 
and  the  apostles,  the  proof  from  the  fulfilment  of  the 
Old  Testament  prophecy. 

When  we  study  the  teachings  of  the  Deists  con- 
cerning revelation,  we  find  ourselves  in  a different 
atmosphere.  Herbert  did  not  deny  revelation,  but  he 
conceived  it  as  mediated  to  us  under  such  conditions 
as  make  it  very  uncertain.  It  was  real  revelation  only 
to  him  that  first  received  it.  To  us  of  a later  time  it  is 
but  tradition;  and  the  reliability  of  a tradition  depends 
upon  the  reliability  of  the  narrator  and  can  never  be., 
more  than  probable.  There  was  great  opportunity  for 
fraud,  and  as  a matter  of  fact  deception  had  been  prac- 
ticed.3 Blount,  apparently  under  the  influence  of 

1 Locke,  W orks,  VIII,  86. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  200.  3 Sorley,  Mind  (1894),  p.  507. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  107 

Herbert,  asks,  “Whether  I am  obliged  to  accept  of 
another’s  revelation  for  the  ground  of  my  faith  P”1  He 
generally  answers  this  question  in  a conservative  way. 
“For  my  own  part,  I who  believe  the  Scriptures  to  be 
the  word  of  God,  do  in  this  point,  as  in  all  others,  resign 
up  my  poor  judgment  to  that  sacred  oracle.”2  However 
at  times  he  assumes  a critical  attitude  toward  certain 
portions  of  the  Bible.3 

1 Religio  Laid,  p.  94. 

2 Anima  Mundi  (London,  1679),  pp.  25,  31,  95.  The  only  account 
of  the  Jews  that  we  can  rely  on  “is  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures,  which 
as  everybody  knows,  was  dictated  by  the  Holy  Spirit.” — Miscellaneous 
Works,  p.  136. 

3 Miscellaneous  Works,  p.  147;  Philostratus,  Book  I,  chap,  vi, 
illustration  5;  Book  I,  chap,  xvii,  illustration  2. 

In  the  Oracles  of  Reason  there  is  printed  a letter  to  Blount  from  one 
whose  identity  remains  hidden  behind  the  initials  of  his  name.  He 
holds  that  revelation  cannot  be  a necessary  supplement  to  natural 
religion,  because  the  latter  is  the  only  general  means  to  happiness  that 
has  been  proposed  and  must  therefore  be  adequate  and  known  to  all  men. 
This  letter  was  published  as  a part  of  the  Oracles  of  Reason,  which  was 
recognized  as  representative  of  the  deistic  movement  at  that  time. 

Stillingfleet’s  Letter  to  a Deist,  which  is  said  to  be  the  first  formal 
reply  to  Deism  that  is  known,  sheds  much  light  on  the  sort  of  views  that 
he  was  opposing.  Works  (London,  1709),  II,  120  ff.  The  Deist  whom 
he  is  answering  found  all  manner  of  confusion  in  the  Bible  and  sought  out 
and  magnified  the  difficulties.  He  set  forth  the  points  agreed  upon  which 
are  but  an  enlargement  of  those  which  Herbert  had  held.  His  seven 
objections  to  the  authority  of  Scripture  are  extremely  radical:  (1) 
There  is  no  certainty  of  an  event  so  long  ago;  we  have  many  fictitious 
histories.  (2)  Probably  these  were  written  when  no  one  lived  who  could 
contradict  what  was  said.  (3)  They  could  more  easily  do  this  before 
printing  was  known.  (4)  Perhaps  there  were  more  impostors  engaged  in 
giving  false  revelation  and  miracles  than  we  can  now  discover.  (5)  We 
should  not  take  the  testimony  of  Scripture  or  Christian  writers,  for  they 
may  be  prejudiced.  (6)  Contradictions  and  inconsistencies  in  the  Bible, 
unfulfilled  prophecies,  obscurity,  imperfections  of  persons  mentioned, 
justify  suspicion  of  the  truth  of  it.  (7)  We  have  cause  to  doubt  the 


108  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

Toland,  in  the  Preface  to  Christianity  Not  Mysterious , 
frankly  says:  “In  the  following  discourse  the  divinity  of  - 
the  New  Testament  is  taken  for  granted.”* 1  For  him 
the  authority  of  God  is  the  same  as  divine  revelation; 
however  this  revelation  “is  not  a necessitating  motive  of 
assent,  but  a means  of  information.”2  Yet  the  ultimate 
proof  of  the  divinity  of  Scripture  rests  upon  reason,  and  ' 
all  doctrines  and  principles  of  the  New  Testament  must., 
agree  with  natural  reason.3 

Though  Collins  said  that  the  Bible  was  “given  us 
at  diverse  times  by  God  himself,”4  he  also  believes  that 
a natural  duty  was  “of  more  indispensable  obligation 
than  any  positive  precept  of  revealed  religion.”5 

In  Tindal  we  come  to  the  more  radical  development! 
of  the  deistic  view  of  revelation.  He  starts  out  from  the 
thesis  that  external  and  internal  revelation  must  agree, 
must  in  fact  be  the  same;  the  standard  of  the  latter  must 
be  the  basis  for  judging  the  former.6  Hence  revelation  ’ 


apostles’  sincerity — they  “might  have  indirect  ends  in  divulging  the 
miracles  recorded  in  Scripture.” 

It  is  evident  that  Stillingfleet  had  in  mind  some  writer  who  held 
almost  all  of  the  characteristically  radical  opinions  of  later  Deism. 

1 Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  pp.  xxiv  and  4. 

2 Ibid.,  pp.  18,  38,  65;  Vindicius  Liberius  (London,  1702),  p.  104; 
Letters  to  Serena,  pp.  19,  56. 

3 Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  pp.  32  ff.,  46. 

4 A Discourse  on  Freethinking,  p.  10. 

s Ibid.,  p.  174.  In  the  Preface  to  A Discourse  on  the  Grounds  and 
Reasons  of  the  Christian  Religion,  he  assumes  a somewhat  unfriendly 
attitude  toward  the  Old  Testament  and  sees  difficulties  in  its  divergence 
from  the  New  Testament. 


6 Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  pp.  8,  59,  188. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  109 

cannot  supplement  reason.1  Therefore  external  revela- 
tion, in  addition  to  the  light  of  nature,  is  not  necessary.2 
He  even  claims  that  had  our  documents  of  revelation 
asserted  authority  without  relying  upon  reason,  they 
would  have  had  no  authority.3  Here  reason  is  not  only 
the  authority  that  certifies  that  an  alleged  revelation  is 
revelation;  it  becomes  also  the  judge  of  that  which 
revelation  brings.  Revelation  is  made  to  depend  on 
reason  to  a greater  extent  than  in  any  previous  writer. 

Bolingbroke  would  test  the  Old  Testament,  as  every 
other  historical  work,  by  seeing  whether  its  contents 
squared  with  experience.4  By  this  test  we  find  that 
“there  are  gross  defects  and  palpable  falsehoods  in  almost  ^ 
every  page  of  Scripture.”  Their  whole  tenor  is  such 
that  one  who  would  believe  in  an  all- wise  Being  cannot 
believe  them  to  be  His  word.5  He  even  says:  “Can 
he  be  less  than  mad  who  boasts  a revelation  superadded 
to  reason?”  and  then  adds  reason  to  revelation.  And 
into  such  madness  St.  Paul,  Augustine,  Malebranche, 
and  the  Bishop  of  Cloyne  fell.6  And  concerning  the 
reliability  of  the  records,  we  have  only  opinion  to  attest 
supernatural  revelation  handed  down  by  tradition; 
hence  there  is  a decreasing  probability  of  its  being  true ; 1 
while  natural  religion  suffers  no  diminution.  The, 
original  pure  gospel  of  Christ  was  supplemented  from 

1 Ibid.,  p.  69.  “Whatever  is  true  by  reason,  can  never  be  false  by 
revelation”  (p.  178). 

2 Ibid.,  p.  195.  “The  Scripture  can  be  only  a secondary  rule,  as  far 
as  it  is  found  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  things.”  The  ultimate  criterion 
of  revelation  is  subjective  (pp.  188,  190).  Revelation  so  far  as  it  is 
reasonable  is  not  set  aside  by  reason  (p.  213). 

3 Ibid.,  pp.  210  ff.  s Ibid.,  p.  148. 

4 Bolingbroke,  Works,  VI,  238.  6 Ibid.,  pp.  170,  171. 


no  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

heathen  sources;  hence  not  all  of  the  New  Testament  is 
gospel.  Even  in  the  very  beginning  it  was  changed  by 
Paul,  for  his  gospel  is  different  from  that  of  Christ.1 
Turning  to  the  purpose  of  revelation,  which,  in  spite 
of  his  racial  hostility,  he  seems  to  accept  as  a fact, 
Bolingbroke  finds  that  “it  was  not  given  to  convince 
men  of  the  reasonableness  of  morality,  but  to  enforce  the 
practice  of  it  by  a superior  authority.”2 

Morgan  assumes  revelation  as  a fact.3  Yet  it  is  no 
guaranty  of  the  truth  of  that  which  was  revealed  save 
to  the  first  person  who  received  it;  for  all  who  came 
later  have  the  account  transmitted  through  tradition.4] 
In  the  Tracts,  his  first  publication,  he  held  that  revela- 
tion may  be  able  to  give  man  that  which  unaided  reason 
could  not  reach;5  but  in  The  Moral  Philosopher  he 
teaches  that  revelation  cannot  give  us  anything  above 
reason,  to  which  it  must  always  appeal.6  In  fact  the 
only  thing  left  for  us  to  do  is  to  appeal  to  reason,  for  in 
so-called  revelation  there  is  confusion  everywhere.7 
Morgan  believes  that  he  has  proved  that  revelation  is 

1 Bolingbroke,  Works,  pp.  303,  350  ff.,  354-56;  VII,  39  ff. 

2 Ibid.,  VI,  329,  330.  In  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  “revelation 
commands  what  it  is  impossible  to  obey,  without  an  assistance  unknown 
to  reason”  (p.  331). 

3 The  Moral  Philosopher,  I,  15,  20. 

4 Ibid.,  pp.  81,  82. 

s Tracts,  X,  18.  In  the  preceding  chapter  he  discusses  the  use  of  the 
concept  of  reason. 

6 The  Moral  Philosopher,  III,  84  ff.  Nothing  miraculous  or  supernat- 
ural can  have  any  authority  over  reason  (p.  134).  Physico-Theology, 
pp.  328  ff.  The  authority  of  any  doctrine  is  grounded  in  nature  or 
reason,  not  in  the  manner  of  its  communication  (p.  126). 

1 Physico-Theology,  pp.  144  ff.  <, 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  hi 

not  infallible,  and  that  those  ancient  Jewish  historians 
were  not  under  any  unerring  guidance  of  the  Holy 
Ghost.1 

Chubb  recognizes  some  sort  of  revelation,  and  Christ 
as  a mediator  of  a divine  revelation  to  the  world,  and 
our  accounts  of  these  revelations  of  God  as  “in  the  main 
strictly  true,”  though  we  must  make  allowance  for 
error.2  But  our  certainty  of  revelation  rests  not  barely 
on  the  fact  of  “divine  declaration,”  but  “on  the  ground 
of  reason.”3 

It  will  be  instructive  here  to  note  what  some  of  the 
critics  of  Deism  indicated  as  the  objectionable  element 
in  the  movement.  It  is  significant  that  their  attitude 
toward  revelation  forms  one  of  the  main  points  of  * 
attack,  and  sometimes  almost  the  only  point  of  attack. 
Stillingfleet  selects  this  as  their  most  objectionable 
teaching.4  Boyle  discusses  the  objections  of  Deists  to 
Scripture  and  revelation,  and  concludes  that  “Deists 
must,  to  maintain  their  negative  creed,  swallow  greater 
improbabilities  than  Christians,  to  maintain  the  positive 
creed  of  the  Apostles.”5  Richard  Willis  argues  against 
those  who  say  that  revelation  is  impossible.6  These 
were  the  early  critics  of  the  deistic  movement;  they 
knew  it  as  it  was  a generation  before  Tindal  uttered  his 

1 The  Moral  Philosopher , III,  Preface. 

2 The  True  Gospel  of  Jesus  Christ  Asserted,  pp.  xi,  12;  An  Enquiry 
Concerning  the  Books  of  the  New  Testament,  whether  They  Were  Written 
by  Inspiration  (London,  1734),  pp.  5,  6. 

3 The  True  Gospel  of  Jesus  Christ  Asserted,  pp.  137,  139. 

4 A Letter  to  a Deist  in  Origines  Sacrae  (Oxford,  1797),  Vol.  II. 

5 Boyle,  Works,  V,  660,  661. 

6 Occasional  Papers,  I;  A Letter  to  a Deist. 


1 12  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

radical  views.  Stillingfleet  and  probably  Boyle  directed 
their  criticisms  against  unknown  writers  of  a deistic 
literature  before  Toland  and  perhaps  before  Blount. 
It  is  evident  that  even  in  its  early  stages  the  deistic 
movement  was  characterized  by  a hostile  attitude  toward 
revelation ; and  it  is  also  plain  that  the  defenders  of  the 
more  orthodox  position  considered  this  one  of  the  most 
objectionable  features. 

In  their  attitude  toward  the  prophetic  portions  of 
revelation  we  find  a like  difference  between  the  Deists 
and  Locke,  who  agrees  with  the  more  conservative 
writers  of  the  progressive  movement.  Though  Blount 
seldom  refers  to  prophecy,  he  is  very  critical  in  what  he 
says.  Moses,  Elijah,  Isaiah,  and  many  other  prophets 
failed,  for  prophecies  were  suspended.  Sometimes  they 
deceived  each  other.1  Toland  scarcely  mentions  proph- 
ecy. He  seems  however  to  accept  it  as  a fact.2  Collins 
is  critical  and  hostile  in  his  attitude  toward  it,  though 
he  does  not  make  an  open  denial  of  it.3  However,  he 
challenges  it  as  a proof  of  revelation,  assuming  that  in 
many  instances  an  allegorical  interpretation  is  neces- 
sary.4 Tindal,  contrary  to  what  we  would  naturally 
expect,  seeks  to  avoid  the  discussion  of  prophecy.  Yet 
he  shows  that  he  is  as  critical  here  as  elsewhere.  He 
asserts  that  the  apostles  were  deceived  by  prophecy; 
then  how  can  we  be  certain?5  Woolston  accepted 

1 Religio  Laid,  pp.  37-47;  Philostratus,  Book  I,  chap,  xvii,  illustra- 
tion 2;  Miscellaneous  Works,  pp.  162-65. 

2 Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  p.  90. 

3 A Discourse  on  Freethinking,  pp.  153  it. 

4 A Discourse  on  the  Grounds  and  Reasons  of  the  Christian  Religion, 
pp.  35  ff.,  41,  94. 

5 Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  pp.  258-62. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  113 

prophecy  as  a fact,  and  even  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  he 
believed  that  the  controversy  concerning  Christ’s 
mission  “will  end  in  the  absolute  demonstration  of 
Jesus’  Messiahship  from  prophecy,”  and  not  from 
miracles.  He  would  apply  the  allegorical  method  of 
interpretation  to  all  prophecy.1  Bolingbroke  seems  to 
accept  prophecy  as  a fact,  but  does  not  discuss  it.2 
Morgan  holds  that  prophecy  is  no  proof  for  us  of  the 
truth  of  anything  that  others  report.  He  seems  to 
accept  prophecy  as  fact,  but  denies  to  it  as  well  as  to 
miracles  any  evidential  value;  Christ  was  not  the 
fulfiller  of  Jewish  prophecy.3  Chubb  did  not  mention 
prophecy  in  anything  that  he  published;  however  in  a 
posthumous  pamphlet  he  asserted  that  it  would  not 
prove  the  truth  of  Scripture.4 

Looking  backward  over  the  survey  of  the  opinions  of 
Locke  and  the  Deists  concerning  revelation  and  Scrip- 
tures, we  see  that  the  difference  in  point  of  view  or 
method,  that  was  set  forth  in  the  preceding  chapter,  has 
brought  its  fitting  results  in  their  widely  divergent 
attitudes  toward  supernatural  revelation  and  its  record. 
Both  were  rationalistic;  both  appealed  to  nature  and 
reason  as  over  against  authority.  But  in  making  this 
appeal  Locke  was  conservative  and  emphasized  the 
limits  of  unaided  reason  in  the  field  of  religion,  whereas 
the  Deists  were  radical  and  magnified  those  factors 
which  tended  to  weaken  the  authority  of  an  externally 

1 A Discourse  on  the  Miracles  of  Our  Saviour,  pp.  1,  2. 

3 Bolingbroke,  Works,  VI,  351. 

3 The  Moral  Philosopher,  I,  343  ff.;  II,  xxviii. 

4 Chubb,  Posthumous  Works  (London,  1748),  II,  139  ff. 


1 14  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

given  revelation.  Accordingly,  when  they  come  to  the 
discussion  of  revelation,  they  consider  it  from  different 
and  ever  more  widely  diverging  points  of  view.  One 
cannot  pass  from  Locke  to  Tindal  without  being  sensible 
of  the  great  chasm  that  exists  between  them.  The 
former,  a reverent,  pietistic  rationalist,  saw  in  every 
part  of  Scripture  God’s  supernaturally  given  message 
for  guiding  man  to  salvation,  which  message  he  accepted 
as  from  God  on  grounds  which  his  reason  convinced  him 
were  sufficient;  though  this  conviction  fell  short  of 
certain  knowledge.  And  once  he  was  led  on  the  basis 
of  sufficient  reason  to  accept  a book  as  from  God,  he  was 
ready  to  give  up  any  opinion  that  was  not  in  harmony 
with  it.  Though  he  believed  that  revelation  could  not 
and  did  not  bring  to  man  anything  that  was  contrary  to 
reason,  its  message  might  be  above  it.  Tindal,  whose 
chief  book  became  one  of  the  most  influential  and 
representative  deistic  writings,  challenged  revelation 
and  the  Bible  in  the  spirit  of  a more  radical  rationalism; 
Scripture  becomes  only  a secondary  rule;  revelation 
can  give  us  nothing  above  reason  and  nothing  that 
reason  cannot  attain;  hence  it  is  not  necessary.  The 
contrast  could  scarcely  be  greater.  Locke  is  reverential 
in  his  attitude  toward  the  old  beliefs,  and  uses  his 
rationalistic  method  to  establish  the  supernatural 
sanctions;  Tindal  and  the  typical  Deists  are  hostilely 
critical  toward  the  old  beliefs,  and  apply  their 
rationalistic  method  to  the  destruction  of  the  tradi- 
tional supernatural  sanctions  in  the  interest  of  estab- 
lishing the  sole  normative  authority  of  that  which 
is  naturally  mediated.  The  former  is  a “super- 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  115 

natural  rationalist”;  the  latter  are  anti-supernatural 
rationalists.1 

Comparing  the  views  of  these  very  divergent  systems 
concerning  revelation,  we  find  that  Locke  accepts  super- 
natural revelation  as  a fact,  and  that  the  Deists  also 
accepted  it,  but  with  considerable  reservation.  For  him 
it  was  synonymous  with  the  Bible;  for  the  Deists  it  was 
not,  though  opinions  differed  somewhat  in  this,  becoming 
more  hostile  as  the  movement  advanced.  Locke  was 
convinced  that  we  as  rational  beings  could  not  accept 
anything,  not  even  revelation,  without  sufficient  reason; 
so  were  the  Deists.  But  he  also  held  that  revelation 
can  and  does  give  us  that  which  unassisted  reason  could 
not  attain,  though  it  is  in  harmony  with  reason;  the 
Deists  denied  this,  though  here  again  there  was  some 
difference  of  opinion.  Locke  taught  that  revelation 
supplements  reason;  with  few  exceptions  the  Deists  said 
that  this  was  impossible.  For  Locke  reason  is  insuffi- 
cient to  give  us  all  that  is  necessary  for  salvation, 
revelation  is  necessary;  again  the  Deists  dissent. 
Locke  accepted  prophecy  as  a fact,  and  recognized  in 
fulfilled  prophecy  evidence  of  the  divine  origin  of 
Scripture;  the  Deists  as  a group,  perhaps  all  of  the 
more  important  Deists,  also  accept  prophecy  as  a fact,  - 
but,  with  the  surprising  exception  of  Woolston,  they  deny] 
to  it  any  evidential  value,  and  are  generally  skeptical 
and  critical  in  their  treatment  of  it. 

ITh.e  term  “supernatural  rationalism”  was  used  by  McGiffert  in 
Protestant  Thought  before  Kant,  pp.  199  ff.,  for  describing  the  views  of 
such  men  as  Tillotson,  Locke,  Clarke,  and  others.  It  is  accurately 
descriptive.  Though  they  held  firmly  to  the  supernatural,  they  were 
thoroughly  rationalistic. 


n6  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

With  the  help  of  naturalistic  principles  Locke 
attempted  to  free  from  blind  authority-belief  and  to 
ground  rationally  the  essential  elements  of  the  tradi- 
tional view  of  revelation  as  supernatural;  while  the 
Deists  became  ever  more  hostile  and  skeptical  toward  it, 
challenging  now  this,  now  that,  and,  though  they  did  not 
deny  it  outright,  they  reduced  the  supernatural  in 
revelation  almost  to  the  vanishing-point. 

3.  RELIGION 

At  no  time  did  the  deistic  controversy  challenge  the 
fact  of  religion.  Just  as  everybody  believed  that  there 
was  a God,  so  they  believed  that  man  stood  in  some 
relation  to  Him  which  involved  certain  obligations  on 
the  human  side.  Attention  has  been  called  to  the  free 
and  easy  use  of  epithets  at  this  time;  the  controversial 
literature  was  full  of  scolding  names.  But  even  if  there 
were  atheists,  they  were  not  Deists.  Both  the  Deists 
and  their  critics  accepted  religion  as  an  unchallenged 
fact.  But  since  so  many  of  the  industrious  orthodox 
pamphleteers  identified  religious  faith  with  the  accept- 
ance of  a set  of  authoritatively  formulated  dogmas, 
dissent  from  such  man-made  standards  was  considered 
irreligion.  Even  among  the  Protestants  “human 
glosses,”  as  Locke  called  such  dogmas,  were  treated  as 
rules  of  faith  that  believers  must  accept.  This,  along 
with  “popery,”  was  the  religion  of  authority,  against 
which  the  rational  theologians,  the  Cambridge  “Lati- 
tude Men,”  Locke,  and  the  Deists  were  continually  pro- 
testing. But  religion  itself  was  not  denied  at  any  time. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  we  noted  the  use  that  was 
made  of  the  concepts  of  nature  and  reason  in  discussing 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  117 

religious  topics.  We  saw  that  they  were  extensively 
used  throughout  the  period  that  we  are  considering;1 
they  were  important  motives  in  the  speculative  thought 
of  England  at  this  time.  At  least  the  more  progressive 
minds  sought  to  account  for  and  to  justify  the  existence 
of  principles  and  institutions  by  deriving  them  from 
nature  or  from  nature  and  reason.  Nothing  should  be 
accepted  as  true  by  an  intelligent  being,  such  as  man, 
unless  it  is  grounded  in  the  nature  of  things  and  is  in  L"' 
harmony  with  right  reason. 

A.  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  NATURAL  RELIGION 

It  was  inevitable  that  religion  should  be  subjected 
to  this  test.  If  the  lesser  things  of  life  are  rational, 
certainly  that  which  is  man’s  “supreme  concernment” 
cannot  be  irrational;  and  if  human  institutions  have 
an  anchorage  in  the  nature  of  things,  religion,  which  is 
a divine  institution,  cannot  have  less,  and  it  may  have 
more.  And,  above  all,  the  heathen  apparently  without 
any  revelation  learned  to  know  God  and  their  relations 
to  Him  merely  by  the  use  of  their  natural  powers. 
Natural  religion  was  a fact  that  could  be  verified.  This 
conviction  was  an  inheritance  from  former  centuries. 
The  question  at  once  arises  as  to  its  value,  and  as  to 
what  sort  of  relation  exists  between  it  and  revealed 
religion.  Which  is  supreme  ? Is  it  to  be  judged  by 
positive  religion,  or  is  positive  religion  to  be  judged  by 
it  ? These  questions  were  much  debated  in  England  of 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  and  opinions 

1 They  were  a heritage  from  former  periods,  but  whence  they  came 
need  not  concern  us  here.  Their  origin  and  the  history  of  their  use  are 
not  relevant  to  our  problems. 


n8  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

differed  widely.  They  constituted  one  of  the  significant 
problems  of  the  age.  We  can  classify  men  according  to 
their  answers.  Though  certain  phases  of  this  problem 
were  touched  upon  in  the  study  of  the  use  of  the  concepts 
of  nature  and  reason,  its  most  important  phase,  which 
concerns  the  relation  of  natural  and  revealed  religion, 
has  not  been  adequately  considered.  We  shall  therefore 
make  a critical  survey  of  the  views  that  were  held 
concerning  natural  religion  by  the  more  influential 
progressive  thinkers,  from  Hooker  until  the  decline  of 
the  deistic  movement. 

a)  The  rational  theologians. — The  first  two  books  of 
Hooker’s  Ecclesiastical  Polity  are  concerning  natural 
A Jaw  and  divine  law.  In  the  preceding  chapter  we  saw 
that  in  his  discussion  of  these  subjects  he  has  much  to 
say  concerning  nature  and  reason,  the  source  of  their 
authority  and  what  they  can  and  what  they  cannot  give 
us.  This  law  of  reason  or  nature  is  from  God,  and  comes 
with  His  authority.1  It  can  show  us  that  there  is  a God, 
( and  certain  of  our  duties  toward  Him  ;2  but  it  is  limited, 
it  cannot  teach  us  what  we  “should  do  that  we  might 
attain  unto  life  everlasting”;  the  way  of  salvation  is 
supernaturally  given,  revelation  is  necessary,  it  supplies 
the  insufficiency  of  the  light  of  nature.3  According  to 
Hooker  man  by  unaided  reason  can  know  something  of 
God  and  his  relations  to  Him;  the  light  of  nature  is 
sufficient  to  enable  him  to  know  certain  duties,  but  the 
way  of  salvation  must  be  supernaturally  revealed.  He 
clearly  recognizes  natural  religion,  though  he  scarcely 
uses  the  term,  but  he  also  emphasizes  its  limitations. 

1 Hooker,  Works,  I,  205,  227,  232,  233.  2 Ibid.,  pp.  230,  231. 

s Ibid.,  pp.  331,  333,  also  234,  259,  269,  and  elsewhere. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  119 

This,  with  individual  modifications,  was  the  position 
taken  by  the  rational  theologians.  It  did  not  occur  to 
anyone  to  deny  that  man  by  his  natural  powers  could 
know  God,  and  could  have  some  sense  of  religion.  Even 
Stilhngfleet  in  his  Irenicum  taught  that  by  reason  we  can 
discover  the  ‘Taw  of  nature”  which  comes  from  God,  and 
therefore  “cannot  be  superseded  by  any  positive  human 
or  divine  enactments”;  and  “things  clearly  deducible 
from  the  law  of  nature  ....  may  be  practised  in  the 
Church.”1  It  is  significant  that  Stillingfleet  in  his 
controversy  with  Locke  did  not  find  fault  with  Locke’s 
attitude  toward  natural  religion.  Tillotson,  another 
contemporary  of  Locke,  would  test  revelation  by  our 
“natural  notions  about  religion.”  Sherlock  said  in  a 
sermon  that  “the  Gospel  is  the  true  original  religion  of 
reason  and  nature,”  and  that  if  it  “represents  the 
religion  of  nature,  it  need  but  appeal  to  a man’s  reason 
for  acceptance.”  However  he  added:  “The  religion 
of  the  Gospel  is  the  true  original  religion  of  reason  and 
nature.  It  is  so  in  part;  it  is  all  that,  and  more.”2 
And  a little  later  Prideaux  in  his  Letter  to  the  Deists  went 
so  far  as  to  say:  “Let  what  is  written  in  all  the  books  of 
the  New  Testament  be  tried  by  that  which  is  the  touch- 
stone of  all  religion,  I mean  that  religion  of  nature  and 
reason  which  God  has  written  in  the  hearts  of  every  one 
of  us  from  the  first  creation;  and  if  it  varies  from  it  in 
any  one  particular”  it  is  an  argument  strong  enough  to 
overthrow  it.  Even  Bishop  Butler,  the  great  champion 
of  orthodoxy  against  the  Deists,  writes  in  the  first  chapter 
of  the  second  part  of  the  Analogy:  “For  though  natural 

1 Tulloch,  Rational  Theology  and  Christian  Philosophy,  I,  427-30. 

2 Sermons  Preached  on  Several  Occasions,  V,  134-43,  148. 


120  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

religion  is  the  foundation  and  principal  part  of  Chris- 
tianity, it  is  not  in  any  sense  the  whole  of  it.”  In  fact 
he  is  ready  to  go  almost  as  far  as  Prideaux,  who  published 
his  book  a few  years  later.  “If  in  revelation  there  be 
found  any  passages,  the  seeming  meaning  of  which  is 
contrary  to  natural  religion,  we  may  most  certainly 
conclude  such  seeming  meaning  not  to  be  the  real  one.”1 
Yet  however  much  they  magnified  natural  religion,  and 
however  plainly  they  recognized  its  normative  character, 
they  were  all  careful  to  say  that  it  was  inadequate  to 
meet  the  religious  needs  of  man.  Some  of  these  church 
leaders  were  considered  liberal,  but  most  of  them  were 
recognized  as  the  great  apologists  of  their  time.  We 
can  safely  take  their  views  as  representative  of  the 
orthodox  progressive  leaders  in  the  church. 

b)  The  philosophers. — The  philosophers  of  the  period 
recognized  natural  religion,  but  there  was  not  full  agree- 
ment as  to  the  importance  it  should  have.  In  our  study 
of  the  use  that  was  made  of  nature  and  reason  as  ground- 
ing principles  for  laws  and  institutions,  we  saw  that 
though  Bacon  recognized  natural  religion  he  assigned  a 
modest  place  to  natural  theology,  and  that  Hobbes  also 
recognized  it,  though  he  accounted  for  it  in  another  way. 
In  the  union  of  philosophy  and  Christianity,  which  the 
Cambridge  Platonists  sought  to  effect,  the  place  of 
natural  religion  was  at  least  as  clearly  recognized  as  it 
was  by  the  theologians.  Whichcote’s  striking  expression 
may  be  taken  as  characteristic  of  the  whole  school: 
“The  spirit  in  man  is  the  candle  of  the  Lord,  lighted  by 
God,  and  lighting  man  to  God.”2  With  nothing  but  our 

1 Essays  and  Reviews , pp.  267,  268. 

2 Tulloch,  op.  cit.,  II,  99. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions 


121 


natural  faculties,  we  can  “ascend  the  world’s  great  altar- 
stairs  that  slope  through  darkness  up  to  God.”  Unaided 
reason  can  attain  to  a knowledge  of  certain  of  the  funda- 
mental elements  of  religion;  but,  however  much  man 
knows  in  this  way,  it  still  falls  short  of  revelation;  nature 
is  not  sufficient  to  attain  all  that  God  bestows.1  The 
Cambridge  Platonists  are  as  careful  to  emphasize  the 
limitations  of  that  which  nature  through  our  reason 
reveals  to  us  of  God  and  our  duties  toward  Him  as  they 
are  to  magnify  the  dignity  and  importance  of  the  natural 
light,  which  is  also  divine,  that  shines  in  the  soul  of 
every  man. 

In  full  agreement  with  the  rational  theologians  and 
the  Cambridge  Platonists,  Boyle,  who  was  really  a 
theologian  and  a philosopher  as  well  as  a scientist, 
recognizes  natural  religion,  which  “as  it  is  the  first  that 
is  embraced  by  the  mind,  so  it  is  the  foundation  upon 
which  revealed  religion  ought  to  be  superstructed,  and  is 
as  it  were  the  stock  upon  which  Christianity  must  be 
grafted.  For,  though  I readily  acknowledge  natural 
religion  to  be  insufficient,  yet  I think  it  very  necessary.”2 
Boyle’s  estimate  of  natural  religion  might  well  be  taken 
as  representative  of  all  the  progressive  thinkers  of  the 
more  conservative  tendency,  whether  from  the  camp 
of  the  philosophers  or  from  the  theologians. 

It  is  evident  that  at  the  time  when  Locke  was  doing 
most  of  his  writing  natural  religion  was  one  of  the  chief 
centers  of  interest  in  religious  speculation.  Apparently 
almost  everybody  had  an  opinion  concerning  it;  the 
more  conservative  men  were  engaged  in  setting  its 

1 Ibid,.,  p.  70;  also  Culverwell,  The  Light  of  Nature,  pp.  267,  272. 

2 Boyle,  Works,  V,  46,  685. 


122  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

limits  and  the  more  liberal,  as  we  shall  see  later,  in 
magnifying  its  importance.  In  the  preceding  chapter  we 
saw  that  Locke  exalted  reason  and  also  recognized  the 
importance  of  nature  in  accounting  for  things.  He  also 
was  intensely  interested  in  all  matters  pertaining  to 
religion;  it  is  really  in  the  background  of  all  his  specula- 
tions and  often  appears  when  least  expected.  We 
would  naturally  think  that  since  he  treated  so  many 
problems  in  philosophy  and  religion  systematically  he 
would  give  us  a thorough  discussion  of  natural  religion. 
But  though  isolated  passages  in  his  works  show  clearly 
that  he  recognized  it  as  a fact,  he  nowhere  makes  an 
ordered  presentation  of  his  views  concerning  it.  His 
interests  in  religious  problems  were  focused  rather  on 
revealed  religion  and  the  rationalization  of  it  than  on 
that  religion  which  man  with  his  unaided  capacity  can 
attain.1 

In  discussing  the  imperfection  of  words  he  says: 
“Nor  is  it  to  be  wondered,  that  the  will  of  God,  when 
clothed  in  words,”  should  be  liable  to  that  uncertainty 
which  “attends  that  sort  of  conveyance.”  We  should  be 
thankful  that  God  by  His  works  and  Providence  and  the 
light  of  reason  has  enabled  men,  who  know  not  His 
special  revelations,  to  know  Him  and  their  relation  to 

1 Worcester  discusses  “the  comparative  practical  importance  Locke 
assigns  to  ‘revealed’  and  to  what  he  sometimes  calls  ‘natural’  religion. 
One  difficulty  in  the  way  of  such  an  inquiry  lies  in  the  fact  that  Locke 
nowhere  clearly  states  exactly  what  he  understands  by  the  latter  expres- 
sion and  as  all  his  specifically  religious  writings  lie  in  the  field  of  Revela- 
tion, his  conception  of  a ‘natural  religion’  is  preserved  in  only  a few  brief 
hints,”  The  Religious  Opinions  of  John  Locke  (p.  30).  Crous  also  calls 
attention  to  Locke’s  failure  to  discuss  natural  religion.  He  makes  the 
very  important  observation  that  Locke  does  not  enter  into  a thorough 
presentation  of  it,  “but  emphasizes  the  necessity  of  the  sending  of 
Jesus”  (p.  106). 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  123 

Him,  so  that  they  need  not  “doubt  of  the  being  of  God, 
or  of  the  obedience  due  Him.  Since  the  precepts  of 
natural  religion  are  plain  and  very  intelligible  to  all 
mankind,  and  seldom  come  to  be  controverted”;  and 
revealed  truths,  expressed  in  language,  are  liable  to  the 
“natural  obscurities  and  difficulties  incident  to  words; 
methinks  it  would  become  us  to  be  more  careful  and 
diligent  in  observing  the  former,  and  less  magisterial, 
positive,  and  imperious,  in  imposing  our  sense  and  inter- 
pretations of  the  latter.”1  Here  Locke  is  emphasizing 
the  “imperfections  of  words”;  he  is  not  magnifying  the 
importance  of  natural  religion.  Owing  to  this  imper- 
fection, which  necessarily  attends  this  way  of  convey- 
ance, it  happens  that  natural  religion  is  not  hampered 
by  the  uncertainty  that  necessarily  attends  the  use  of 
words,  because  it  is  mediated  through  the  light  of 
reason,  while  revelation  is  thus  hampered  because  it  is 
conveyed  in  words.  Therefore  natural  religion  has  this 
one  advantage  over  revealed  religion,  its  principles  are 
not  hampered  by  the  uncertainties  of  words.  We  are 
not  justified,  on  the  basis  of  this  passage,  in  assuming 
that  it  has  any  other  advantage;  it  may  have  many 
disadvantages. 

A passage  in  A Discourse  of  Miracles,  which  was 
published  posthumously,  seems  to  give  great  prominence 
to  natural  religion.  He  says:  “ That  no  mission  can  be 
looked  on  to  be  divine,  that  delivers  anything  derogating 
from  the  honor  of  the  one,  only,  true,  invisible  God,  or 
inconsistent  with  natural  religion  or  the  rules  of  morality : 
because  God  having  discovered  to  men  the  unity  and 
majesty  of  His  eternal  Godhead,  and  the  truths  of 

1 Essay,  III,  ix,  23. 


124  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

natural  religion  and  morality  by  the  light  of  reason,  He 
cannot  be  supposed  to  back  the  contrary  by  revelation; 
for  that  would  be  to  destroy  the  evidence  and  the  use  of 
reason,  without  which  men  cannot  be  able  to  distinguish 
divine  revelation  from  diabolical  imposture.”  Locke 
is  certain  that  God  gave  reason  to  man,  through  which 
he  discovers  Himself  to  men  as  the  one  true  God,  and 
certain  of  man’s  duties  toward  Him.  We  must 
remember  that  much  of  this  that  we  know  by  reason 
concerning  God  is  of  the  nature  of  demonstrative 
certainty;  and  it  is  really  a revelation  of  God,  though 
through  natural  means.  To  set  up  anything  in  con- 
tradiction to  this  is  to  deny  reason,  and  if  we  do  this  we 
are  helpless;  we  have  no  way  of  distinguishing  true 
revelation  from  that  which  is  false.  We  should  also 
recall  in  this  connection  that  according  to  Locke  faith 
is  a persuasion  short  of  knowledge.  We  may  conclude 
from  this  passage  that  reason  and  the  religion  of  reason 
or  natural  religion,  so  far  as  it  goes,  cannot  be  contra- 
dicted by  other  revelation.  But  we  cannot  conclude 
anything  concerning  the  adequacy  of  natural  religion. 

If  there  is  such  a thing  as  natural  religion,  if  man  by 
the  exercise  of  his  reason  can  know  the  one  true  God  and 
his  duty  toward  Him,  the  question  arises  as  to  what 
place  there  is  left  for  a supernatural  revelation.  We 
find  Locke’s  answer  to  this  in  the  Reasonableness  of 
Christianity  in  his  discussion  of  the  faith  of  those  who, 
because  they  lived  before  Christ  or  in  a place  where 
knowledge  of  Him  had  not  come,  did  not  have  an 
opportunity  to  accept  Jesus  as  the  Messiah.1  “Nobody 

1 The  closing  portion  of  the  Reasonableness  of  Christianity,  Works, 
VII,  128  to  end. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  125 

was,  or  can  be,  required  to  believe  what  was  never 
proposed  to  him  to  believe.”  God  requires  from  every 
man  according  to  what  he  hath,  and  he  who  makes  use 
of  the  candle  of  the  Lord  will  be  sure  to  find  the  way  to 
forgiveness. 

But  though  the  works  of  nature  and  man’s  reason 
show  the  way  to  God,  man  failed  to  know  Him  as  he 
should.  Several  Greeks  grasped  the  truth,  but  it  was 
not  communicated  to  the  mass  of  mankind.  Only  the 
few  have  knowledge  of  the  one  true  God.  Christ  came, 
and  threw  down  the  wall  of  partition,  and  showed  that 
the  knowledge  of  God  was  for  all  mankind.  Further- 
more, man  lacked  a clear  knowledge  of  duty.  “He 
that  shall  collect  all  the  moral  rules  of  the  philosophers, 
and  compare  them  with  those  contained  in  the  New 
Testament,  will  find  them  to  come  short  of  the  morality 
delivered  by  our  Savior,  and  taught  by  His  Apostles.” 
And  even  if  such  a collection  from  ancient  thinkers  were 
made,  and  even  if  it  equalled  that  taught  by  Christ,  it 
would  be  entirely  without  authority.  In  Christ,  who 
was  sent  by  God,  morality  has  a pure  standard  which 
revelation  vouches. 

Though  Locke  does  not  wish  to  minimize  in  any  way 
the  importance  of  reason,  he  finds  himself  compelled,  by 
the  religious  and  moral  conditions  that  prevail  and  have 
prevailed,  to  admit  that  reason  has  not  sufficed  in  matters 
of  religion  and  morality.  It  seems  that  theoretically 
reason  is  capable  of  much  more  than  it  actually  accom- 
plishes, owing  to  the  darkening  influence  of  vice  and  the 
passions  of  men.  We  have  seen  already  that  he  holds 
that  revelation  can  and  does  give  us  that  which  is  above 
reason,  though  not  contrary  to  it. 


126  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

Taking  this  lengthy  discussion  of  the  value  to  man 
of  God’s  revelation  in  Christ,  which  Locke  published  in 
1695  when  he  was  still  in  the  period  of  his  greatest 
intellectual  activity,  as  the  standard  for  interrupting 
the  short  passage  from  A Discourse  on  Miracles,  which 
he  wrote  the  year  before  his  death,  and  which  was  not 
published  by  him,  we  conclude  that  Locke  recognized 
natural  religion  as  a fact,  that  he  magnified  the  impor- 
tance of  reason  as  that  which  certifies  to  revelation  and 
which  revelation  cannot  contradict,  and  that  he  empha- 
sizes the  limitations  of  the  religion  and  morals  which 
unaided  reason  can  give.  Natural  religion  for  Locke 
is  a norm  for  testing  revelation  only  so  far  as  concerns 
that  which  contradicts  reason;  revealed  religion  may 
and  does  contain  elements  that  are  above  reason.  He 
emphasizes  the  imperfections  and  limitations  of  all 
religions,  save  that  which  has  God’s  special  revelation 
as  contained  in  the  Bible.  To  interpret  these  passages 
in  such  a way  as  to  represent  Locke  as  making  natural 
religion  the  sole  standard  for  judging  of  all  religion  would 
be  contrary  to  his  entire  spirit,  and  could  not  be  harmon- 
ized with  the  limitations  that  he  has  set  to  reason  nor  the 
importance  that  he  assigns  to  revelation. 

c)  The  Deists. — But  when  we  come  to  the  Deists,  we 
find  a very  different  attitude  toward  natural  religion. 
Herbert  of  Cherbury,  their  earliest  representative,  shows 
the  spirit  that  dominated  the  movement  when  it  was  at 
its  height.  Scripture  is  very  uncertain;  for  if  there  was 
a supernatural  revelation  it  had  authority  only  for  him 
who  first  received  it;  for  all  others  it  is  but  tradition  and 
can  never  be  more  than  probable.  But  we  find  a sure 
foundation  for  religion  in  our  common  notions,  which 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  127 

we  have  from  our  natural  instinct;  and  that  which  we 
have  through  natural  instinct  cannot  be  doubted. 
Among  these  common  notions  are  the  five  articles  of  his 
universal  religion.  They  are  sure;  they  give  us  some- 
thing definite  by  which  we  can  judge  all  dogmas  of 
religion.  He  does  not  deny  revelation,  but  since  any 
knowledge  that  we  may  have  of  it  is  so  uncertain,  and 
since  these  five  catholic  articles  cannot  be  doubted,  they 
should  be  supreme.  Natural  religion,  which  unaided 
reason  can  discover,  is  sufficient.  Of  course  we  must 
remember  that  with  Herbert  natural  is  almost  synony- 
mous with  divine.1 

Though  Blount  at  times  emphasizes  the  importance 
of  revelation,  as  we  have  seen  in  treating  that  subject, 
he  believes  his  five  articles  of  natural  religion,  which 
are  essentially  the  same  as  those  of  Herbert,  are  suffi- 
cient, and  that  what  goes  beyond  them  is  likely  to  bring 
bad  results  because  it  is  so  uncertain.  Common  reason 
is  our  sure  foundation  in  matters  of  religion;  all  faiths 
have  been  shaken  save  those  which  are  founded  on  it.2 

1 Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  art.  “Herbert”;  W.  R.  Sorley,  Mind 
(1894),  p.  492;  L6chler,  Geschichte  des  engliscken  Deismus,  pp.  42  ff. 

2 Religio  Laid,  pp.  8r-9i.  In  the  Oracles  of  Reason,  the  letter  to 
Blount  from  A.  W.  on  pp.  197  ff.  discusses  “natural  religion  as  opposed 
to  divine  religion”  and  concludes  that  revelation  cannot  be  a necessary 
supplement  to  natural  religion,  because  the  latter  is  the  only  general 
means  of  happiness  that  is  proposed;  it  must  therefore  provide  man  with 
everything  that  is  necessary  for  his  spiritual  well-being.  The  entire 
letter  is  aggressively  hostile  to  the  supernatural  elements  in  religion. 
See  note  under  section  on  “Revelation”  in  this  chapter.  There  were 
evidently  a number  of  less  prominent  deistic  authors,  whose  writings 
have  not  survived,  or  at  least  have  not  drawn  the  attention  of  the 
students  of  this  period.  From  the  limited  information  concerning  them 
that  we  have,  we  are  justified  in  concluding  that  they  were  more  hostile 
to  Christianity  than  Toland,  or  Collins,  or  even  Blount.  Their  criticisms 


128 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


Toland  has  little  to  say  about  natural  religion,  but 
he  recognizes  it.  And  his  denial  that  revelation  can 
give  us  anything  above  reason  increases  its  normative 
authority  as  over  against  positive  religion.  He  quotes 
Which  cote  as  saying  that  “natural  religion  is  eleven 
parts  in  twelve  of  all  religions”;  but  he  adds  that  one 
main  design  of  Christianity  was  to  improve  and  perfect 
the  knowledge  of  the  law  of  nature.* 1  Toland  in  Chris- 
tianity Not  Mysterious  evidently  wants  to  hold  to 
Christianity  in  its  orthodox  form,  or  at  least  he  wishes 
to  appear  to  do  so;  he  also  wants  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  Deists.  But  in  N azarenus , which  appeared 
twenty-two  years  later,  he  is  much  more  radical  in  his 
attitude  toward  revelation;  the  spirit  of  the  book  is 
more  hostile  toward  traditional  Christianity  than  any- 
thing that  he  had  written. 

Collins,  strictly  speaking,  does  not  discuss  natural 
religion,  but  he  emphasizes  “natural  light”  and  sets 
natural  duty  over  against  revealed  religion  in  such  a way 
as  to  show  plainly  the  great  importance  that  he  attaches 
to  it.2 

As  we  would  naturally  expect,  Tindal  gives  a radical 
interpretation  of  the  relation  of  natural  and  revealed 

seem  to  have  anticipated  almost  all  of  the  characteristic  opinions  of  the 
later  and  more  radical  Deism.  However,  it  may  be  that  Toland  was 
more  radical  in  his  views  than  he  gave  himself  out  to  be;  in  reading  his 
books  one  is  likely  to  suspect  insincerity. 

1 N azarenus,  pp.  67  £f. 

2 A Discourse  of  Freethinking,  p.  173.  He  quotes  Tillotson,  whom  he 
appeals  to  frequently  (p.  1 74).  Collins  uses  the  central  thesis  of  his  book 
very  loosely.  Bentley  is  justified  in  criticizing  severely  his  “perpetual 
juggle”  about  his  term  of  art,  freethinking,  Remarks  upon  a Late  Dis- 
course of  Free-thinking  (London,  1713),  p.  65. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  129 

religion.  His  great  deistical  work,  Christianity  as  Old  — 
as  Creation,  may  be  considered  a discussion  of  the  thesis, 
“natural  and  revealed  religion  differ  in  nothing.”  From 
the  beginning  God  must  have  given  men  such  rules  of 
conduct  as  would  guide  them  in  doing  that  which  is 
acceptable  to  Him,  and  “external  revelation”  can  do  no 
more.  And  if  God  gave  man  a religion  from  the  begin- 
ning, was  that  religion  perfect  or  imperfect  ? Certainly 
it  was  absolutely  perfect,  which  means  that  it  could 
admit  of  no  change  either  by  addition  or  diminution. 
Natural  and  revealed  religion  differ  only  as  to  the  means 
whereby  they  are  communicated.1  The  thesis  of  the 
sixth  chapter  is,  “that  the  religion  of  nature  is  an  abso- 
lutely perfect  religion;  and  that  external  revelation  can 
neither  add  to,  nor  take  from  its  perfection;  and  that 
true  religion  whether  internally  or  externally  revealed 
must  be  the  same.”  Assuming  that  the  agreement  of 
natural  and  revealed  religion  is  an  accepted  fact,  a 
further  question  arises:  Which  one  is  normative;  when 
there  is  a difference  between  natural  and  revealed 
religion,  which  one  should  be  followed  ? Consistent 
with  his  radical  rationalism,  Tindal  holds  that  the 
religion  of  reason  is  always  supreme.  The  law  of  nature 
is  the  standard  of  perfection,  and  by  it  we  must 
judge  antecedent  to  all  traditional  religion  what  is  or  is 
not  proper  and  worthy  of  God.2  “Could  we  suppose 
any  difference  between  natural  and  traditional  religion, 
to  prefer  the  latter  would  be  acting  irrationally,”3  for 

1 Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  pp.  3-6.  The  gospel  was  not  to  add 
to  natural  religion  which  man  had  from  the  beginning,  but  to  free  man 
from  the  load  of  superstition  (p.  8,  also  p.  79). 

2 Ibid.,  p.  59,  also  pp.  164,  178. 


3 Ibid.,  p.  328. 


130  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

religion  is  blemished  by  that  which  is  added  to  it  beyond 
what  natural  religion  offers;  thus  superstitions  came  in.1 
According  to  Tindal,  Deism  really  consists  in  judging 
revelation  by  natural  religion;  its  very  essence  is  hos- 
tility, in  some  form,  to  revelation.2 

For  Wollaston  religion  is  but  an  ethical  system  on  a 
theistic  background.  He  has  nothing  to  say  concern- 
ing the  relative  importance  of  natural  and  revealed 
religion.  Natural  religion  exists  in  the  sense  of  a moral 
duty.  There  is  a law  of  nature  that  must  be  followed, 
and  doing  so  is  religion.  He  speculates  in  the  spirit  of 
Tindal  and  has  nothing  to  add  to  the  discussion  of  this 
point.3 

Bolingbroke,  though  probably  attaching  more  impor- 
tance to  revelation,  occupies  practically  the  same  posi- 
tion as  Tindal.  He  holds  that  to  think  that  man  is 
unable  “to  attain  a full  knowledge  of  natural  theology 
and  religion  without  revelation”  dishonors  man;  revela- 
tion can  add  nothing  to  reason.4 

Morgan,  though  more  conservative  than  Tindal  and 
Wollaston  in  some  respects,  is  probably  the  most  radical 
deistic  writer  in  discussing  the  relative  importance  of 
natural  and  revealed  religion.  Natural  religion  is  the 
sure  and  certain  religion;  if  you  exclude  it  you  have  no 

1 Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  pp.  85  ff.  and  141  ff. 

2 Ibid.,  pp.  368,  369. 

3 The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,  pp.  2,  4,  41. 

4 Bolingbroke,  Works,  VI,  41,  171, 172,  282,  288  ff.  Yet  he  admits, 
apparently  inconsistently,  that  “there  are  many  doctrines  which  reason 
would  never  have  taught,  nor  is  able  to  comprehend,  now  they  are 
taught.”  This  “cannot  be  denied”  (p.  356).  But  the  whole  tenor  of 
his  writings  runs  in  the  other  direction. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  13 1 

religion  left.1  “Revealed  religion”  is  built  upon  tradi- 
tion and  human  authority,  and  this  “clerical  or 
sacerdotal  Christianity  or  revealed  religion  consists  in 
the  belief  of  doctrines  which  cannot  be  understood.”2 
Natural  religion  is  clear  and  sure  and  is  the  standard 
for  all  religions.  Neither  Chubb  nor  Woolston  added 
anything  to  this  discussion. 

For  the  Deists  natural  religion  has  an  increasingly 
honorable  and  important  position.  It  is  not  only  a 
genuine  religion,  but  for  most  of  the  leaders  from 
Herbert  on  it  is  the  only  sure  religion  that  is  free  from 
the  mysteries,  uncertainties,  and  confusion  that  weaken 
the  claims  of  positive  Christianity.  Hence  the  religious 
truths  and  principles  that  unaided  reason  can  discover, 
or  that  God  reveals  to  man  through  reason,  are  made  the 
standard  for  testing  all  revelation.  If  supernatural 
revelation  is  acknowledged  at  all,  it  is  of  less  value  than } 
the  principles  of  natural  religion,  either  because  that 
which  was  revealed  could  have  authority  only  for  him 
who  first  received  it,  for  to  all  others  it  was  but  tradi- 
tion, or  because  revelation  could  not  give  man  anything 
that  was  above  his  reason  or  beyond  its  reach.  Or, 
expressing  it  differently,  the  Deists  emphasized  the 
importance  and  normative  authority  of  natural  religion 
and  the  limitations  of  revealed  religion.3 

Locke  and  others  that  we  have  studied  also  recog- 
nized the  importance  of  natural  religion,  but  they 
emphasized  its  limitation,  its  insufficiency.  They  sought 

1 The  Moral  Philosopher , I,  346,  434. 

2 Ibid.,  Preface,  also  pp.  94, 117. 

3 “Accordingly  Deism  is  essentially  an  elevation  of  natural  religion, 
supported  by  free  examination,  to  the  norm  and  rule  of  all  positive 
religion”  (Lechler,  Geschichte  des  emglischen  Deismus,  p.  460). 


132 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


to  show  that  it  must  be  supplemented  and  that  it 
actually  is  supplemented  by  revelation,  which  brings  to 
man  that  which  unaided  reason  could  not  attain.  “The 
religion  of  the  Gospel  is  the  true  original  religion  of 
reason  and  nature.”  To  this  the  Deists  would  readily 
assent.  But  Sherlock  and  others,  including  Locke, 
would  add:  “It  is  so  in  part;  it  is  all  that  and  more.”1 
That  which  is  postulated  over  and  above  natural 
religion  distinguishes  the  liberal  non-deistical  writers 
from  the  Deists.  Revelation  was  not  only  a historical 
fact,  as  most  of  the  Deists  taught,  but  it  actually  brought 
to  man  something  that  unaided  reason  could  never  have 
attained.  And  that  which  it  conveyed  to  man  was  of 
importance  for  his  religious  life.2 

1 Sherlock,  Discourses  Preached  on  Several  Occasions,  V,  134,  142. 
Preaching  before  the  king  in  June  of  1700,  he  defined  Deism.  It  is  “to 
believe  a God  and  to  deny  all  revealed  religion”  (I,  256). 

2 After  setting  forth  the  rationalistic  motive  in  the  theological 
speculations  of  all  the  parties  of  this  period,  Mark  Pattison  says: 
“According  to  this  assumption,  a man’s  religious  belief  is  a result  which 
issues  at  the  end  of  an  intellectual  process.  In  arranging  the  steps  of 
this  process,  they  conceive  natural  religion  to  form  the  first  stage  of  the 
journey.  That  stage  theologians  of  all  parties  and  shades  travel  in 
company.  It  was  only  when  they  had  reached  the  end  of  it  that  the 
Deists  and  Christian  apologists  parted.  The  former  found  that  the 
light  of  reason  which  had  guided  them  so  far  indicated  no  road  beyond. 
The  Christian  writers  declared  that  the  same  natural  powers  enabled 
them  to  recognize  the  truth  of  revealed  religion.  The  sufficiency  of 
natural  religion  thus  became  the  turning  point  of  the  dispute.  The 
natural  law  of  right  and  duty,  argues  the  Deists,  is  so  absolutely  perfect 
that  God  could  not  add  anything  to  it.”  The  “Christian  defenders 
. . . . never  demur  to  making  the  natural  the  basis  on  which  the 

Christian  rests Christianity  is  a resume  of  the  knowledge  of  God 

already  attained  by  reason,  and  a disclosure  of  further  truths.  These 
further  truths  could  not  have  been  thought  out  by  reason;  but  when 
divinely  communicated,  they  approve  themselves  to  the  same  reason” 
(Essays  and  Reviews,  pp.  269  ff.). 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  133 

B.  RELIGION  DEFINED  AS  MORALITY 

Another  significant  point  of  dispute  in  the  deistic 
controversy  concerning  religion  is  the  definition  of  it 
largely  or  exclusively  in  terms  of  morality.  Is  religion 
mere  morality,  or  is  it  something  more  ? This  is  closely 
associated  with  and  in  a sense  grows  out  of  the  problem 
of  the  relation  of  natural  and  revealed  religion;  in  fact 
it  might  almost  be  considered  a part  of  it.  Men  were 
convinced  that  unaided  reason  could  know  that  there 
is  a God,  and  that  man  has  certain  duties  toward  Him 
and  toward  his  fellow-men,  and  that  the  performance  of 
these  duties  brought  divine  approval  and  the  neglect  of 
them  divine  displeasure.  Man’s  welfare  here  and  here- 
after depended  upon  knowing  and  doing  his  duty.  It 
was  a legalistic  age;  religion  consisted  in  obeying  the 
divine  laws,  and  these  were  revealed  to  unaided  reason. 
If  there  were  “mysteries”  in  religion  they  were  of  less 
importance,  for  God  had  given  them  to  only  a few. 
From  these  premises  it  was  easy  to  conclude  that 
religion  should  be  defined  wholly  or  almost  wholly  in 
terms  of  morality.  And  as  a rule  speculation  in  the 
philosophy  of  religion  was  likely  to  do  this  just  in  the 
degree  in  which  natural  religion  was  given  a normative 
authority  over  positive  religion.  The  more  radically 
men  asserted  the  supremacy  of  reason  in  all  matters  of 
religion,  the  more  they  challenged  the  “mysteries”  in 
revelation  and  magnified  the  ethical  at  the  expense  of  the 
supernatural.  As  the  supernatural  waned  in  radical 
Deism,  the  ethical  grew  in  importance,  until  religion  was 
but  a moral  system  on  a theistic  background. 

Among  the  rational  theologians  we  have  no  trace 
of  this  tendency  to  minimize  the  supernatural.  Though 


134 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


they  emphasized  nature  and  reason  in  their  speculations 
concerning  religion,  they  were  always  careful  to  show  the 
limitations  of  the  natural  and  the  necessity  of  the  super- 
natural. It  is  true  that  they  conceived  religion  legal  - 
istically,  after  the  manner  of  the  times.1  For  Hooker 
revelation  was  primarily  for  directing  action,  the  notion 
of  law  and  duty  was  very  prominent.  And  his  suc- 
cessors held  the  same  view : they  emphasized  the  ethical 
factor  in  religion,  and,  with  others,  they  probably 
helped  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  more  radical  deistic 
writers  who  conceived  religion  in  terms  of  an  ethical 
system. 

Among  the  Cambridge  Platonists  the  moral  element 
in  religion  is  emphasized  still  more.  Whichcote  saw  but 
two  things  in  religion — morals  and  institutions — and 
morals  are  nineteen  parts  out  of  twenty  of  all  religion.2 
Cudworth  agreed  with  him.  “The  Cambridge  Divines 
....  gave  their  chief  interest  and  study  to  the  moral 
side  of  Christianity  and  the  divine  power  which  it 
reveals  in  the  life  and  sacrifice  of  divine  love.”3  They 
emphasize  the  ethical  element  in  religion  more  than  any 
other  writers  outside  of  the  rank  of  the  Deists,  but  they 
never  resolve  religion  wholely  into  terms  of  morality. 
In  their  systems  revelation  was  always  considered  a 
necessary  supplement  to  that  which  is  mediated  through 
nature. 

1 That  in  this  period  religion  was  conceived  legalistically  in  England 
is  seen  in  much  of  the  theological  literature,  but  it  is  not  so  clear  just 
whence  this  tendency  came.  It  may  be  due  to  the  Calvinistic  type  of 
theology  and  perhaps  also  in  part  to  the  influence  of  Socinianism,  both 
of  which  emphasized  legalism. 

2 Tulloch,  Rational  Theology  and  Christian  Philosophy,  II,  107. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  235. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  135 

Locke,  like  his  predecessors  and  contemporaries, 
conceived  religion  largely  from  the  legalistic  point  of 
view.  In  the  opening  pages  of  the  Reasonableness  of 
Christianity,  Christ’s  redemption  is  made  to  consist  in 
restoring  what  Adam  lost  by  setting  up  the  new  law  of 
faith,  “which  is  allowed  to  supply  the  defect  of  full 
obedience,”  in  lieu  of  the  law  of  works  which  had  been 
delivered  to  the  Jews,  which  was,  “Do  this  and  live, 
transgress  and  die.”  Man  could  not  yield  perfect 
obedience,  but  faith  can  take  its  place;  thus  the  immor- 
tality lost  in  Adam’s  fall  is  regained.  But  the  moral 
elements  of  the  law  still  hold.  This  faith  was  believing 
that  Jesus  was  the  promised  Messiah;  but  in  order  to 
avail  for  salvation  it  must  be  accompanied  by  repentance. 
“Faith  ....  and  a new  life  are  the  conditions  of  the 
new  covenant.”  The  law  of  works  was  too  hard  for 
man — perfect  obedience,  which  it  required,  was  all  but 
impossible;  hence  Christ  came  with  a new  law,  which  is 
the  law  of  faith;  in  this  sense  Christ  is  represented  as  a 
new  lawgiver.1  But  the  faith  element,  accepting  as 
true  what  God  wishes  us  to  believe,  is  a necessary  part 
of  our  obedience  toward  God.  The  great  emphasis  that 
Locke  lays  on  faith  and  repentance  makes  the  legalism  in 
his  conception  of  Christianity  perhaps  more  apparent 
than  real.2 

Certain  students  of  Locke’s  writings  are  disposed 
to  interpret  some  of  his  statements  concerning  the  place 

1 The  whole  doctrinal  background  in  which  this  appears  is  well 
worked  out  by  Worcester  in  the  third  chapter  of  The  Religious  Opinions  of 
J okn  Locke.  Though  interesting  and  instructive,  it  does  not  bear  directly 
on  this  problem  except  in  so  far  as  it  has  been  presented  in  very  brief 
outline. 

2 Reasonableness  of  Christianity,  Works,  VII,  the  opening  pages 
and  pp.  128  2. 


136 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


morality  should  have  in  worship  as  proving  that  he  is  of 
the  school  of  Herbert  of  Cherbury.  In  speaking  of 
toleration  Locke  says:  “A  good  life,  in  which  consists 
not  the  least  part  of  religion  and  true  piety  concerns  also 
the  civil  government.”1  And  in  the  opening  pages  of 
his  first  Letter  on  Toleration,  he  states  that  “the  business 
of  true  religion  ....  is  the  regulating  of  men’s  lives 
according  to  the  rule  of  yirtue  and  true  piety.”  This  he 
sets  over  against  ecclesiastical  pomp  and  authority. 
But  in  this  same  portion  of  his  discussion  of  toleration, 
he  asserts  that  “faith  only,  and  inward  sincerity  are  the 
things  that  procure  acceptance  with  God.”  Morality 
is  the  outward  expression  of  the  inward  state.2  The 
place  of  morality  in  religion  is  also  emphasized  in 
Sacerdos,  which  Bourne  says  was  written  before  1667 
and  was  published  posthumously.3  Locke  opposed,  as 
vigorously  as  any  man,  that  type  of  Christianity  which 
magnifies  the  forms  of  righteousness  and  the  pomp  of 
outward  worship;  in  doing  this  he  emphasized  the 
virtuous  and  pious  life;  the  Christianity  that  does  not 
regulate  action  and  result  in  holiness  of  life  is  not 
genuine.  But  he  is  never  in  danger  of  making  religion 
and  morality  synonymous.4  On  all  essential  points  in 

1 Locke,  Works,  VI,  41. 

2 Ibid.,  VI,  28. 

3 L.  King,  Life  of  John  Locke  (London,  1830),  II,  84  ff. 

4 In  the  closing  pages  of  The  Reasonableness  of  Christianity,  he  gives 
reasons  why  Christ  came  to  bring  God’s  revelation  to  man.  Among 
other  advantages  that  we  have  through  His  coming  is  a clear  and 
authoritative  moral  standard,  for  “a  clear  knowledge  of  their  duty  was 
wanting  to  mankind.” 

It  was  too  hard  a task  for  reason  to  establish  morality  in  all  its  parts. 
The  best  that  the  philosophers  discovered  fell  far  short  of  the  rules  of 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  137 

the  definition  of  religion  he  probably  agreed  with  the 
more  progressive  leaders  of  his  day  in  the  Church  of 
England.  He  was  legalistic  in  his  conception  of  religion, 
after  the  fashion  of  that  period,  and  he  emphasized,  to  a 
limited  extent,  the  ethical  factors  in  religion;  but  in  this 
he  does  not  go  as  far  as  Whichcote  and  Cudworth. 

In  the  deistic  movement,  especially  when  it  was  at 
its  height,  a different  spirit  prevailed.  In  the  very 
beginning  Herbert  laid  the  foundation  in  his  philosophy 
of  religion  for  resolving  all  religions  into  morality.  His 
universal  principles  were  so  sure,  and  a revelation  that 
was  mediated  through  tradition  was  so  uncertain,  that, 
as  has  been  stated,  his  five  articles  were  made  normative 
for  all  religion.* 1  The  central  element  in  religious  life,  1 
according  to  Herbert,  is  worshiping  by  moral  and  pious 
living.  Man  also  knows  that  he  ought  to  repent  for 
sins;  this  is  one  of  the  “common  notions.”  But  he 
would  not  know  sin  were  it  not  for  the  moral  law,  in 
obeying  which  he  worships  God.  Thus  for  Herbert  the 
ethical  factor  in  the  religious  life  was  all-important. 


the  New  Testament.  And  even  if  they  could  have  found  out  their  full 
duty,  it  would  have  lacked  authority.  But  this  is  just  one  of  the  advan- 
tages that  men  have  through  Christ.  He  brought  the  new  covenant  and 
now  man  can  have  salvation  through  the  law  of  faith  instead  of  through 
the  law  of  works,  and  faith  believes  what  God  would  have  us  believe  and 
that  is  that  Jesus  is  the  Messiah. 

The  statements  by  Crous  on  pp.  85  and  109  are  misleading.  On  a 
small  foundation,  and  by  emphasizing  what  Locke  mentioned  only 
incidentally,  he  succeeds  in  putting  him  within  the  deistic  movement. 
By  a like  process  of  reasoning  he  could  make  many  others  Deists. 

1 These  five  catholic  articles  are:  There  is  a God;  He  ought  to  be 
worshipped;  Virtue  and  piety  are  the  chief  parts  of  worship;  Sin 
must  be  atoned  for  by  repentance;  Punishment  and  rewards  follow  this 
life. 


138  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

Religion  became  little  more  than  an  ethical  system  in 
which  the  theological  background  was  emphasized. 

It  is  probable  that  Blount’s  position  resembled  closely 
that  of  Herbert,  whose  five  articles  greatly  influenced 
him.  He  nowhere  says  outright  that  religion  is  morality, 
but  the  general  tenor  of  Religio  Laid  is  to  magnify  the 
ethical  at  the  expense  of  the  supernatural.1  Though 
Toland  seldom  mentions  the  ethical  factor  in  religion,  it 
has  considerable  importance  for  him.  But  there  is  no 
effort  to  reduce  religion  to  a system  of  morals.2 

Tindal  is  the  first  one  of  the  more  prominent  Deists 
to  give  us  a complete  statement  of  the  relation  of  morals 
and  religion.  He  is  as  radical  here  as  elsewhere. 
According  to  Tindal  religion  consists  “in  the  practice  of 
morality  in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God.”  The  differ- 
ence between  morality  and  religion  is  this:  morality  is 
“acting  according  to  the  reason  of  things  considered  in 
themselves,”  while  religion  is  “acting  according  to  the 
same  reason  of  things  considered  as  the  will  of  God.”3 
Natural  religion,  which  is  about  the  only  kind  of  religion 
that  Tindal  recognizes,  is  but  an  ethical  system  on  a 
theistic  background;  it  consists  in  observing  the  rules 

1 The  letter  from  A.  W.  to  Blount  that  was  published  in  Oracles  of 
Reason  is  much  more  radical  than  Blount.  The  writer  identifies  the 
rules  of  natural  religion,  which  is  about  the  only  religion  that  he  recog- 
nizes, with  morality.  He  says  the  practice  of  obedience  “to  the  rules 
of  right  reason ” is  “ moral  virtue ” ....  is  “natural  religion.” 

2 The  next  year  after  the  appearance  of  Christianity  Not  Mysterious 
(i.e.,  in  1697)  Willis  in  Occasional  Papers,  p.  17,  objected  to  the  deistic 
foundation  of  ethics  and  expressed  the  conviction  that  we  had  better 
ground  our  morals  on  revelation  than  on  the  deistic  principle  laid  down 
by  reason.  Collins  is  silent  on  the  subject.  See  also  Nazarenus,  p.  67, 
and  A Collection  of  Several  Pieces,  II,  121,  130,  138  II. 

3 Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  p.  192. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  139 

that  reason  discovers.  And  anything  added  to  this  is 
a blemish.1  The  whole  of  religion,  according  to  the 
Deists,  consists  in  performing  all  the  duties  of  morality.2 

For  Wollaston  religion  is  “nothing  else  but  an 
obligation  to  do  what  ought  not  to  be  omitted,  and  to 
forbear  what  ought  not  to  be  done.”  If  there  is  moral 
obligation,  there  is  natural  religion.  The  foundation  of 
religion  lies  in  the  difference  between  the  good  and  evil 
acts  of  men.3  The  whole  of  The  Religion  of  Nature 
Delineated  is  but  a theistic  moral  system,  in  which  the  •*- 
naturalistic  factor  is  emphasized,  but  the  theistic  founda- 
tion is  never  lost  sight  of. 

Morgan  agrees  with  Tindal  and  Wollaston;  he  says 
the  same  thing  in  different  words.  “By  Christianity, 

I mean  that  complete  system  of  moral  truth  and  right- 
eousness, justice  and  charity,  which,  as  the  best  tran- 
script of  the  religion  of  nature,  was  preached  to  the 
world  by  Christ  and  the  Apostles.”  Morgan  holds  that 
natural  rehgion  consists  of  eternal  and  immutable 
principles  of  moral  truth.4 

Deism,  in  its  beginning  and  at  the  time  of  its  greatest- 
influence,  so  emphasized  the  ethical  factor  in  religion 
that  it  almost  eclipsed  the  supernatural.  After  the 
manner  of  the  times  the  Deists  conceived  rehgion 
legalistically.  It  consisted  largely,  perhaps  almost 
entirely,  in  obeying  certain  laws.  The  legalistic  way 

1 Ibid,.,  pp.  13  fL,  1 4 1. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  366.  Just  at  this  time  (1731)  John  Balguy  in  A Second 
Letter  to  a Deist  (London,  1731)  said  that  Deism  is  more  than  merely 
being  governed  by  the  obligations  of  moral  fitness  (p.  64). 

3 The  Religion  0}  Nature  Delineated,  pp.  4,  41. 

4 The  Moral  Philosopher,  I,  94,  439. 


140  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

of  viewing  religion,  which  prevailed  everywhere,  when 
united  with  the  more  radical  rationalism  and  naturalism 
of  the  deistic  movement,  resulted  in  conceiving  religion 
almost  entirely  in  terms  of  ethics.  Practically  every 
serious  thinker  on  religious  problems  would  say  that  the 
religious  life  is  a moral  life;  but  few,  if  any,  beyond  the 
camp  of  the  Deists  would  say  that  the  moral  life  is 
always  a religious  life;  or,  as  several  of  the  Deists  put  it, 
that  Socrates  was  a Christian.  The  essential  element  in 
natural  religion  is  obeying  rules  that  reason  can  discover; 
and  natural  religion  is  the  standard  for  judging  all 
religion.  It  may  be  that  this  tendency  in  Deism  is  but 
the  doctrine  of  Cudworth  further  developed.  Some  of 
them  speak  of  ethics  in  the  language  of  Cambridge. 
But  they  do  not  accept  the  objectivity  of  the  distinction 
between  right  and  wrong  as  a point  of  departure  from 
which  to  begin  their  discussions  of  religion  or  morals, 
as  do  the  Cambridge  Platonists.  It  is  rather  the  spirit 
of  Herbert  that  speaks  in  the  more  radical  later  Deism. 
Virtue  and  piety  are  the  chief  parts  of  worship,  according 
to  his  fundamental  principles  of  universal  religion;  and 
man  knows  this  religion  of  nature  by  his  unaided  reason. 
Tindal  and  Wollaston  and  Morgan  emphasized  natural 
religion,  which  they  practically  or  actually  identified 
with  morality,  and  made  it  the  norm  for  testing  all 
religion.  Though  their  systems  remained  theistic,  the 
supernatural  was  reduced  to  a minimum. 

Locke  clearly  stands  outside  of  this  line  of  develop- 
ment. It  is  true  that  he  emphasized  the  moral  side  of 
Christianity.  But  in  doing  so  he  contrasted  it  with  the 
empty  ecclesiastical  forms  and  pomp  that  were  notori- 
ously barren  of  holiness  of  life.  When  the  Deists 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  14 1 

emphasized  the  ethical  elements  in  Christianity  or  in 
natural  religion,  they  contrasted  them  with  the  super- 
natural. Though  they  sometimes  use  the  same  language, 
they  do  not  say  the  same  thing.  The  supernatural 
relations  and  sanctions  of  the  religious  life  occupy  a 
much  more  important  place  in  Locke’s  system  than  in 
Deism. 

4.  TOLERATION 

A full  discussion  of  toleration  in  England  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  would  be  a 
history  of  Nonconformity.  For  our  purpose  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  make  only  a general  survey  of  the  period. 

We  must  remember  that  not  all  preachers  of  tolera- 
tion were  tolerant.  One  need  but  read  Bourne’s  account 
of  events  at  Oxford,  just  before  and  during  the  time  of 
Locke’s  student  days,  to  realize  how  often  the  advocates 
of  toleration  forgot  their  exalted  principles  when  they 
had  the  power  to  coerce  others.1  With  some  individual 
exceptions  toleration  was  never  the  creed  of  the  party  in 
power;  it  was  generally  the  cry  for  justice  of  a party 
that  was  oppressed.  However  there  were  some  leaders, 
we  may  say  there  were  certain  groups  of  leaders,  who 
advocated  it. 

The  spirit  of  the  whole  rationalistic  movement  in 
theology  and  related  interests  tended  toward  toleration. 
As  we  have  seen,  it  fostered  free  inquiry;  a corollary  of 
this  is  toleration  of  resulting  divergent  opinions.  If  a 
man  is  to  think  for  himself  in  religious  matters,  he  must 
be  free  to  think,  he  must  have  the  privilege  of  holding  his 
opinions  unmolested  by  others.2  This  was  the  teaching 

1 Bourne,  Life  of  John  Locke,  I,  chaps,  ii,  hi. 

2 Tulloch,  Rational  Theology  and  Christian  Philosophy,  1, 158  if.,  164ft'. 


142  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

of  Faulkland  and  Hales.  Chillingworth  held  that  the 
Apostles’  Creed  contained  all  the  great  principles  of 
religion,  and  on  these  all  men  were  agreed;  hence  the 
Protestants  were  divided  not  on  matters  of  faith,  but 
on  minor  matters  of  speculation.1  He  grasped  the 
meaning  of  Protestantism  and  saw  the  real  sense  of 
“agreeing  to  differ.”  In  this  same  class  stands  Jeremy 
Taylor’s  defense  of  The  Liberty  of  Prophesying.  It  was 
probably  the  greatest  plea  of  that  century  for  the 
“liberty  of  Christian  teaching  within  the  Church.” 
And  in  like  spirit  Stillingfleet  wrote  The  Irenicum  of  a 
Comprehensive  Church , though  he  modified  his  opinions 
later.  Both  Taylor  and  Stillingfleet  set  up  broad  and 
comprehensive  principles  as  the  ideal.2  The  Christian 
religion  is  a religion  of  peace  and  tolerance.  The  church 
has  no  right  to  require  more  than  Christ  Himself  asked. 
There  is  no  reason  that  can  be  given  why  the  things  that 
are  necessary  for  salvation,  as  laid  down  by  our  Savior 
in  His  words,  are  not  enough  for  membership  in  any 
church  body.  Unfortunately  the  Restoration  was 
dominated  by  another  and  a very  different  spirit. 

Contemporary  with  this  movement,  or  perhaps  a 
little  later,  the  group  of  leaders  at  Cambridge  exerted 
an  influence  for  toleration.  In  some  respects  they 
strongly  resembled  the  rational  theologians,  and  yet 
they  differed  from  them.  Hales,  Chillingworth,  and 
Taylor,  as  we  have  seen,  distinguished  fundamental  and 
nonfundamental,  and  advocated  comprehension  of  sects 
by  the  Church  of  England  on  the  basis  of  the  funda- 

1 Tulloch,  Rational  Theology  and  Christian  Philosophy,  I,  pp.  325, 
335.  341-43- 

2 Ibid.,  pp.  344  ff.,  41 1 fi. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  143 

mental  articles  of  faith.  Their  interests  centered  in 
church  polity;  they  would  so  modify  the  conditions  of 
membership  in  the  state  church  that  it  would  “compre- 
hend” all  sects;  their  problem  concerned  the  practical 
administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  church.  The 
Cambridge  divines,  on  the  other  hand,  turned  their 
attention  to  interests  that  were  more  profound;  they 
discussed  the  nature  of  religion  and  raised  critical  ques- 
tions in  the  spirit  of  the  new  speculation — questions 
which  touched  “the  very  essence  of  religious  and  moral 
principles.”  They  attempted  on  philosophical  grounds 
to  say  to  just  what  extent  men  had  a right  to  be  dogmatic 
and  to  insist  on  a certain  standard  of  orthodoxy. 
Though  they  came  to  practically  the  same  views  as 
Chillingworth  and  others  concerning  toleration,  they 
reached  their  conclusions  by  a different  way.  It  was 
religious  philosophy  rather  than  ecclesiastical  polity  that 
concerned  them.1 

Among  these  Cambridge  divines,  Whichcote  con- 
ceived the  essence  and  character  of  true  religion  in  such 
a way  that  he  could  not  understand  how  regenerate  men, 
who  agree  on  the  great  articles  of  faith  and  principles 
of  a good  life,  could  not  overlook  subordinate  differences.2  T 
And  Smith,  Cudworth,  and  More  were  of  the  same 
opinion.  In  the  midst  of  the  warring  sects  they  sought 
to  grasp  a nobler  religious  ideal  which  was  common  to  all 
Christians.  Freedom  of  conscience  in  all  religious  . 
matters  was  sacred.  Hence  all  true  religion  must  be 
tolerant.  The  reason  enlightened  by  revelation  is  a 
sufficient  guide.  The  fundamentals  were  sufficient  as  a 
basis  for  church  unity;  it  was  unreasonable  and  against 

1 Ibid.,  II,  1 ff.  2 Ibid.,  pp.  ioi  fi. 


144  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

the  real  spirit  of  Christianity  to  demand  uniformity  of 
belief  in  that  which  is  not  central  in  religion.  Man 
has  no  right  to  demand  acceptance  of  more  than  Christ 
and  the  Apostles  required.  Because  of  their  broad 
^ views  they  were  soon  known  as  “the  latitude  men.” 
Cambridge  Platonism  became  the  center  around  which 
developed  the  latitudinarian  movement.  But  this  was  a 
new  message  that  the  rational  theologians  and  the  Cam- 
bridge Platonists  brought.  It  did  not  fit  the  prevailing 
conception;  men  were  still  too  prone  to  define  religious 
faith  in  terms  of  the  acceptance  of  sectarian  dogmas. 
Their  counsel  was  rejected  by  both  Anglican  and  Puritan. 

Somewhat  separate  from  these  liberal  theologians  of 
the  established  church,  and  also  apart  from  the  Platon- 
ists at  Cambridge,  stood  Milton,  “the  great  interpreter 
of  the  Commonwealth.”  Though  he  was  close  to  the 
Cambridge  divines  in  many  things — for  they  were  of  the 
Puritans1 — he  did  not  share  their  philosophical  specula- 
tions. He  approached  toleration  rather  from  the 
political  or  practical  side.  He  wrote  a Treatise  of  Chris- 
tian Liberty  in  Ecclesiastical  Causes , Showing  That  It 
Is  Not  Lawful  for  Any  Person  on  Earth  to  Compel  in 
Matters  of  Religion , and  also  a book  on  True  Religion, 
Heresie,  Schism,  and  Toleration.  In  the  latter,  which 
appeared  at  a time  when  it  was  dangerous  to  utter  such 
views,  he  taught  toleration  for  every  religious  opinion 
except  idolatry,  which  is  impiety,  and  popery,  which  is 
rather  a political  than  a religious  party.2  Many  of  the 
greatest  advocates  of  toleration,  including  Locke, 
excepted  atheists  and  Romanists  for  these  reasons.  In 

1 Tulloch,  Rational  Theology  and  Christian  Philosophy,  I,  p.  7. 

2 Ibid.,  English  Puritanism  and  Its  Leaders,  pp.  239  ff. 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  145 

the  period  of  the  Restoration  Milton  was  probably  the 
greatest  critic  of  the  intolerance  that  then  prevailed. 

Locke  saw  very  early  in  life  the  evil  results  of  the 
prevailing  intolerance.  During  his  student  days  at 
Christ  Church  College  men  were  driven  from  academic 
chairs  for  no  other  reason  than  that  they  were  of  another 
party  than  that  which  was  in  power.  Clergymen  were 
taken  from  congregations,  some  leaders  of  ecclesiastical 
parties  were  imprisoned,  and  in  a few  instances  men  suf- 
fered harm  in  person  and  estate.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  as  a young  man,  probably  less  than  thirty  years 
old,  he  saw  the  impossibility  of  church  uniformity  in 
doctrine  and  cultus.  It  was  forced  home  upon  him  that 
honest  men  of  religious  conviction  did  not  think  the  same 
on  all  matters,  and  that  the  points  on  which  they  differed 
were  almost  always  not  of  cardinal  importance  for 
religious  faith;  they  generally  concerned  doctrinal 
statements  that  were  formulated  by  man — human 
glosses  as  he  expressed  it — and  pot  ^le-plain  truths  of 
revelation.  In  an  essay  entitled  Reflections  on  the  Roman 
Commonwealth,  which  was  written,  according  to  Bourne, 
about  1660,  when  Locke  was  twenty-eight  years  old,  he 
presents  Numa’s  principle  of  toleration  in  all  religious 
matters  most  sympathetically,  and  traces  schisms  and 
heresies  to  “multiplying  articles  of  faith,  and  narrowing 
the  bottom  of  religion  by  clogging  it  with  creeds  and 
catechisms  and  endless  niceties.”  He  also  sets  limits  to 
authority  in  enforcing  uniformity.  The  Roman  state 
is  held  up  as  an  ideal  of  religious  toleration.1  About  the 
same  time,  or  very  soon  after,  in  an  unpublished  essay,  he 
discusses  the  problem  from  a somewhat  different  angle, 

1 Bourne,  Life  of  John  Locke,  I,  149. 


146  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

with  results  that  seem  to  suggest  an  extension  of  the 
power  of  the  civil  magistrates  over  indifferent  things.1 
During  the  next  seven  years  his  experience  in  offices  of 
state  was  extensive.  He  was  secretary  to  the  first  Earl 
of  Shaftesbury.  Before  1667  he  returned  to  the  problem 
in  Sacerdos,  in  which  he  shows  that  coercion  in  matters 
of  religion  is  unreasonable.2  And  very  soon  after  this  he 
wrote  his  Essay  Concerning  Toleration,  which  is  a fuller 
and  more  systematic  treatment  of  the  subject.  Here, 
in  the  name  of  freedom  of  conscience,  he  advocates 
toleration  for  all  religious  beliefs,  save  such  as  contain 
tenets  that  are  hostile  to  the  state  or  society;  hence 
Atheists  and  Catholics  should  not  be  tolerated.3  In 
1669  he  incorporated  religious  toleration  in  The  Funda- 
mental Constitution  for  the  Government  of  Carolina ,4  He 
touched  upon  the  discussion  of  tolerance  in  several  other 
writings  before  he  wrote  his  great  work  on  toleration, 
Epistola  de  Tolerantia,  in  the  winter  of  1685  and  1686. 
It  was  published  in  1689,  and  was  the  first  discussion  of 
toleration  by  Locke  that  reached  the  public.  This  was 
vigorously  attacked,  and  Locke  wrote  a second  letter  in 
its  defense.5 

| It  is  very  doubtful  whether  any  other  topic  occupied 
1 Locke’s  attention  as  often  as  toleration.  He  returns 
to  it  again  and  again,  now  from  one  point  of  view, 

1 Bourne,  Life  of  John  Locke,  I,  p.  154. 

2 Ibid.,  p.  156. 

3 Ibid.,  p.  174. 

4 Ibid.,  pp.  239  ff. 

s Crous  gives  an  excellent  digest  of  Bourne’s  account  of  the  develop- 
ment of  Locke’s  views  on  toleration  with  considerable  additional  matter; 
he  also  gives  a faithful  presentation  of  Locke’s  arguments  and  con- 
clusions; it  is  thorough  and  correct  (pp.  51  ff.). 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  147 

now  from  another.  It  probably  is  the  determining 
motive  of  his  most  important  theological  treatise,  The 
Reasonableness  of  Christianity.  But  whether  writing  a 
pretentious  work  for  publication  or  a short  note  or  essay  ■ 
just  to  formulate  his  views,  his  fundamental  principle- 
was  always  the  same.  Every  law-abiding  citizen  has  a j 
right  to  freedom  of  conscience  in  religious  belief  and 
worship,  so  long  as  this  does  not  interfere  with  the  rights  1 
of  others.  

A genetic  study  of  the  development  of  Locke’s 
teaching  concerning  toleration  would  indicate  that  the 
determining  motive  is  to  be  found  in  practical  interests. 
An  intolerable  situation  of  intersectarian  jealousy  and 
oppression  existed.  In  the  interests  of  the  well-being 
of  all  parties  concerned,  both  as  citizens  of  the  state 
and  as  members  of  organized  religious  bodies,  the  situa- 
tion demanded  relief.  Very  early  in  life  Locke  set 
himself  to  devising  a means  of  escape.  He  was  thus  led, 
primarily  by  the  very  practical  question  of  church  polity 
and  the  interests  of  state,  in  working  out  his  views  on 
toleration.  In  this  respect  he  probably  stands  in  closer 
relation  to  the  rationalistic  theologians  than  to  the  more 
abstractly  philosophical  Cambridge  Platonists.  Lor, 
Locke  toleration  rose  out  of  a very,  practical  demand;'1 
it  is  a way  of  meeting  a given  situation,  rather  than  the  ! 
corollary  of  a theory  of  religion.  His  philosophy  of- 
religion  is  never  wholly  lost  sight  of,  but  it  is  not  the* 
determining  and  molding  factor  in  his  advocacy  oft 
toleration. 

In  the  debate  concerning  toleration  Locke’s  great  j 
service  is  that  he  gave  a complete  systematic  presenta- 1 
tion  of  his  views;  it  may  be  said  that  he  summed  up  the' 


148  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

best  that  had  been  written  on  the  subject.  Further- 
more, he  uttered  his  plea  in  the  language  of  the  more 
intelligent  middle  class,  and  he  supported  his  position 
with  the  simple  but  convincing  arguments  of  common 
sense.  Milton  reasoned  more  profoundly,  and  so  did 
the  Cambridge  Platonists,  but  Locke,  who  was  not 
burdened  by  the  heavy  Miltonic  diction  or  by  Platonic 
speculation,  reasoned  more  convincingly  for  the  reading 
public.  As  a result  of  this  and  the  more  fortunate 
conditions  that  obtained  after  1688  his  writings  on  tolera- 
tion exerted  a great  influence.  But  he  is  not  strictly  a 
pathfinder  here.  A number  of  great  men  had  spoken 
of  it  before  him;  practically  all  of  the  more  progressive 
thinkers  of  the  period  urged  toleration;  Locke  is  just  one 
of  the  most  important  men  of  this  group. 

The  Deists,  of  course,  were  among  those  who  wanted 
complete  toleration.  But,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  they 
had  very  little  to  say  about  it  when  their  movement 
was  at  its  height.  From  Blount  to  Chubb  it  is  mentioned 
probably  not  more  than  two  or  three  dozen  times,  and 
nowhere  is  there  a formal  discussion  of  it.  These  men 
came  upon  the  stage  after  the  great  leaders,  among  whom 
was  Locke,  had  practically  won  the  battle.  Hence  they 
generally  assumed  toleration  as  an  acknowledged  fact; 
some  of  them  never  even  mention  it. 

For  Herbert  religious  toleration  is  the  corollary  of  his 
five  fundamental  principles  of  all  religion;  these  consti- 
tute the  core  of  all  true  religion;  whatever  more  there 
is  in  a religious  system  is  uncertain  and  cannot  be  con- 
sidered essential  and  binding.  Therefore  all  who 
embrace  these  principles  should  be  tolerated.  Toland 
devotes  a few  pages  to  asserting  and  defending  tolera- 


Main  Points  in  Religious  Discussions  149 

tion.1  Collins,  Tindal,  and  Wollaston  are  silent  on  the 
subject.  Woolston  expressly  assumes  it.2  Bolingbroke, 
in  his  vigorous  protest  against  authority,  several  times 
condemns  all  forms  of  coercion  in  religion,  and  says  that 
persecution  is  caused,  not  by  the  gospel,  but  by  the 
systems  that  have  been  raised  on  it.  This  is  the  nearest 
approach  to  a discussion  of  toleration  among  the  Deists.3 
Morgan  refers  to  toleration  in  a very  energetic  way 
though  briefly.  Fundamentals  in  Christianity  have  been 
multiplied,  with  the  result  that  the  right  of  private 
judgment  has  been  ignored.4  For  Chubb  the  only  thing 
necessary  for  recognition  as  a Christian  were  the  essential 
facts  of  the  gospel  and  not  men’s  opinions.  Christ  is 
man’s  sole  lawgiver;  no  man  has  a right  to  force  faith 
or  subjection.5  ^ 

Deism,  at  least  in  its  period  of  greatest  influence,  paid 
but  little  attention  to  toleration.  Conditions  had 
changed  since  the  days  of  the  rational  theologians  and  the 
Cambridge  Platonists.  Toleration  was  all  but  an 
accomplished  fact,  so  far  as  concerned  active  coercion. 
Certain  political  disabilities  continued  for  a century  or 
more,  but  there  was  freedom  of  conscience  to  the  extent 
that  men  could  believe  almost  what  they  pleased  in 
religious  matters  and  yet  live  in  peace.  Toleration  was 
no  longer  a living  issue. 

1 Vindicius  Liberius,  pp.  107-15.  He  claims  toleration  for  all  save 
the  Papists — they  condemn  all  others  and  are  under  a foreign  ruler.  He 
believes  that  without  religion  civil  liberty  is  impossible. 

2 A Discourse  on  the  Miracles  of  Our  Saviour,  pp.  68  ff. 

3 Bolingbroke,  Works,  VI,  286,  290,  350,  483  2.,  and  in  Vol.  VII  the 
orepart  of  his  discussion  of  “Tolerance.” 

4 Tracts,  pp.  xvi  2.,  also  Physico-Tkeology,  pp.  270  2. 

s The  Gospel  of  Jesus  Christ  Asserted,  Preface,  and  pp.  3 2. 


150  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

The  occasional  references  that  the  Deists  make  to  it 
are  not  sufficiently  extensive  to  enable  us  to  know  which 
principle  determined  their  thinking  on  the  subject, 
whether  they  were  in  the  line  that  came  down  from  the 
rational  theologians,  or  in  that  which  we  have  from  the 
Cambridge  Platonists.  It  is  impossible,  on  the  basis  of 
their  few  incidental  references  to  toleration,  to  determine 
whether  they  were  close  to  the  practical  discussion  of 
Locke  or  to  the  more  speculative  reasoning  of  Cambridge. 
But  it  is  clear  that  toleration  is  not  peculiar  to  Locke 
or  the  Deists;  it  is,  however,  a distinguishing  character- 
istic of  the  more  progressive  thinkers  of  the  whole  period. 
We  find  it  advocated  by  the  Rational  Theologians,  the 
Cambridge  Platonists,  Locke,  and  the  Deists;  it  was  a 
doctrine  common  to  many  minds.  The  fact  that  both 
Locke  and  the  Deists  advocated  toleration  marks  them 
as  part  of  one  movement,  but  not  necessarily  as  consti- 
tuting the  whole  of  that  movement;  as  we  have  seen, 
there  were  many  others  who  held  the  same  opinions. 
iWhen  the  new  order  came  after  1688,  Locke,  by  his 
vigorous  and  plain  appeal  for  toleration,  became  the 
leader  of  all  those  who  advocated  it,  of  whom  a minority 
were  Deists.  He  did  not  become  the  leader  of  the 
Deists,  as  Crous  asserts.1 

1 Since  toleration  was  not  a point  of  dispute  with  Deism,  it  should 
not  be  discussed  here  if  we  were  to  adhere  strictly  to  the  principle  that 
has  guided  in  the  selection  of  the  topics  that  have  been  developed  in  this 
chapter.  But  Crous  used  it  to  prove  Locke’s  identity  with  the  deistic 
movement;  hence  this  cursory  account  has  been  given  of  such  portions 
of  the  debate  on  Nonconformity  as  were  relevant. 


CHAPTER  VI 


DIRECT  EVIDENCE  OF  THE  RELATION  OF  THE 
ENGLISH  DEISTS  TO  LOCKE 

Locke’s  influence  dominated  the  period  when  Deism 
was  most  productive.  The  extent  of  this  influence,  as 
seen  in  quotations  from  Locke  and  direct  references  to 
him  in  the  deistic  writings,  should  therefore  be  investi- 
gated. It  will  appear  that  some  of  the  Deists  seemed 
to  be  wholly  independent  of  Locke,  while  others  were 
influenced  by  him,  but  in  a way  that  is  not  significant, 
and  that  at  least  Bolingbroke  appreciated  the  difference 
between  the  religious  opinions  of  Locke  and  those  of 
the  Deists. 

I.  LOCKE’S  INFLUENCE  IN  ENGLAND  AFTER  1 688 

Spinoza  and  Locke  were  born  in  the  same  year,  1632. 
Spinoza  died  in  1677  while  Locke  was  traveling  in  France. 
Had  Locke  died  at  that  time  his  name  might  have  been 
preserved  as  the  friend  of  Sydenham,  or  as  the  secretary 
of  the  first  Earl  of  Shaftesbury  and  tutor  to  his  son.  He 
was  recognized  as  a genial  “student”  at  Christ  Church, 
Oxford,  of  scholarly  tastes  and  more  than  average 
ability;  he  had  many  friends,  among  whom  were  some  of 
the  most  prominent  men  of  the  time;  but  he  was  com- 
paratively unknown,  he  had  done  nothing  to  attract 
the  attention  of  the  public.  Locke  at  fifty  was  a scho- 
larly English  gentleman,  who,  as  he  said  when  speaking 
of  his  unjust  expulsion  from  Oxford  in  1684,  “had  lived 


152 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


inoffensively  in  the  College  for  many  years.”1  He  suf- 
fered this  expulsion,  not  so  much  from  anything  that  he 
had  done  that  called  forth  royal  disfavor,  as  because 
of  his  association  with  Shaftesbury,  whose  political  sun 
had  set. 

But  just  as  England  after  1688  was  another  England, 
so  Locke  after  his  return  from  Holland  in  1689  was 
another  Locke.  It  is  probable  that  1686  marks  the 
literary  turning-point  in  his  life.2  Before  that  he  was 
the  modest,  retiring  student;  after  that  he  was  the  author 
of  books  that  marked  epochs.  Almost  contemporary 
with  his  arrival  in  England  appeared  A Letter  Concerning 
Toleration;  it  was  both  a plea  and  a challenge.  In  the 
letter  “to  the  Reader”  he  says,  “absolute  liberty,  just 
and  true  liberty,  equal  and  impartial  liberty,  is  the  thing 
we  stand  in  need  of.  Now,  though  this  has  been  much 
talked  of,  I doubt  it  has  not  been  much  understood — 
I am  sure  not  at  all  practiced.”  We  are  not  surprised 
that  he  at  once  drew  the  fire  of  the  apologists  of  the  old 
idea  of  uniformity.  His  book  was  vigorously  attacked 
and  stoutly  defended.  And  while  the  debate  was  still 
on,  his  Essay  Concerning  the  Human  Understanding  came 
from  the  press,  and  English  Empiricism  started  on  its 
course.  That  same  year  he  published  two  Treatises  of 
Government  and  a second  Letter  Concerning  Toleration. 
After  this  England  knew  John  Locke.  He  at  once 
became  influential  in  political  affairs;  he  was  a counselor 
of  ministers  and  statesmen.  His  political  philosophy 
more  and  more  shaped  the  political  ideas  of  the  new 
England  of  William  and  Mary. 

1 Bourne,  Life  of  Jotm  Locke,  I,  484. 

2 Ibid.,  II,  45. 


Direct  Evidence 


i S3 


When  the  Essay  Concerning  the  Human  Understand- 
ing appeared,  England  was  without  a philosopher. 
Hobbes  had  died  in  ill  repute.  Rightly  or  wrongly 
many  held  his  materialistic  philosophy  responsible  for 
the  low  morals  of  the  Restoration.1  Furthermore,  the 
Baconian  program  had  been  gaining  rapidly,  especially 
since  the  founding  of  the  Royal  Society.  The  new 
science,  which  relied  on  experiment  rather  than  on 
deductive  speculation,  was  now  well  established  and  had 
vindicated  itself  by  its  results.  England  was  ready  for 
an  empirical  system  of  philosophy;  and  there  were 
probably  other  factors  in  the  general  situation  that 
helped  to  account  for  the  influence  that  the  Essay  soon 
exerted.  Within  eleven  years  after  its  first  appearance 
it  had  passed  through  four  English  editions  and  had 
appeared  in  a Latin  version  and  also  in  French.  As 
most  epoch-marking  books,  it  was  much  criticized.  It 
had  also  its  great  defenders.  For  various  reasons,  many 
of  which  were  not  philosophical,  it  had  probably  more 
foes  than  friends;  but  among  its  friends  were  many  of 
the  greatest  men  of  the  time.  But  whether  praised  or 
blamed,  it  was  the  philosophy  that  was  most  discussed, 
and  its  author  was  generally  recognized  as  the  greatest 
living  philosopher. 

2.  THE  TEMPORAL  RELATION  OF  LOCKE  AND  THE  DEISTS 
Attention  has  already  been  called  to  the  fact  that 
Locke  and  the  Deists  were  close  to  each  other  in  time. 
He  was  a boy  of  sixteen  at  Westminster  when  Herbert 
died;  he  was  an  unobtrusive  “student”  of  Christ  Church 
when  Stillingfleet  wrote  his  Letter  to  a Deist;  he  was  in 
1T.  B.  Macaulay,  History  of  England  (London,  1849),  I,  chap.  ii. 


154  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

his  fifties  when  Blount  was  publishing  his  deistic  writings, 
and  in  his  sixties  when  Toland’s  Christianity  Not  Mys- 
terious appeared.  When  he  died  in  1704,  Collins  was  a 
young  man  of  twenty-eight,  Tindal  was  forty-seven, 
Wollaston,  forty-five,  Woolston,  thirty-five,  Boling- 
broke,  twenty-six,  Chubb,  twenty-five,  and  Morgan  was 
about  the  same  age.  Locke’s  period  of  greatest  activity 
began  with  his  return  to  England  early  in  1689.  And 
Lockian  thought  influenced  many,  perhaps  most,  of  the 
progressive  thinkers  for  some  time  after  his  death.  With 
the  exception  of  Herbert  and  Blount,  all  the  more 
prominent  Deists  wrote  during  the  period  of  Locke’s 
greatest  influence.  At  least  Toland  and  Collins  were 
personally  known  to  him.  Thus  the  deistic  movement, 
which  had  its  beginnings  early  in  the  century,  but  did  not 
develop  much  strength  until  the  last  decade  of  the 
century,  and  did  not  reach  its  period  of  greatest  influence 
until  after  Locke’s  death,  covered  the  entire  span  of  his 
life  and  extended  nearly  half  a century  beyond.  How- 
ever, the  most  important  deistic  writings  and  the  most 
vigorous  part  of  the  deistic  controversy  came  after  his 
death;  generally  speaking,  almost  all  the  later  deistic 
literature  was  produced  in  the  period  when  Locke  was  the 
leading  influence  in  English  philosophy.  He  was 
progressive,  rationalistic,  and  critical;  so  were  they. 
You  would  expect  to  find  the  shadow  of  the  Essay 
over  the  literature  of  Deism. 

3.  DIRECT  EVIDENCE  OF  LOCKE’S  INFLUENCE  ON 
THE  DEISTS 

It  is  not  easy  to  determine  when  and  to  what  extent 
one  writer  influences  another.  There  are  several  sorts 
of  evidence,  but  no  one  kind  of  evidence  can  be  taken 


Direct  Evidence 


155 


alone;  it  must  be  taken  with  others;  and,  as  we  saw  in 
the  study  of  method  for  this  problem,  its  value  must  be 
estimated  with  the  whole  background  before  us.  But 
the  most  important  factors,  from  which  the  influence  of 
Locke  upon  Deism  can  be  determined,  have  been  studied 
in  the  two  preceding  chapters,  in  which  we  considered  the 
use  that  was  made  of  the  concepts  of  nature  and  reason, 
which  played  such  an  important  role  in  the  more  progres- 
sive thinking  of  the  age,  and  the  conclusions  that  were 
reached  on  certain  points  that  were  under  discussion. 
We  studied  critically  the  resemblances  between  Locke 
and  the  Deists;  these  afford  the  most  important  evidence 
of  dependence.  We  found  that  though  there  were 
fundamental  agreements  there  were  also  clearly  marked 
differences.  The  significance  of  these  agreements  and 
differences  will  appear  more  fully  in  the  concluding 
chapter.  There  is  another  important  sort  of  proof  of  the 
relation  of  the  Deists  to  Locke.  Most  of  them  wrote 
their  books  and  tracts  when  Locke  was  the  dominant 
figure  in  English  thought,  and  almost  of  necessity  their 
writings  contain  evidence  of  their  relation  to  him  and  of 
their  attitude  toward  him.  We  shall  examine  the  books 
of  the  leading  Deists  to  see  what  use  they  made  of 
Lockian  thought. 

Of  course  the  relation  in  time  makes  it  impossible 
for  Herbert  to  have  been  influenced  by  Locke  in  any 
way;  and  Blount,  who  committed  suicide  in  1693, 
published  practically  nothing  after  the  appearance  of  the 
Essay.  His  two  most  significant  works,  Philostratus 
and  Religio  Laid,  appeared  in  1680  and  1683, 
respectively.  There  is  no  evidence  that  Locke  was 
influenced  by  them.  He  expressly  rejects  Herbert’s 
doctrine  of  innate  ideas. 


156  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

A.  TOLAND 

Much  has  been  made  of  Toland’s  dependence  upon 
Locke.  In  1695  Locke  published  the  Reasonableness  of 
Christianity,  and  the  next  year  appeared  Toland’s 
Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  in  which  he  made  use  of 
Locke’s  definition  of  knowledge  and  other  epistemological 
elements  of  his  philosophy.  Stephen  is  probably  right 
in  saying  that  “Toland  attempted  to  gain  a place  in 
social  and  literary  esteem  by  boasting  of  his  intimacy 
with  Locke,  and  by  engrafting  his  speculations  upon 
Locke’s  doctrines.”1  Though  Locke  repudiated  Toland, 
Stillingfleet,  Bishop  of  Worcester,  grouped  them  together 
in  his  contribution  to  the  Unitarian  discussion,  to  which 
Locke  replied.  This  resulted  in  the  well-known  con- 
troversy between  Stillingfleet  and  Locke.  The  Essay 
had  been  before  the  public  six  years,  and  was  unusually 
popular  for  a philosophical  treatise,  the  third  edition 
having  appeared  in  1 695.  It  had  been  criticized  already, 
especially  by  Norris,  and  by  Sherlock  who  objected  to 
Locke’s  criticism  of  innate  ideas.  Stillingfleet  under- 
took to  review  the  whole  philosophical  system  of  Locke 
and  to  show  that  it  tended  to  foster  just  that  atti- 
tude toward  the  traditional  views  of  Christianity 
which  is  found  in  Toland’s  book.  This,  no  doubt,  has 
served  to  emphasize  Toland’s  alleged  dependence  upon 
Locke.2 

1 Leslie  Stephen,  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  I,  90-93. 

2 “Toland,  an  Irish  Pantheist,  in  his  Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  has 
exaggerated  some  doctrines  in  the  Essay  and  then  adopted  them  thus 
exaggerated  as  premises  of  his  own”  (Fraser,  Locke's  Essay  Concerning 
Human  Understanding,  Preface,  p.  xli).  At  this  period  in  Toland’s  life 
we  find  no  evidence  in  his  writings  of  a pantheistic  bent;  that  seems  to 
have  been  a later  development. 


Direct  Evidence 


157 


Generally  speaking  the  Lockian  epistemology  is 
adopted  by  Toland.  In  attempting  to  give  his  dis- 
cussion a philosophical  foundation  in  the  opening  pages 
of  Christianity  Not  Mysterious,  he  accepts  Locke’s 
definition  of  knowledge,  emphasizes  the  inadequacy  of 
our  knowledge  of  the  essence  of  things,  and  distinguishes 
our  knowledge  of  nominal  essence,  which  we  can  attain, 
from  knowledge  of  real  essence,  of  which  we  have  no 
manner  of  notion,  and  concludes  that  we  know  only  the 
observable  qualities  of  things  (pp.  81  If.)-  Toland  also 
emphasized  the  necessity  of  clear  and  definite  ideas, 
which  is  thoroughly  in  the  spirit  of  Locke.  But  he 
went  much  farther  than  Locke  in  the  application  of  these 
principles.  Locke,  as  we  saw,  in  spite  of  his  rationalism 
always  held  firmly  to  the  supernatural,  largely  in  the 
orthodox  sense.  But  in  Toland’s  book  Lockian  doctrines 
were  applied  very  differently  from  the  way  Locke 
intended  they  should  be,  as  even  Stillingfleet  acknowl- 
edged, and  it  is  probable  that  they  underwent  some 
change  in  Toland’s  hands.  Locke  in  the  debate  with 
Stillingfleet  frequently  repudiated  Toland,  claiming  that 
he  “went  upon  another  ground  ” ; and  Toland  repudiated 
Locke  twenty  years  later,1  when  he  said,  “I  proceed 
upon  different  principles  from  Mr.  Locke  and  principles 
that  are  better.”2 

1 Tetradymus,  pp.  190  ff. 

2 Though  it  would  be  unfair  to  quote  Locke’s  critics  in  proof  of  his 
responsibility  for  Toland’s  views,  or  of  his  identity  with  the  deistic 
movement,  we  can  properly  use  them  to  prove  the  opposite.  If  Stilling- 
fleet and  Edwards  do  not  make  him  out  a Deist,  it  is  very  probable  that 
he  was  not  identified  with  the  movement  by  others. 

The  controversy  with  Stillingfleet  was  started  by  the  latter’s 
attempt  to  join  Locke  with  the  Unitarians,  which  Locke  resented.  In 


158  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

It  is  clear  that  so  far  as  concerns  the  establishing  of 
his  more  radical  conclusions,  and  it  is  these  that  give 
Toland’s  book  its  character,  the  Lockian  elements  play 
an  unimportant  part.  Toland  seems  to  forget  his 
philosophical  foundation  when  he  develops  his  philosophy 
of  religion.  He  made  no  use  of  Locke  in  his  later 
writings;  but  he  called  attention  to  the  difference  that 
exists  between  himself  and  Locke. 

Zscharnack,  in  the  introduction  to  his  German  trans- 
lation of  Christianity  Not  Mysterious , shows  clearly 
that  Toland’s  views  as  therein  expressed  could  not  have 
been  influenced  by  the  Reasonableness  of  Christianity. 

his  reply  Stillingfleet  said  that  he  was  satisfied  with  Locke’s  attitude 
toward  Scripture  and  was  convinced  that  Toland  used  Locke’s  principles 
in  a way  in  which  Locke  had  not  intended  them  to  be  used.  Yet  he 
insists  that  the  grounds  of  certainty  as  set  forth  in  the  Essay  lay  him 
open  to  just  such  wrong  use.  He  says  in  addressing  Locke:  “Your 
notions  were  turned  to  other  purposes  than  you  intended  them.”  He  is 
anxious  to  make  this  clear  and  repeats  it  a number  of  times.  He  wishes 
his  reader  to  know  that  he  recognizes  clearly  the  difference  that  exists 
between  Locke  and  Toland.  He  nowhere  intimates  that  Locke  is  a 
Deist;  he  is  satisfied  with  his  attitude  toward  Scripture,  though  not 
with  his  views  of  the  Trinity,  which  Locke  persistently  refuses  to  discuss. 
He  also  finds  fault  with  certain  of  Locke’s  philosophical  speculations, 
which  he  thinks  may  be  used  against  supernatural  revelation,  but  this 
he  says  is  not  as  Locke  intended  (Stillingfleet,  Works  [London,  1710], 
HI,  S3  2-). 

Even  the  bitter  Edwards,  in  his  attack  on  The  Reasonableness  of 
Christianity,  is  satisfied  to  call  Locke  a Socinian  and  Racovian  and  to  say 
that  his  book  tended  to  atheism,  that  it  had  a “tang”  of  atheism;  but 
he  nowhere  says  that  Locke  is  a Deist.  Edwards  was  not  the  man  who 
would  refrain  from  using  a scolding  name  for  good  manners’  sake.  It 
is  very  probable  that  if  he  could  have  fastened  the  reproachful  name 
Deist  on  Locke,  he  would  have  done  it;  his  failure  to  do  so  is  significant. 
We  may  conclude  that  Locke’s  opinions  were  distinguished  from  those 
of  Toland  and  that  he  was  not  considered  a Deist  by  Stillingfleet  or 
Edwards. 


Direct  Evidence 


iS9 

Toland’s  letters  indicate  that  already  in  May  of  1694 
he  was  at  work  on  his  book,  and  that  at  that  time 
the  central  idea  was  well  developed.  Zscharnack  makes 
a very  clear  case  for  Toland’s  independence  of  the 
influence  of  the  Reasonableness  of  Christianity . In 
this  book  Locke  is  thoroughly  rationalistic,  but  he 
holds  firmly  to  the  supernatural;  while  Toland  is  also 
thoroughly  rationalistic,  but  he  shows  a very  marked 
anti-supernatural  tendency.  Both  proceed  from  the 
same  motive,  both  magnify  reason,  which  is  in  harmony 
with  the  spirit  of  the  age;  the  difference  lies  in  the  way 
the  principle  is  applied.  Toland  is  radical;  Locke  is 
conservative.1 

B.  COLLINS 

Collins  does  not  show  the  influence  of  Locke  any- 
where in  his  Discourse  on  Freethinking.  He  mentions 
his  name  in  a list  of  great  men  whom  he  calls  freethinkers, 
Erasmus,  Descartes,  Grotius,  Hooker,  Chillingworth, 
Faulkland,  Herbert,  Hales,  Milton,  Whichcote,  Cudworth, 
More,  Temple,  and  Locke.  Just  a few  pages  before  he 
had  referred  to  Tillotson,  “whom  all  English  free- 
thinkers own  as  their  head.”  He  also  informs  us  that 
Carrol  had  called  Locke  and  Clarke  atheists.2  In 
another  work  he  quotes  Locke  and  also  refers  to  him  in  a 

1 In  Vindicius  Liberius,  p.  37,  Toland  claims  that  Christianity  Not 
Mysterious  was  read  by  the  Bishop  of  Worcester,  Mr.  Norris,  Dr.  Paine, 
Dr.  Browne,  Dr.  Beverly,  and  others.  ' Some  of  these  said  it  used  unusual 
language,  others  that  it  favored  Socinianism,  “and  a very  few  charged  it 
with  principles  tending  to  Deism.” 

Toland  seems  to  be  anxious  to  be  considered  orthodox  in  his  religious 
views.  He  objects  very  vigorously  to  being  called  a Socinian  or  a Deist 
( Vindicius  Liberius,  p.  150;  Nazarenus,  p.  xxiii). 

2 A Discourse  of  Freethinking,  pp.  85,  171,  177. 


160  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

marginal  note;  but  neither  passage  is  important.1 
There  is  no  evidence  that  Locke  influenced  Collins  to  any 
appreciable  extent. 

That  Locke  was  called  a freethinker  by  Collins  is  not 
significant  for  the  determination  of  Locke’s  relation  to 
Deism.  Though  the  name  “freethinker”  was  often 
used  at  this  time,  more  especially  after  Collins  wrote  his 
book,  as  synonymous  with  Deist,  it  also  had  a broader 
meaning  and  was  claimed  by  some  of  the  orthodox 
theologians.  In  1715  certain  anti-deistic  clergymen 
began  the  publication  of  the  Freethinker.2 

c.  TINDAL 

Tindal’s  Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation  appeared  in 
1730,  and  in  three  years  passed  through  four  editions; 
it  was  translated  into  German  in  1741.  It  was  at  once 
recognized  as  a standard  work  of  Deism  and  was  known 
as  the  “Deists’  Bible.”  Probably  no  other  work  is 
more  representative  of  the  movement.3 

Tindal  makes  frequent  use  of  the  books  of  other 
writers  on  religious  subjects,  not  only  of  those  whom  we 
associate  closely  with  the  Deists,  such  as  Tillotson,  whom 
he  quotes  at  least  a dozen  times,  and  Burnet,  to  whom 
he  frequently  refers,  but  also  of  the  more  orthodox 
theologians,  such  as  Scot,  whom  he  quotes  thirteen  times, 
Prideaux,  Nye,  Taylor,  Chillingworth,  Sherlock,  and 
Clarke.  If  we  could  determine  affinity  and  dependence 
by  a statistical  survey  of  men  quoted,  we  would  conclude 
that  Scot,  Tillotson,  Burnet,  and  Clarke  were  more 

1 An  Enquiry  ConcerningHuman  Liberty  (London,  i73S),pp.  32  ff.,  77. 

2 Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  art.  “Deism.” 

3 Lechler,  Geschiclite  des  englischen  Deismus,  p.  327. 


Direct  Evidence 


161 


responsible  for  shaping  Tindal’s  radical  views  than 
Blount  or  Toland  or  Collins.  He  was  probably  making 
out  the  best  case  possible  for  his  radical  views  from 
the  writers  who  were  considered  good  churchmen. 

It  is  very  significant  that,  in  establishing  the  legis- 
lative authority  of  natural  religion,  he  makes  no  use  of 
Locke’s  philosophy.  However  there  are  several  pas- 
sages which  might  be  used  to  show  some  dependence  of 
Tindal  on  Locke.  He  quoted  Locke  just  five  times  in 
his  entire  book;  three  of  these  passages  are  unimportant. 
On  page  301  there  is  a marginal  reference  to  Locke  which 
has  no  significance.  And  there  is  a long  quotation  on 
page  235  from  the  Essay  which  emphasizes  reason  as  the 
means  that  men  have  for  distinguishing  between  true 
religion  and  superstition.  In  this  same  argument  he 
uses  passages  from  Chillingworth,  Taylor,  Chandler, 
and  others.  Certainly  all  the  progressive  thinkers  and 
probably  many  of  the  very  orthodox  clergy  would  find 
nothing  objectionable  in  the  position  here  set  forth. 

On  page  294  Tindal  has  a long  quotation  from  the 
Essay  (IV,  xvi,  10)  on  the  rules  governing  the  value  of 
testimony  when  it  has  been  repeated.  This  supports  the 
deistic  contention,  which  began  in  Herbert,  that,  since 
our  knowledge  of  revelation  comes  to  us  through  tradi- 
tion, it  is  of  necessity  not  authoritative;  revelation  is 
authoritative  as  revelation  only  to  the  one  who  first 
receives  it.  Locke  is  discussing  the  degrees  of  assent 
and  cites  a well-known  “rule  observed  in  the  law  of 
England.”  Tindal  takes  this  statement  of  the  principle 
of  law  as  made  by  Locke  and  makes  a special  application 
of  it  to  the  advantage  of  the  religion  of  reason — an 
application  which  Locke  did  not  make,  which  is  contrary 


162  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

to  Locke’s  views  concerning  revelation,  and  which  could 
have  been  made  just  as  well  by  simply  citing  the  recog- 
nized practice  of  the  courts  without  mentioning  Locke. 
Assuming  that  there  is  no  contradictory  evidence,  and 
we  have  seen  that  there  is  such  evidence,  this  passage 
would  have  no  value  as  proof  of  the  dependence  of 
Tindal  on  Locke. 

Coming  to  the  two  important  passages  from  Locke, 
we  find  that  Tindal,  in  arguing  against  certain  positions 
of  Clarke,  dissents  from  Clarke’s  doctrine  that  natural 
light  cannot  reveal  to  man  that  the  sinner  has  forgiveness, 
and  against  this  he  quotes,  on  page  391,  the  teaching  of 
Nye  and  Locke,1  who  are  convinced  that  by  the  light  of 
reason  man  can  know  God  as  good  and  merciful  and 
forgiving.  The  point  at  issue  is  not  whether  we  can 
know  God  by  reason,  but  whether  we  can  know  enough 
about  Him  to  be  sure  that  He  is  merciful.  Clarke  said 
we  could  not;  Nye,  Locke,  and  Tindal  said  we  could.2 
The  teaching  is  not  characteristic  of  Deism.  All  those 
who  held  that  the  gospel  is  a republication  of  the  pure, 
original  religion,  which  was  as  old  as  creation,  would  not 
hesitate  to  assert  it.3  Though  it  was  a liberal  view,  it 
was  held  by  some  rationalistic  clergymen,  who  were 
generally  considered  orthodox.  There  is  no  proof  here 
of  the  responsibility  of  Locke  for  Tindal’s  doctrine. 

But  the  quotation  from  Locke’s  Discourse  on  Miracles, 
which  was  published  posthumously,  seems  to  be  clearly 

1 Locke,  Works,  VII,  133. 

2 Whatever  Nye  was,  he  was  not  a Deist.  Wallace  in  Anti  trinitarian 
Biography  (London,  1850),  I,  331,  exonerates  Nye  from  the  author- 
ship of  a Unitarian  tract  that  had  been  credited  to  him. 

3 Sherlock,  Discourses  Preached  on  Several  Occasions,  V,  138. 


Direct  Evidence 


163 


deistic.  It  has  been  considered  already  in  the  study  of 
Locke’s  attitude  toward  natural  religion  in  the  fifth 
chapter.  Tindal  is  arguing  that  to  magnify  revelation 
is  to  weaken  the  force  of  the  religion  of  reason,  and  to 
strike  at  all  religion.  In  doing  this  he  claims  that  even 
the  Scriptures  assume  that  man  is  an  intelligent  being, 
capable  of  knowing  good  from  evil,  and  religion  from 
superstition.  And  in  support  of  this  he  quotes  from 
Locke’s  Discourse  on  Miracles: 

That  no  mission  can  be  looked  upon  to  be  divine,  that  delivers 
anything  derogating  from  the  honour  of  the  one,  only,  true, 
invisible  God,  or  inconsistent  with  natural  religion  and  the  rules 
of  morality;  because  God  having  discovered  to  men  that  unity 
and  majesty  of  his  eternal  godhead,  and  the  truths  of  natural 
religion  and  morality  by  the  light  of  reason,  he  cannot  be  supposed 
to  back  the  contrary  by  revelation;  for  that  would  be  to  destroy 
the  evidence  and  the  use  of  reason,  without  which  men  cannot  be 
able  to  distinguish  divine  revelation  from  diabolical  imposture.1 

Tindal  believed  that  this  passage  teaches,  (1)  that 
no  mission  or  revelation  is  true  that  admits  of  more  than 
one  God;  (2)  that  men  by  reason  know  wherein  honor  of 
God  consists;  (3)  that  they  must  know  by  the  light  of 
reason  what  are  the  truths  of  natural  religion  and  rules 
of  morality. 

This  passage  from  Locke  may  be  understood  as 
teaching  that  natural  religion  is  the  supreme  legislator 
for  all  religions,  which  is  a characteristic  deistic  doctrine. 
This  does  not  fit  in  with  what  Locke  has  said  elsewhere, 
as  was  shown  in  the  study  of  his  views  of  natural  religion 
But  Tindal  does  not  give  it  this  radical  interpretation, 
and  it  can  be  read,  as  we  saw,  in  a way  that  is  consistent 


1 Locke,  Works,  IX,  261. 


164  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

with  Locke’s  general  position.  He  insisted  that  the 
natural  light  of  reason  is  supplemented  by  revelation. 
Perhaps  theoretically  reason  can  know  God  and  all 
morality,  but  actually  it  fell  short  and  revelation  was 
necessary.  As  was  observed  above,  we  may  conclude 
from  this  passage  that  reason  and  the  religion  of  reason 
or  natural  religion,  so  far  as  it  goes,  cannot  be  con- 
tradicted by  other  revelation.  To  this  extent  it  may  be 
considered  to  have  a legislative  authority  over  revela- 
tion; but  one  cannot  conclude  anything  concerning  the 
adequacy  of  natural  religion,  which  Tindal  and  the 
typical  Deists  assert  and  Locke  denies.  Without 
twisting  the  sense,  this  passage,  which  Locke  himself 
never  published,  can  be  understood  in  a way  that  is  in 
harmony  with  the  explicit  statements  that  Locke 
published  concerning  natural  religion.  It  is  not  an 
argument  for  the  deistic  position  of  Locke,  and  Tindal 
did  not  use  it  as  such.  There  is  also  no  reason  for  assum- 
ing that  it  influenced  his  general  view. 

There  is  no  other  evidence,  so  far  as  the  writer  knows, 
that  would  suggest  the  dependence  of  Tindal  on  Locke. 
These  passages  show  that  Tindal  in  proving  certain  of 
his  theses  used  passages  from  the  writings  of  Locke. 
Even  if  there  were  no  evidence  to  the  contrary,  and  in 
the  preceding  chapters  we  have  seen  that  there  is  much, 
to  conclude  on  the  bases  of  these  passages  that  there  was 
dependence  would  be  to  rest  an  important  hypothesis 
on  a very  small  and  uncertain  foundation.  If  Tindal’s 
views  were  borrowed,  the  number  and  the  character  of 
the  quotations  from  Tillotson,  Sherlock,  Scot,  and  others 
would  suggest  them  as  the  sources  of  his  system.  We 
can  co-ordinate  a larger  number  of  facts,  and  can  bring 


Direct  Evidence 


165 

them  together  with  a smaller  remainder,  if  we  assume 
that  the  author  of  the  Deists’  Bible  simply  accepted  the 
rationalistic  and  critical  way  of  approaching  religious 
problems,  which  was  used  by  all  progressive  thinkers, 
including  Locke,  and  applied  it  more  radically  than  some 
others. 

D.  WOLLASTON 

In  the  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,  Wollaston  makes 
no  use  of  Locke’s  philosophy,  nor  of  any  writing  of  his. 
Perhaps  Locke’s  insistence  upon  the  supernatural  and 
the  inadequacy  of  that  which  is  purely  ethical  was  so 
far  out  of  harmony  with  the  central  thesis  of  Wollaston 
that  he  recognized  in  Locke  another  spirit,  so  different 
that  he  did  not  care  to  use  any  part  of  his  system. 

E.  BOLINGBROKE 

Bacon  is  the  philosopher  whom  Bolingbroke  praises 
most,  and  Locke  is  the  one  whom  he  criticizes  most.  It 
is  “our  Verulam,”  “My  Lord  Bacon,”  “the  herald  of  a 
new  period,”  “astounding  genius,”  before  whose  time 
the  foundations  were  ill  laid,  but  he  laid  them  on  the  rock 
of  nature  and  truth.1 

He  appreciates  Locke  as  an  empirical  philosopher, 
who  uses  the  psychological  method.  It  is  evident  that 
he  considered  him  one  of  the  greatest  thinkers  of  the  age, 
greater  than  Descartes  or  Gassendi;  the  only  person  to 
be  compared  with  him  is  Bacon.2 

1 Bolingbroke,  Works,  VI,  155,  156,  404;  VII,  243,  406. 

2 “The  first  steps  toward  a right  conduct  of  the  understanding 
. . . . are  an  accurate  analysis  of  the  mind,  a careful  review  of  the 


intellectual  faculties  ....  and  an  attentive  observation  of  the  whole 
intellectual  procedure When  this  is  well  and  truly  done  by  any 


writer,  the  reader  will  feel  consciously  that  it  is  so;  for  he  will  perceive 


i66 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


But  when  we  come  to  religious  problems,  which  are 
the  issues  that  concern  Deism,  he  dissents  from  Locke 
practically  every  time  that  he  mentions  him,  and  his 
criticism  is  often  severe.  Locke  is  glaringly  incon- 
sistent when  he  argues  in  the  Reasonableness  of  Christian- 
ity and  in  his  commentaries  on  Paul’s  Epistle  that  there 
are  degrees  of  historical  probability.  It  does  not  fit  in 
with  what  he  said  concerning  error  that  attends  the  use 
of  words.  Locke  is  also  inconsistent  in  asserting  that 
the  heathen  did  not  know  the  one  true  God,  though  the 
works  of  nature  were  sufficient  proof  of  Him.* 1  He 
dissents  from  Locke’s  view  concerning  the  origin  of 
monotheism,  that  the  Israelites  were  the  only  mono- 
theists among  the  ancients,  and  rejects  his  teaching 
that  mankind  before  Christ  lacked  a clear  knowledge 
of  duty.2 

He  criticizes  Locke’s  doctrine  that  saving  faith  is 
to  believe  that  Jesus  is  the  Messiah.  This  may  be  the 
primary  but  it  is  not  the  sole  object  of  our  faith. 
“There  are  other  things,  doubtless,  contained  in  the 
revelation  he  made  of  himself,  dependent  on  and  relative 
to  this  article,  without  the  belief  of  which,  I suppose,  that 
our  Christianity  would  be  very  defective.” 

Bolingbroke  saw  clearly  that  there  was  a funda- 
mental difference  between  his  view  and  that  of  Locke 


the  phenomena  of  his  own  mind  to  be  such  as  they  are  represented,  and 
he  will  recollect  that  the  same  things  have  passed  there,  though  he  has 
not  always,  or  at  all  observed  them.  This  happens  to  me  when  I read 
the  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding.  I am  led  as  it  were,  through 
a course  of  experimental  philosophy”  {Works,  VII,  603;  see  also  VI, 
162,  163). 

1 Works,  VI,  188. 


2 Ibid.,  pp.  187,  192,  218. 


Direct  Evidence 


167 


concerning  man’s  native  capacity.  Locke  “ asserts  the 
insufficiency  of  human  reason,  unassisted  by  revelation, 
in  its  great  and  proper  business  of  morality.  Human 
reason  never  made  out  an  entire  body  of  the  laws  of 
nature  from  unquestionable  principles,  or  by  clear 
deduction.  Scattered  sayings — incoherent  apothegms 
of  philosophers  and  wise  men — could  never  rise  to  the 
force  of  a law.”  When  Locke  contrasts  the  supposed 
imperfect  knowledge  of  the  religion  of  nature,  which 
the  heathen  had,  with  “the  supposed  perfect  knowledge, 
which  is  communicated  in  the  Gospel,  what  he  advances 
stands  in  direct  contradiction  to  truth.”1  Perhaps 
Bolingbroke  understood  Locke’s  attitude  toward  natural 
religion  better  than  some  of  Locke’s  modern  readers. 
He  saw  that  Locke  emphasized  the  limitations  of  reason 
in  a way  that  he  could  not  approve.  Locke  pointed  out 
the  imperfections  of  natural  religion  and  the  necessity 
of  revelation,  while  Bolingbroke  laid  stress  upon  the 
sufficiency  and  perfection  of  natural  religion,  and  its 
normative  authority  for  all  religion.  They  represented 
two  different  tendencies  in  the  religious  thought  of  the 
age,  and  Bolingbroke  knew  it. 

R.  MORGAN 

Morgan  professes  himself  to  be  a disciple  of  Locke, 
though  he  seldom  mentions  him,  and  disagreed  with 
him  on  important  points;  but  Morgan,  like  Wollaston 
and  unlike  Tindal,  makes  little  use  of  what  others  have 
said.  After  investigating  and  rejecting  Locke’s  teaching 
concerning  innate  ideas,  he  praises  his  greatness  and 
adds:  “in  almost  everything  else,  I must  own  Mr.  Locke 

1 Ibid.,  pp.  327  ff.,  351  ft. 


1 68  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

as  my  master,  and  the  first  guide  and  director  of  my 
understanding.”1  Yet,  with  the  exception  of  one 
passage,  this  is  the  only  evidence  of  Locke’s  influence 
upon  him.  He  refers  to  complex  ideas  in  almost  the 
words  of  Locke;  it  is  clear  that  he  had  the  discussion  of 
the  Essay  in  mind.  But  he  at  once  passes  on  without 
making  any  special  use  of  Locke’s  teachings.2 

He  dissents  from  the  main  thesis  of  the  Reasonable- 
ness of  Christianity: 

Mr.  Locke  in  his  Reasonableness  of  Christianity  has  proved  that 
the  one  single  point  as  a matter  of  faith  which  the  apostles  preached 
in  and  about  Judea,  after  the  resurrection,  was  this,  that  Jesus 
was  the  Messiah,  according  to  the  prophets;  and,  I think,  I have 
proved  that  our  Jesus,  or  the  true  Christian  Messiah,  and  Saviour 
of  the  world,  never  claimed  that  grand  essential  character,  of  being 
the  temporal  restorer  and  deliverer  of  the  nation,  and  that  he 
never  promised  any  such  thing  to  bring  it  about,  either  then,  or 
at  any  other  time. 

Morgan  and  Locke  understood  the  Jewish  Messianic 
expectation  in  different  ways;  Locke  interpretes  it 
after  the  traditional  manner — the  anticipated  deliverer 
is  Christ  the  Redeemer,  the  spiritual  leader  of  the  whole 
race,  who  was  sent  by  God;  Morgan  understood  the 
expectation  of  Israel  to  point  to  a temporal  restorer  and 
deliverer  and  not  to  the  “true  Christian  Messiah  and 
Saviour  of  the  world.”  Probably  this  difference  between 
Locke  and  Morgan  is  accounted  for  by  the  difference 
between  the  Lockian  and  deistic  views  of  prophecy.3 

1 Physic o-Theology,  pp.  73,  74. 

2 Ibid.,  174  ff. 

3 A.  Morgan,  Letter  to  Eusebius,  in  The  Moral  Philosopher,  II,  57. 
Locke  is  also  mentioned  on  p.  141  to  illustrate  a point,  but  it  is  without 
significance;  he  could  have  used  any  other  name  just  as  well. 


Direct  Evidence 


169 

The  references  that  Morgan  makes  to  Locke  show 
that  he  knew  him  and  esteemed  him  highly,  but  they 
do  not  prove  that  he  is  dependent  on  Locke  in  any 
matters  of  importance.  In  spite  of  his  owning  Locke  as 
his  master  and  guide  and  director  of  his  understanding, 
he  does  not  use  his  writings.  A study  of  Morgan’s  book 
would  never  suggest  that  he  sat  at  the  feet  of  Locke. 
Any  theory  that  might  be  offered  to  account  for  this 
difference  between  Morgan’s  professed  dependence  on 
Locke  and  the  practical  ignoring  of  Locke  that  we  find 
in  his  works  would  be  very  uncertain;  Morgan’s  books 
give  us  no  clue.  It  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  he 
recognized  that  there  was  an  essential  difference  between 
them,  as  did  Bolingbroke. 

Woolston  and  Chubb  give  no  evidence  that  they  were 
even  acquainted  with  Locke’s  writings. 

4.  CONCLUSION 

The  above  is  a complete  survey  of  the  direct  internal 
evidence  of  the  dependence  of  the  Deists  on  Locke. 
With  the  exception  of  Toland  and  Tindal,  the  references 
to  Locke  in  deistic  literature  are  without  significance. 
Wollaston,  Woolston,  and  Chubb  do  not  use  his  writings 
and  do  not  refer  to  him.  In  Toland  we  have  more 
evidence  of  Locke’s  responsibility  for  the  deistic  opinions 
than  in  any  other  deistic  writer.  But  here  it  concerns 
only  the  philosophical  background  of  his  religious 
speculation,  which  plays  a very  unimportant  part  in  the 
development  of  the  thesis  that  he  is  seeking  to  establish. 
There  is  no  evidence  that  the  theological  writings  of 
Locke  influenced  Toland  in  any  way,  and  later  in  life  he 
seems  to  emphasize  his  departure  from  Locke.  Collins, 


170  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

though  as  a young  man  he  stood  in  closer  personal 
relation  to  Locke  than  any  other  Deist,  gives  no  evidence 
of  having  been  influenced  by  him.  Tindal  quoted  Locke 
several  times  in  support  of  certain  theses  that  he  sought 
to  establish,  but  none  of  these  passages  are  important 
in  his  philosophy  of  religion.  If  we  were  to  establish 
Tindal’s  dependence  on  others  by  direct  internal  proofs, 
the  evidence  would  point  to  Tillotson  and  Scot.  There 
is  no  reason  why  Locke  should  be  held  responsible  for 
the  Deists’  Bible,  and,  as  we  saw  in  earlier  chapters, 
there  are  good  reasons  why  we  should  think  that  he  is  not 
responsible  for  it.  Bolingbroke  appreciates  Locke’s 
importance  as  a philosopher,  but  he  also  saw  clearly  that 
between  him  and  the  author  of  the  Essay  there  was  a 
fundamental  difference,  which  was  shown  in  his  per- 
sistent polemic  against  Locke’s  views  on  religious 
problems.  And  Morgan,  though  he  claimed  to  be  a 
disciple  of  Locke  in  most  everything  save  the  doctrine 
of  innate  ideas,  shows  no  evidence  of  it  in  his  books. 

The  internal  evidence  shows  that  Locke’s  influence 
on  the  deistic  movement,  when  it  was  at  its  height,  was 
small,  that  it  was  greatest  in  Toland  and  either  negligible 
or  without  significance  in  the  writings  of  Wollaston, 
Tindal,  and  Morgan,  who  wrote  the  most  important  and 
most  characteristic  deistic  books.  As  the  movement 
advanced,  it  seemed  to  get  farther  away  from  Locke,  and 
either  ignored  him  or  assumed  a critical  attitude  toward 
him,  more  especially  toward  his  religious  views. 

When  it  is  recalled  that  at  this  time  Locke  was  the 
most  important  English  philosopher,  and  that  he  exerted 
a molding  influence  in  other  fields,  the  Deists’  inde- 
pendence of  him  becomes  a problem.  It  is  so  contrary 


Direct  Evidence 


171 

to  what  we  would  naturally  expect  that  it  challenges  us 
to  seek  an  explanation.  Probably  Bolingbroke  suggests 
the  reason  when  he  criticizes  Locke  for  asserting  the 
insufficiency  of  human  reason  in  its  great  and  proper 
business  of  morality,  and  the  imperfect  knowledge  of  the 
religion  of  nature,  which  the  heathen  had,  when  com- 
pared with  the  perfect  knowledge,  which  we  have  in  the 
gospel.  When  Locke  makes  this  contrast  between 
natural  and  revealed  religion,  to  the  disparagement  of 
the  former,  “what  he  advances  stands  in  direct  con- 
tradiction to  truth.”  As  has  been  shown,  both  Locke 
and  the  Deists  were  rationalistic,  but  Locke  emphasized 
the  limits  of  reason  and  the  necessity  of  a supernatural 
revelation,  while  the  Deists  emphasized  the  sufficiency 
of  reason  in  morals  and  religion  and  its  normative 
authority  over  revelation.  We  know  that  Bolingbroke 
understood  the  significance  of  the  difference  between  him 
and  Locke;  it  is  probable  that  Wollaston  and  Tindal 
understood  it  also,  and  that  this  accounts  for  their 
indifferent  attitude  toward  him.  Had  they  considered 
Locke  a supporter  of  their  views,  Wollaston,  who  seldom 
quoted  from  other  writers,  might  have  been  silent,  but 
Tindal  would  have  paraded  it  in  his  book.  Locke  and 
the  Deists  differed  radically;  and  the  Deists  knew  it. 


CHAPTER  VII 


CONCLUSION 

The  nature  of  this  problem  called  for  a study  of  the 
relation  of  Locke  and  Deism  on  the  background  of  the 
speculation  of  that  period.  This  study  has  been 
completed.  We  shall  now  bring  together  the  results, 
define  and  compare  Locke’s  religious  opinions  with  those 
of  the  Deists,  and  test  the  several  possible  theories 
concerning  the  relation  of  Locke  and  Deism  by  the 
relative  facts  that  have  been  gathered. 

I.  RESUME 

We  saw  in  the  fourth  chapter  that  the  age  was 
dominated  by  two  focal  concepts,  nature  and  reason. 
These  were  the  two  distinguishable  but  inseparable 
poles  of  liberal  speculation.  In  order  to  be  adequately 
grounded,  institutions  and  principles  must  be  both 
natural  and  reasonable. 

Just  as  the  idea  of  development  dominates  speculative 
thinking  today,  so  the  leaders  of  English  thought  three 
hundred  years  ago  undertook  to  account  for  all  institu- 
tions and  principles  by  nature.  It  determines  the 
character  of  things  and  gives  them  authority.  In  this 
all  progressive  thinkers  agreed — the  liberal  theologians, 
the  philosophers,  including  the  Cambridge  Platonists 
and  Locke,  and  the  Deists.  As  an  ultimate  concept 
for  grounding  things  it  characterized  the  whole  age. 


1 72 


Conclusion 


i73 


When  we  ask  what  is  meant  by  nature,  opinions  differ 
widely,  and  there  is  confusion.  We  can,  however, 
bring  the  various  conceptions  into  two  general  groups. 
We  found  that  the  liberal  theologians,  Locke  and  the 
Deists,  regarded  nature  as  the  fixed  world  or  world- 
order,  made  by  God  and  revealing  Him  and  His  will,  and 
that  the  Cambridge  Platonists  tended  to  conceive  nature 
as  a fixed  and  immutable  order  more  or  less  independent 
of  God.  Generally  speaking  Locke  and  the  Deists  agree 
in  their  way  of  thinking  of  nature  and  stand  in  the  line 
which  comes  down  from  Hooker;  Chubb  is  the  only  clear 
exception  to  this;  Morgan  and  Bolingbroke  speak  in 
uncertain  terms. 

Furthermore,  all  liberal  thinkers  agreed  in  the 
demand  that  everything,  including  religion,  should  be 
reasonable.  There  was  an  increasing  conviction  that 
authority  was  an  inadequate  foundation  for  the  faith  of 
rational  beings.  If  religion  is  true,  it  must  vindicate 
itself  before  the  court  of  reason.  No  one  dissented  from 
this  thesis;  practically  everybody  accepted  the  rational- 
istic way  of  looking  at  things.  But  there  was  wide 
divergence  in  the  way  this  principle  was  applied,  with 
consequent  variations  in  results.  Most  writers  on 
religious  problems  were  content  to  use  the  scholastic 
formula,  that  revelation  could  give  us  that  which  was 
above  reason  but  not  that  which  was  contrary  to  it. 
The  liberal  theologians,  the  Cambridge  Platonists, 
Locke,  and  several  of  the  early  Deists  held  this  view. 
But  those  Deists  who  represented  the  movement  when  it 
was  at  its  height  asserted  that,  if  there  was  such  a thing 
as  revelation,  it  could  not  give  us  anything  above 
reason.  They  tended  to  become  more  and  more  hostile 


174  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

to  positive  Christianity.  All  parties  were  rationalistic; 
but  the  Deists  were  more  radical  in  their  application  of 
the  rationalistic  principle. 

Passing  to  the  study  of  the  difference  between  Locke 
and  the  Deists  on  disputed  points,  which  constituted 
the  fifth  chapter,  we  found  that  nobody  questioned  the 
existence  of  God,  but  that  there  was  some  difference  as 
to  how  it  was  proved.  Locke  considered  the  cos- 
mological proof  a demonstration,  criticized  the  ontologi- 
cal proof,  and  probably  ignored  the  teleological  proof; 
while  the  Deists,  though  they  paid  little  attention  to 
proving  God’s  existence,  at  first  taught  that  we  have 
innate  ideas  of  God,  but  this  doctrine  was  given  up  later, 
and  when  the  movement  was  most  influential  they 
emphasized  the  teleological  proof  and  practically  ignored 
the  cosmological  proof.  Locke  and  the  Deists  proved 
the  existence  of  God  in  different  ways. 

There  were  also  found  unexpected  agreements  and 
some  differences  in  the  way  God’s  relation  to  the  world 
was  conceived.  Locke  and  all  of  the  leading  Deists 
accepted  the  doctrine  of  Providence  in  the  traditional 
sense,  though  it  was  rejected  by  some  unnamed  writers, 
whom  we  know  through  the  criticisms  that  were  directed 
against  them,  and  who  were  called  Deists.  Locke  and 
all,  or  almost  all,  of  the  Deists  accepted  miracles  as 
historical  facts.  But  generally  the  deistic  attitude 
toward  miracles  was  hostile;  they  challenged  certain 
biblical  accounts  of  miraculous  events  and  explained 
others  away.  Locke  nowhere  shows  the  skeptical  atti- 
tude toward  miracles  that  characterized  the  Deists.  He 
accepted  and  emphasized  repeatedly  the  importance  of 
miracles  as  evidence  of  revelation,  which  was  the  pre- 


Conclusion 


175 


vailing  view  of  the  time.  The  Deists,  with  the  exception 
of  Toland  and  Bolingbroke,  denied  all  evidential  value 
to  miracles,  and  frequently  emphasized  and  gave  reason 
for  this  denial.  This  view  characterized  Deism;  it  was 
a radical  departure  from  the  views  that  were  generally 
accepted,  which  were  held  by  Locke. 

Perhaps  no  points  of  dispute  in  the  deistic  contro- 
versy were  more  significant  than  the  place  and  authority 
of  revelation  and  of  natural  religion.  Locke  accepted 
supernatural  revelation,  which  he  identified  with  the 
Bible,  and  its  authority,  on  rational  grounds,  as  did 
practically  all  other  progressive  thinkers.  It  supple- 
ments reason  with  that  which  is  above  it,  but  not 
contrary  to  it,  which  unaided  reason  could  not  attain. 
He  also  recognized  fulfilled  prophecy  as  a proof  of  revela- 
tion. The  Deists,  with  some  reservations,  accepted 
revelation  as  a fact,  but  they  did  not  identify  it  with  the 
Bible,  and  insisted,  as  a rule,  that  it  could  not  supple- 
ment reason,  and  some  believed  that  it  was  superfluous. 
All  Deists  except  Woolston  deny  that  prophecy  has 
any  evidential  value.  Though  they  did  not  deny 
revelation,  their  attitude  toward  it  was  more  and  more 
skeptical  as  the  movement  advanced;  at  last  they 
reduced  the  supernatural  almost  to  the  vanishing-point. 

All  the  liberal  writers  that  have  been  studied  recog- 
nize the  importance  of  natural  religion;  but  all  save 
the  Deists  emphasize  its  limitations  and  insufficiency. 
They  sought  to  show  that  it  must  be  supplemented  by 
revelation;  they  denied  to  it  all  legislative  authority 
over  against  revealed  religion.  But  the  Deists  emphasize 
the  limitations  of  revealed  religion  and  the  importance 
and  normative  authority  of  natural  religion. 


176  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

There  was  also  a difference  between  Locke  and  the 
Deists  in  defining  religion.  The  legalistic  way  of  con- 
ceiving religion  prevailed  in  England  at  that  time.  But 
this,  when  joined  to  the  more  radical  rationalism  of  the 
deistic  movement,  resulted  in  defining  religion  almost 
wholly  in  terms  of  morality.  Locke  in  his  definition  of 
religion  did  not  neglect  the  ethical  side,  but  he  empha- 
sized the  supernatural  factors  more  than  the  Deists. 

It  was  also  shown  that  all  progressive  thinkers 
advocated  toleration.  This  was  a subject  that  was 
debated  between  them  and  the  defenders  of  rigid  con- 
formity. It  is  really  not  a part  of  the  deistic  controversy. 

2.  DEFINITION  AND  COMPARISON  OP  LOCKE’S  RELIGIOUS 
OPINIONS  AND  DEISM 

In  summing  up  the  results  of  this  study  we  have 
really  defined  Locke’s  philosophy  of  religion  and  Deism. 
By  taking  into  consideration  the  speculations  of  others, 
we  have  found  that  some  very  prominent  elements 
common  to  both  Locke  and  Deism  are  not  characteristic 
features,  but  that  they  mark  out  and  characterize  the 
age  rather  than  any  particular  writer  or  movement  of 
the  age. 

Both  Locke  and  the  Deists  were  rationalistic  and 
critical  in  their  method  of  treating  religious  problems; 
both  appealed  to  reason  as  over  against  authority.  But 
Locke  was  conservative  and  the  Deists  were  radical. 
He  and  all  other  liberal  thinkers  except  the  Deists 
emphasized  the  authority  of  an  externally  given  revela- 
tion. He  is  reverential  in  his  attitude  toward  old 
beliefs,  and  uses  his  rationalistic  method  to  establish  the 
traditional  supernatural  sanctions,  as  do  the  other 


Conclusion 


177 


progressive  thinkers;  the  Deists  are  hostilely  critical 
toward  old  beliefs,  and  apply  their  rationalistic  method  to 
discredit  the  traditional  supernatural  sanctions  in  the 
interests  of  establishing  the  sole  normative  authority  of 
natural  religion.  Both  Locke  and  the  Deists  recognize 
the  importance  of  natural  religion.  Locke  insisted  that 
it  was  insufficient  and  must  be  supplemented  by  revela- 
tion; the  Deists  held  that  it  was  sufficient  and  normative 
for  revelation  and  all  religion. 

The  resemblances  are  in  the  principles  which  shape 
their  thinking,  which  were  rationalistic  and  critical,  and 
were  common  to  the  whole  progressive  movement;  the 
differences  are  in  the  way  these  principles  were  applied 
and  in  the  consequent  results. 

These  differences  were  recognized  at  that  time.  Not 
even  Locke’s  severest  critics  classed  him  among  the 
Deists;  and  Leland,  the  persistent  foe  of  Deism,  writing 
only  half  a century  after  Locke’s  death,  recognized 
Locke  as  differing  from  and  separate  from  the  deistic 
movement.1  Bolingbroke  was  aware  of  an  irreconcilable 
difference  between  his  views  and  those  of  Locke,  and 
probably  Tindal  was  also.  And  Locke  in  the  Reason- 
ableness of  Christianity  classes  himself  as  differing  from 
the  Deists  and  among  their  critics,  for  against  such  was 
the  book  written.2 

'John  Leland,  The  Principal  Deistical  Writers  (London  1754),  I, 
51  JfL,  380. 

2 There  has  been  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  whether  Shaftes- 
bury should  be  classed  as  a Deist.  We  are  now  in  a position  to  deter- 
mine where  he  belongs.  He  accepted  revelation  and  inspiration  as  facts 
and  expressly  dissents  from  the  deistic  attitude  toward  revelation 
{Characteristics  [1732],  I,  53;  II,  210;  III,  74).  He  would  not  exalt 
reason  above  faith  nor  dare  to  oppose  the  sacred  histories  of  religion 


1 78 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


3.  THEORIES  TESTED  BY  FACTS 

The  data  from  which  we  are  to  form  a theory  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  relation  that  exists  between  Locke  and 
English  Deism  have  been  collected  and  critically 
reviewed.  The  problem  now  is  to  devise  a statement  of 
this  relation  that  will  fit  the  facts,  that  will  enable  us  to 
co-ordinate  our  historical  data  with  the  least  remainder. 

The  possible  theories  that  might  be  formulated  for 
setting  forth  this  relation  between  Locke  and  English 
Deism  were  set  forth  in  the  closing  section  of  the  first 
chapter.  We  are  now  in  a position  to  test  them  by 
facts. 

a)  It  may  be  that  the  relation  that  exists  between 
Locke  and  English  Deism  is  causal,  that  the  one  in  large 

(II,  207).  In  a striking  passage  he  asserts  his  orthodoxy  (III,  3x5,  316). 
“In  the  first  place,  it  will  appear,  that  through  a profound  respect,  and 
religious  veneration,  we  have  foreborne  so  much  as  to  name  any  of  the 
sacred  and  solemn  mysteries  of  revelation.  And,  in  the  next  place,  as 
we  can  with  confidence  declare,  that  we  have  never  in  any  writing, 
public  or  private,  attempted  such  high  researches,  nor  have  ever  in 
practice  acquitted  ourselves  otherwise  than  as  just  Conformists  to  the 
lawful  Church;  so  we  may,  in  a proper  sense,  be  said  faithfully  and 
dutifully  to  embrace  those  holy  mysteries,  even  in  their  minutest  particu- 
lars, and  without  the  least  exception  on  account  of  their  amazing  depth. 
And  though  we  are  sensible  that  it  would  be  no  small  hardship  to  deprive 
of  a liberty  of  examining  and  searching,  with  due  modesty  and  submis- 
sion, into  the  nature  of  those  subjects;  yet  as  for  ourselves,  who  have  not 
the  least  scruple  whatsoever,  we  pray  not  any  such  grace  or  favor  in  our 
behalf:  being  fully  assured  of  our  own  steady  orthodoxy,  resignation,  and 
entire  submission  to  the  truly  Christian  and  Catholick  doctrines  of  our 
Holy  Church,  as  by  Law  established.” 

If  Shaftsbury  had  been  a Deist  he  could  not  have  written  this. 
From  what  we  know  of  his  moral  character  we  are  justified  in  accepting 
his  own  statement. 

Leland,  in  The  Principal  Deistical  Writers  (I,  57  fi.),  classes  Shaftes- 
bury among  the  Deists,  but  he  probably  confuses  Shaftesbury’s 


Conclusion 


179 


degree  accounts  for  the  other.  This  would  readily 
explain  the  likenesses.  But  a causal  relation  may  work 
either  way:  Deism  may  be  responsible  for  Lockian 
thought,  or  Locke  may  be  responsible  for  Deism — the 
“progenitor”  of  the  Deists,  as  Stephen  expressed  it. 

1)  If  Deism  is  responsible  for  Locke,  it  is  the  Deism 
before  Toland,  the  doctrines  of  Herbert  and  of  the 
unnamed  Deist  against  whom  Stillingfleet  wrote,  and 
of  the  writer  of  the  letter  to  Blount  in  the  Oracles  of 
Reason,  and  of  Blount.  The  time  relation  makes  it 
impossible  for  Toland  and  the  later  Deists  to  have 
influenced  him  in  any  way.  Both  Locke  and  the  early 
Deists  were  rationalistic  and  they  emphasize  nature  and 
reason  as  did  many  others;  they  probably  understood 

approval  of  critical  methods  in  the  study  of  Scripture  with  hostility  to 
revelation. 

Tillotson,  Archbishop  of  Canterbury,  who  was  a famous  preacher 
and  a leader  in  the  church,  has  often  been  classed  among  the  Deists. 
Perhaps  more  than  any  other  writer,  outside  of  the  camp  of  the  Deists, 
Tillotson  emphasized  the  importance  of  natural  religion.  He  taught 
that  natural  knowledge  of  God  is  the  foundation  of  all  revelation  and 
that  revelation  must  be  in  harmony  with  natural  religion.  But  he  also 
pointed  out  the  defects  of  natural  religion.  It  does  not  suffice.  “Its 
sanctions  have  proved  ineffective,  and  it  has  therefore  been  supplemented 
by  revelation.  The  function  of  the  latter  is  not  to  destroy  or  correct 

natural  religion,  but  simply  to  make  it  clearer  and  more  effective 

Certain  requirements  are  added  by  revelation,  particularly  that  we 
should  recognize  Christ  as  the  Son  of  God,  worship  God  in  His  name,  and 
receive  the  sacraments,  but  these  are  enjoined  with  the  same  purpose 
of  promoting  virtue.” 

Tillotson  is  evidently  close  to  the  Deists.  But  his  insistence  that 
revelation  supplements  natural  religion,  and  that  prophecy  and  miracles 
are  proofs  of  revelation,  show  that  he  assigned  a much  greater  place  to 
the  supernatural  factors  in  Christianity  than  the  typical  Deists  were 
ready  to  admit.  He  was  probably  one  of  the  most  radical  of  the  super- 
natural rationalists,  but  not  a Deist  (McGiffert,  Protestant  Thought 
before  Kant,  pp.  194  ff.). 


180  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

nature  in  the  same  way.  But  they  differed  as  to  reason. 
Herbert  claimed  that  his  five  universal  articles  of 
natural  religion  or  the  religion  of  reason  were  universal 
because  they  were  innate,  and  Blount  agreed  with  him 
in  this,  which  was  contrary  to  Locke’s  philosophy.  They 
also  differed  radically  in  their  attitude  toward  revelation 
and  Scripture,  and  in  their  view  concerning  the  authority 
of  natural  religion.  As  has  been  shown,  they  agree  in 
those  things  that  characterize  the  age,  they  differ  in  that 
which  distinguishes  Deism.  These  important  differences 
make  this  theory  untenable. 

2)  But  perhaps  the  causal  relation  may  be  found 
to  work  the  other  way;  it  may  be  that  Locke  accounts 
for  Deism.  So  many  important  movements  can  be 
traced  to  Locke  that  it  would  be  natural  for  one,  who 
chances  upon  marked  resemblances  between  Locke  and 
Deism,  to  assume  that  he  shaped  the  movement.  Locke 
was  rationalistic ; so  were  the  Deists;  Locke  emphasized 
natural  religion,  so  did  the  Deists;  and  there  is  internal 
evidence  that  the  later  Deists  used  Locke’s  writings, 
though  in  a way  that  was  not  significant.  But  there 
were  radical  differences  between  Locke  and  Deism.  As 
has  been  shown,  they  agree  in  that  which  characterized 
the  age  and  they  differ  in  that  which  characterized 
Deism;  this  would  suggest  that  they  were  products  of 
the  same  period  but  that  they  developed  differently,  not 
necessarily  that  one  was  the  cause  of  the  other.  If 
Locke  was  the  cause  of  Deism,  there  should  be  conclusive 
evidence  of  the  dependence  of  the  Deists  on  Locke; 
such  evidence  does  not  exist. 

Furthermore,  the  time  factor  makes  it  impossible 
that  Locke  should  account  for  the  deistic  movement.  It 


Conclusion 


181 


began  in  England  with  Herbert,  who  died  in  1648,  and  in 
1678  it  had  become  so  strong  that  Stillingfleet  attacked 
it.  Whoever  the  anonymous  Deist  was,  against  whom 
Stillingfleet  directed  his  polemic,  we  learn  from  the 
quotations  in  his  Letter  to  a Deist  (see  note  3,  p.  107)  and 
from  references  that  he  makes  to  him  that  he  held 
practically  all  of  the  views  that  characterized  the 
writings  of  Wollaston  and  Tindal  and  Morgan.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  letter  to  Blount  in  the  Oracles  of 
Reason.  The  deistic  movement  was  present  in  all  its 
essential  features  before  Locke  could  have  influenced  it. 
Locke  could  not  have  been  the  father  of  Deism. 

b)  The  theories  that  we  have  considered  thus  far 
set  Locke  and  Deism  over  against  each  other  and  treat 
them  in  a more  or  less  complete  mutual  isolation.  It 
may  be  that  this  is  wrong,  that  they  belong  together, 
that  they  form  one  and  the  same  movement,  that 
whatever  else  Locke  was  he  was  one  of  that  group  of 
liberal  thinkers  in  England  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
commonly  known  as  Deists,  who  fostered  free  and  critical 
thinking  in  matters  of  religion.  If  there  are  differences 
between  him  and  Wollaston  or  Tindal  or  Morgan,  these 
are  due  to  the  fact  that  they  represent  a later  and  more 
radical  development  of  the  movement.  Deism  is  but 
Locke’s  philosophy  of  religion  grown  up;  they  took  his 
principles  and  followed  them  to  their  logical  conclusion. 
Thus  all  differences  between  Locke  and  Deism  would  be 
differences  in  the  stage  of  development  along  one  line; 
both  were  rationalists;  the  Deists  were  more  radical  than 
Locke. 

But,  as  has  been  observed,  practically  all  of  the 
characteristic  features  of  Deism  had  been  developed 


182 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


before  Locke.  Stillingfleet’s  unnamed  Deist,  though 
probably  much  less  important,  was  as  much  of  a Deist  as 
the  author  of  “the  Deists’  Bible,”  and  the  same  can  be 
said  of  the  writer  of  the  letter  to  Blount.  But  assuming 
that  there  was  no  time  factor  to  argue  against  this 
theory,  it  would  still  be  clearly  unfair  to  identify  Locke 
with  the  deistic  movement  in  this  way;  for  those  prin- 
ciples of  Locke,  which  the  advocates  of  this  theory  say 
the  Deists  simply  developed  farther,  were  not  peculiar 
to  Locke  but  were  held  by  practically  every  other  repre- 
sentative of  the  liberal  movement.  The  rationalistic 
and  naturalistic  motives  in  the  speculations  of  Locke 
are  not  characteristic  of  him,  they  characterize  the  whole 
liberal  movement.  Even  if  the  deistic  doctrines  are  but 
the  normal  development  of  these  rationalistic  principles, 
it  does  not  argue  that  Locke  is  identified  with  the 
deistic  movement  any  more  than  many  other  liberal 
writers. 

c)  The  theories  that  would  define  the  relation 
between  Locke  and  Deism  as  causal,  or  would  conceive 
them  as  forming  one  movement  and  marking  different 
stages  in  it,  were  rejected  because  they  could  not  provide 
adequately  for  certain  differences  between  Locke  and 
Deism,  and  because  they  fail  to  meet  the  temporal 
conditions.  The  chief  argument  for  them  was  the 
marked  resemblance  between  the  two  systems.  But  as 
has  been  shown,  the  likenesses  between  Locke  and  Deism 
are  no  greater  than  the  likenesses  between  Deism  and 
many  other  liberal  writers  of  this  period;  probably 
Tindal  resembles  Tillotson  and  Sherlock  more  closely 
than  he  resembles  Locke.  The  Deists  and  Locke  agree 
in  their  rationalistic  way  of  looking  at  things,  which 


Conclusion 


183 

characterized  the  whole  liberal  movement,  and  they 
differ  in  that  which  characterized  Deism.  This  suggests 
another  way  of  stating  the  relation  that  exists  between 
them. 

They  are  co-ordinate  parts  of  one  and  the  same 
general  movement.  The  rational  theologians,  the  Cam- 
bridge Platonists,  Locke,  and  the  Deists  constitute  the 
party  of  progress.  They  are  all  rationalistic;  they 
protest  against  scholastic  tradition  and  intolerance  in 
the  name  of  nature  and  reason ; they  face  the  same  foes 
and  use  the  same  weapons.  Locke  and  Deism  would 
then  appear  as  different  manifestations  of  the  same 
spirit  of  the  age,  which  was  seen  also  in  all  other  writers 
of  the  liberal  party.  They  are  distinguishable  parts  of 
one  whole.  Their  common  elements  are  the  character- 
istic marks  of  the  age,  and  their  points  of  divergence  are 
the  characteristic  features  of  the  respective  systems. 
The  resemblances  between  Locke  and  Deism  are  not 
those  of  parent  and  child,  but  rather  those  of  fellow- 
members  of  the  same  family.  They  are  related,  and 
closely  related,  but  their  relation  is  not  causal,  nor  do 
they  mark  different  stages  of  the  same  movement. 

If  we  accept  this  theory,  all  difficulties  with  the  time 
factor  disappear.  If  they  are  co-ordinate  parts  of  the 
larger  liberal  movement,  deistic  views  may  be  held 
before  or  after  or  at  the  same  time  with  Locke.  The 
important  differences  between  Locke  and  the  Deists  are 
provided  for;  they  are  the  characteristic  features  that 
show  that  they  are  different  parts  of  this  one  movement. 
And  the  significant  resemblances,  which  are  common 
to  the  various  parts  of  this  movement,  show  that  in 
certain  fundamental  respects  they  are  one. 


184  John  Locke  and  English  Deism 

If  Deism  is  more  radical  in  its  application  of  the 
rationalistic  principle, it  is  no  more  a further  development 
of  Locke  than  of  the  liberal  theologians.  Possibly 
Locke  influenced  some  of  the  later  Deists,  but  there  is  no 
evidence  that  he  determined  the  movement  to  any 
appreciable  extent;  certainly  he  cannot  be  held  respon- 
sible for  the  radical  spirit  which  is  the  characteristic 
mark  of  Deism. 

If  this  is  a correct  statement  of  the  relation  between 
Locke  and  English  Deism,  the  prevailing  views  are 
wrong;  Locke  cannot  be  the  father  of  the  deistic  move- 
ment, it  cannot  be  merely  a further  development  of  the 
principles  that  he  held,  nor  can  he  be  considered  a part 
of  the  movement.  As  was  set  forth  in  the  second 
chapter,  most  students  of  the  history  of  philosophy 
represent  Locke  and  Deism  as  closely  related  in  one  or 
the  other  of  these  two  ways.  The  special  study  of 
Crous,  which  makes  Locke  a Deist  in  almost  all  essen- 
tials, is  also  wrong.  Crous  misinterpreted  the  points  of 
agreement  and  failed  to  observe  many  points  of  dif- 
ference. The  views  of  von  Hertling  and  McGiffert  and 
perhaps  also  that  of  Windleband  are  not  necessarily 
contradicted  by  the  theory  concerning  the  relation  of 
Locke  and  Deism  which  is  advocated  here.  They  seem 
to  have  grasped  it  partly,  to  have  been  moving  toward 
it,  but  they  did  not  understand  it  fully.  Accordingly, 
this  theory,  which  makes  Locke  and  English  Deism 
co-ordinate  parts  of  the  larger  liberal  movement  of  that 
time,  either  corrects  or  supplements  the  views  that  have 
been  held  hitherto. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abelard,  i 
Absentee  God,  go  £f. 

Academic  freedom,  4 
Albertus  Magnus,  47 
Aquinas,  Thomas,  47,  54 
Atheists,  8,  84,  116,  146,  159 
Augustine,  109 

Bacon,  Francis,  6,  10,  20,  38,  53,  165 
Bacon.  Roger,  3 
Berkeley,  Bishop,  109 
Blount,  5,  25  ff.,  40,  58,  74,  88,  92,  96, 
138,  154,  155,  179  ft'.;  on  revelation, 
106  ft.;  on  prophecy  - 112;  on  natural 
religion,  127  ff. 

Bolingbroke,  61 , 99,  100,  149,  151,  154, 
165  ff.,  170, 173,  175, 177;  on  nature,  60; 
on  reason,  76  ff.;  on  revelation,  109; 
on  prophecy,  113;  on  natural  religion, 

13° 

Boyle,  6,  10,  38,  55,  73,  9°,  93,  95,  nr, 
1 1 2;  on  natural  religion,  121 
Bruno,  2 

Burnet,  58,  96,  160 
Bury.  26 

Butler,  Bishop,  119  ff. 

Cambridge,  7 

Cambridge  Platonism,  8,  10,  15,  23,  28, 
38,  61,  68  ff.,  71,  77,  81,  116,  134,  140, 
142  ff.,  147,  149,  150,  173,  183;  on 
nature,  54  ff.;  on  reason,  68  ff.;  on 
natural  religion,  120  ff. 

Carrol,  159 

Chillingworth,  10,  142,  143,  159,  160;  on 
reason,  66 

Chubb,  27,  41,  93  ff.,  99  ff.,  113,  131,  149, 
154, 169, 173;  on  nature,  61;  on  reason, 
78;  on  revelation,  m 
Clarke,  92,  95,  97,  98,  115,  159,  160,  162 
Collins,  20,  25,  40,  88,  92,  97,  108,  112, 
149,  154,  159,  169  ff.;  on  nature,  58; 
on  reason,  75;  on  natural  religion,  128 
Condillac,  20 
Conservative  party,  39 
Contemporary  thought,  survey  of,  36  ff. 
Cromwell,  10 

Crous,  24  ff.,  137.  146,  150,  184 
Cudworth,  54,  69,  71,  134,  140.  143,  159 
Culverwell,  10,  71;  on  nature,  54;  on 
reason,  69  ff. 


Dante,  2 

Deists,  10,  11,  12,  17  ff.;  on  natural  reli- 
gion, 13 1 ff.;  on  toleration,  148  ff. 
Deist’s  Bible,  160,  165,  170,  182 
Descartes,  7,  88,  159,  165 
Digby,  8 

Dogmatism,  age  of,  5 

Ecclesiastical  authority,  2 
Edwards,  157  ff. 

Enlightenment,  21 

Erasmus,  159 

Essays  and  Reviews,  132 

Faith,  defined  by  Locke,  105 
Falkenberg,  21 
Faulkland,  10,  142,  159 
Fischer,  Kuno,  18,  27 
Fraser,  91  ff.,  156 
Freethinker,  22,  51,  160 

Galileo,  2 
Gassendi,  165 

Genetic  method,  28  ft..  31;  error  of 
G.  M.,  44  ff. 

Gildon,  58 

God,  proof  of  existence  of,  cosmological, 
840.,  89,  90,  174;  ontological,  87,  90, 
174;  teleological,  88,  89  ff.,  174;  from 
innate  ideas,  88,  89,  174 
Grotius,  46,  159 

Hales,  10,  142,  159 
Harvey,  38 
Henry  IV,  1 

Herbert  of  Cherbury,  10,  15,  24,  41,  53, 
57,  74,  88,  96,  138,  140,  148,  153,  159, 
161,  179  ff-;  on  revelation,  106;  on 
natural  religion,  126  ff.,  136;  the  five 
articles  of  religion,  137 
Heresy,  laws  against,  4 
Herding,  von,  23,  28  ff. 

Hildebrand,  Pope,  1 

Hobbes,  10,  20,  24,  38,  46,  53,  54,  67,  88, 
120, 153 
Hoff  ding,  22  ff. 

Hooker,  Richard,  10,  57,  77,  78,  79,  134, 
159-  173;  on  nature,  50 ff.;  on  reason, 
64  ff.;  on  natural  religion,  118 
Hume,  20 


x87 


i88 


John  Locke  and  English  Deism 


Laud,  6 
Lechler,  18  2. 

Legalism,  133  2.,  139  2.,  176 
Leibnitz,  22 
Leland,  177  2. 

Leo,  Pope,  X,  2 

Liberal  party,  9,  10,  n,  392.,  79,  116,  173 
Locke,  10  2.,  172.;  on  toleration,  8, 
1452.;  on  nature,  55  2.;  on  reason,  56, 
7r  2.;  proof  of  existence  of  God,  84  2.; 
on  prophecy,  112;  on  natural  religion, 
121  2.;  legalism  in  thought  of,  1352.; 
the  essay,  153 
Luther  on  persecution,  3 
Malebranche,  109 
McGi2ert,  115,  179 
Milton,  10,  144,  159 

Miracles,  as  proof  of  revelation,  94  2., 
100  2.,  106,  t74 

Miracles,  non-biblical,  96,  98,  99 
Moore,  143,  159 

Morgan,  27,  41,  61,  8g,  93,  gg,  r4g,  167  2., 
170,  173,  i8r;  on  nature,  60;  on  reason, 
77ff.;  on  revelation,  no;  on  prophecy, 
1 13;  on  natural  religion,  130;  religion 
as  morality,  139  2. 

Nature,  di2erent  meanings  of,  48;  origin 
of  concept,  50;  conceived  in  two  ways, 
62,  172  2. 

Nature,  law  of,  51  2.,  58  2. 

Natural  light,  48  2. 

Newton,  38,  go 
Noncomformity,  141 
Norris,  156 
Nye,  160,  162 

Oxford,  7,  8 11,  141,  157 

Pattison,  132 
Petrarch,  2 

Politico-economic  interests,  37 
Pomponazzi,  2 
Popery,  116 
Pridaux,  119  2.,  160 
Protestant  intolerance,  4 2.,  38,  145 
Providence,  Locke  on,  90  2.;  Deists  on, 
92  2.,  174 

Ramus,  8 

Rational  Theologians,  45  2.,  64  2.,  118  2., 
133  2.,  149,  150,  183  2. 

Reformation,  3,  5,  7,  g 
Religious  interests,  37  2. 

Restoration,  153 

Revelation  and  the  Bible,  102,  115;  de- 
fined by  Locke,  103,  175 


Right  of  private  judgment,  4,  9 
Royal  Society,  The,  6,  38,  153 

Scholasticism,  7 
Scholasticism,  Protestant,  21 
Science,  38  2. 

Scot,  160,  164,  170 
Scotists,  47 

Shaftesbury,  First  Earl  of,  146 
Shaftesbury,  Third  Earl  of,  not  a Deist 

177  2- 

Sherlock,  81,  119,  132,  156,  160,  164;  on 
nature,  52;  on  reason,  67 
Smith,  John,  69,  143 
Socinians,  22, 159 
Socrates,  75,  140 
Spinoza,  151 

Steven,  Leslie,  19  2.,  29,  156 
Stillingfleet,  18  2.,  81, 105,  m 2.,  142, 153, 
1562.,  1792.;  on  nature,  51;  on  reason, 
66;  on  natural  religion,  119;  Letter  to  a 
Deist,  107  2. 

Sydenham,  6,  10,  38,  151 

Taylor,  Jeremy,  10, 142, 160;  on  reason,  66 
Tillotson,  10,  51  2.,  81,  95,  115,  119,  159, 
160,  164,  170,  179,  182 
Temple,  8,  159 

Tindal,  27,  40,  52,  88,  90,  92,  g8  2.,  112, 
114,  154,  160  2.,  169  2.,  177,  181;  on 
nature,  59;  on  reason,  75  2.;  on  revela- 
tion, 108  2.;  on  natural  religion,  128  2.; 
on  religion  as  morality,  138  2. 

Toland,  12,  18  2.,  25.  66,  88,  92,  97,  100, 
112,  154,  1562.,  169,  175,  179;  on 
nature,  58;  on  reason,  75;  on  revela- 
tion, 108;  on  natural  relig  on  128 
Toleration,  3,  26,  37,  42;  the  liberal  party 
and,  141  2. 

Uberweg,  17,  27 
Unitarians,  20,  66,  156  2, 

Virgil,  2 
Voltaire,  20,  44 

Warburton,  66 

Whichcote,  54,  68,  120,  128,  134,  143,  159 
Windleband,  21,  23,  29 
Willis,  92,  hi,  138 

Wollaston,  40,  58,  89,  92  2.,  98,  149,  154, 
165,  169  2.,  181;  on  nature,  59  2.;  on 
reason,  76;  on  natural  religion,  130;  on 
religion  as  morality,  139  2. 

Woolston.  40,  98,  112,  115,  131,  149,  154, 

169, 175 

Worcester,  122,  133 


Zscharnack  1582. 


1993*°'  FR°M Pi 


122.2  H461R 


551592 


